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On a small, local train bound for the 
provinces 
 
My PhD in Groningen started with great anxiety. Returning to the 
Netherlands from Tokyo I anticipated moving back to my roots in Rotterdam, 
where I was to start my PhD initially, but my supervisor was offered a chair in 
Groningen and I tallied along. When boarding the train for the first-time, 
Groningen was a great unknown. I still vividly remember my increasing uneasiness 
when the train left Zwolle taking me on an hour-long journey through a very 
uneventful landscape, and a sense of foreboding dawned on me that my life in 
Groningen was going to be an isolating experience. I had just read somebody’s 
career being described as “on a small, local train bound for the provinces, i.e. going nowhere” 
and I felt like I had just embarked one. Yet, upon arriving in Groningen, I 
immediately felt enchanted by the city. Surely it was no metropolis, but its rich 
cultural life was ubiquitous. And although it is not the world’s most beautiful 
campus, Zernike quickly grew on me for I soon befriended the people in my 
department and the SOM research school. As the years progressed and I 
acquainted myself with the vibrant academic life, my initial misperceptions of the 
city and the University quickly faded to the background. 
This thesis marks the end of my endeavors during those four years in 
Groningen. At face value it is meant to read as a narrative of markets, products, 
institutions and organizations. But there is a deeper, more personal narrative; a 
narrative I told myself everyday justifying the time and energy I spent on 
completing it. In a nutshell, this narrative is based on my profound belief that 
organization lies at the basis of all social life and, therefore, studying it constituted 
a worthy cause to me.  
Yet, being a ‘big spender’, I soon ran into red digits. In fact, this thesis 




willingness to invest their personal time and energy toward supporting me along 
this journey. So in the course of pursuing my PhD I ended up running a lot of 
‘social debt’ and with any debt eventually there is ‘pay day.’ As a small token of 
appreciation and only meant as a first down payment - I would like to express my 
gratitude to everyone who so cordially helped me in my pursuit of this research. 
As such, I have very much enjoyed the time I spent at the University of 
Groningen. I am thinking of my direct colleagues within the cluster Strategy & 
Environment, but also more broadly, the Faculty of Management and 
Organization as well as the SOM research school. A special thanks goes out to 
Karin van Brummelen, Tjitske Buwalda, Truusje heb-ik-al-gedaan Cordes, Sylvia 
Luiken and Monique Wiltink. I would also like to acknowledge the indispensable 
help from Mr. Fix-it, Thijs Senseo Broekhuizen, for his relentless patience with my 
software (and other) incompetence and the rest of the 10 o’ clock troika, Arvid 
Hoffman and Jasper Hotho. Furthermore I benefited greatly from discussions with 
dear friends in academia: Jan Willem Bok, Dessi Dikova, Wilfred Dolfsma, Marco 
van Gelderen, Graciela Nowenstein, Ivan Orosa Paleo, Sophie Schweizer and 
Peter van Kampen. For initiating me into Music (and ground my often too rash 
assumptions), Michel Nightmirror Banabila proved my refuge amicale. 
Although I was invariably locked behind my PC in the WSN building, I 
managed to escape every once in a while. As such, I would like to thank the 
University of Leiden for allowing me to sit in on Japanese language courses. Also, I 
am grateful to Toshihiro Nishiguchi, Asami Onuki and Akira Takeishi for a very 
pleasurable stay in the summer of 2003 at the Institute for Innovation Research at 
Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo. Furthermore, I would like to thank the 
University of Pennsylvania, and the Wharton School in particular, for hosting my 
stay in 2005. Specifically, I would like to thank Roz Cohen, Ian MacMillan, Jitendra 
Singh and William Bielby for making this possible. I am very grateful to Paul 
DiMaggio for allowing me to attend his seminar at Princeton University. 
 viii 
I also would like to acknowledge funding from the Netherlands Scientific 
Organization (NWO), the Faculty of Management and Organization, the SOM 
Research School, and the Nicolaas Mulerius Fonds. For the provision of data and 
their willingness to meet for interviews, I would like to thank the Dutch Chamber 
of Commerce, Harold de Groot (Soundaware), Michel Admiraal, Ron Betist en 
Roland Flink (GFK Megacharts), Michiel Laan (Centrale Discotheek Rotterdam), 
Konrad Boehmer, George Knops, en Cees Vervoord (BUMA STEMRA), Paul 
Solleveld (NVPI), Henk Schell (Phononet), Basyl de Groot (3FM), Hans van 
Berkel (SENA), Quint Kik (CvdM), Steenbergen (Softmachine), Willem van 
Beusekom (NPI) and Sony Music Japan as well as MTV Japan. I have been very 
lucky with the research assistance of Arnout Schuitema, Bart Voorhuis, and Joram 
Timmerman, whose help was vital for the collection of the data used in this thesis. 
Although the usual disclaimer applies and all erring is mine, I would like to 
acknowledge the help of my co-authors. It has been great to have been able to pick 
their brains and further my insights. I am thinking of Ming Ming Chiu, who never 
failed to answer why one and one is two (although I still think it is three after 
witnessing your effect on numbers and computations) and who taught me that 
data do not always need to be accompanied by numerous boxes of aspirins. Also I 
would like to thank Charlie Carroll, whose endless appetite for tables (and all the 
data that were served on them) proved crucial for stilling the hunger triggered by 
value chain envy. Also I would like to kindly acknowledge the rigorous reviewing 
done by  the external review committee consisting of Hans Pennings, Arndt Sorge, 
and Arjen van Witteloostuijn. And then my supervisors, Nachoem and Filippo. 
Together they outfitted this slow train - that would otherwise surely have become a 
Siberian Express - with the necessary crew; one handling the coals and the other 
handling the breaks. It proved to be a very enjoyable ride with, of course, the 
occasional shrieks, hisses and letting out of steam. It seemed that, quite often, they 
would be waiting….beams down, lights flashing….but the train wasn’t coming. 
The interaction with Nachoem, much resembled what John Haldane, an English 




worthless nonsense”, Year 2: “this is an interesting, but perverse, point of view” Year 3: “this is 
true, but quite unimportant” and Year 4: “I always said so”. And everything of course 
everything had to be finished in Year 0: more coals on the fire! Filippo would slow 
me down, asking me whether my work was worth being chiseled in stone (sorry 
for letting you down with this paper version). Letting me in on his savvy and 
constantly pushing me into Exposureland, I soon realized that academia was hardly 
the romantic, insular world that it was propped to be, but it surely gained in play. 
And the debt goes on…I would like to thank Christine Huntjens and my 
brother, Stefan, for taking on the role of viva witnesses (paranimfen) by keepin’ me 
real as the end neared. You are surely the best that Ter Aar ever brought forth. 
And it is only fair that I acknowledge where it all started: at home at the dinner 
table where - as a conceited juvenile - I was often arguing feverishly, taking on the 
rest of the family against all odds. And it seemed that - when cornered and at loss 
for a better argument - I was always at the ready to become an opportunistic 
aficionado of Hegel and claiming, “Um so schlimmer für die Tatsache…[but I won’t let 
the facts destroy my theory]”. Thank you mom and dad for making me take this 
detour to prove my point; you are in my heart. And then Saskia….who has been by 
my side through many of the ups and downs of life as a starting academic: kokoro 
no naka ni. 
Although my behavior over the last four years greatly resembled atomistic 
behavior on my part, I am quick to acknowledge with John Donne that “no man is 
an island entire of itself” and I would like to thank all my friends and family for their 
love and support. 
I am very much looking forward to working with my new colleagues at the 
University of Melbourne, where I have been very hospitably welcomed into 
academic life ‘down under’. 
Melbourne, November 2005 
Joeri Mol 
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This thesis seeks to explain how economic agents formulate strategy under 
conditions of uncertainty. Uncertainty is explored by investigating how ambiguity 
regarding exchange value affects economic behavior of both producers and 
consumers. Mitigating institutions are discerned that aim to produce a consensus 
of exchange value between consumers and producers. These institutions, dubbed 
‘selectors’, are posited to crucially affect the strategy of competing firms. Patterns 
of non-random exchange are postulated to emerge when economic exchange takes 
place among consumers and specific producers that were successful in their 
strategy to co-opt the selectors. Although many of the employed concepts – 
exchange, uncertainty, value, and strategy - have been explored within the 
economic discipline, this thesis draws especially on the organizational and 
management literature to build a model for comprehending strategy under the 
condition of uncertainty regarding exchange value. 
The defining objective for the economic discipline has been to 
comprehend economic exchange. Or put more succinctly: to understand how 
demand meets supply. This endeavor culminated in the conceptualization of the 
market as a metaphor for the interaction between suppliers and their prospective 
customers. The first comprehensive inquiry into the functioning of markets was 
proffered by Adam Smith in his seminal work ‘The Wealth of Nations’ (1776), in 
which he dwelled on the implications of the pursuit of self-interest by economic 
actors in an attempt to explain why markets cleared as if guided by an ‘invisible 
hand’. Say (1803) foresaw a leading role for suppliers in the functioning of markets, 
arguing that demand was in essence a natural consequence of which goods and 
services are on offer. 
Although more nuanced models of economic exchange have emerged, the 
stark polarization between suppliers on the one hand and customers on the other 







mechanism was the pursuit of self-interest and accordingly no intervening agent 
was needed to ensure equilibrium. This implied that eventually demand would 
coincide with supply as the price-quantity combination produced by consumers 
seeking to maximize expected utility would equal that produced by suppliers 
seeking to maximize profit.  
Yet for markets to clear under these conditions would imply perfect 
foresight on both parties, an assumption against which increasing criticism was 
voiced. Among the first to acknowledge that supply and demand could be in a 
state of disequilibrium as a result of information asymmetries was Walras (1874), 
who introduced the arbitrageur as the disembodied economic agent who would 
restore the clearance of markets by acting as a go-between for the suppliers and 
their customers. Albeit in different forms, the issue of imperfect information that 
was raised by Walras would form the breeding ground for a host of critiques 
targeting mainstream economics. One of the main critiques was directed against 
the conceptualization of uncertainty. In mainstream economic modeling 
uncertainty was not regarded as an obstacle for economic exchange to materialize. 
In the classic economic model it was simply assumed to be non-existent.1 
Later models incorporated uncertainty but essentially as a stochastic entity. 
A crucial step forward was made by Knight (1921), who differentiated between 
stochastic risk and uncertainty. Whereas the former could be predicted, the latter 
was of a magnitude that could not be estimated by statistical inference.  
Extending the issue of uncertainty would eventually give rise to the 
emergence of the discipline of organization science. Early organization science 
featured debates on the relationship between uncertainty and economic exchange 
as the driver behind economic organization. One of the first important insights 
was provided by Coase (1937) who stressed that economic exchange is costly 




mechanisms that could coordinate economic exchange: the market and the 
organization. Coase revealed that the very existence of organizations is testimony 
to the fact that markets do not function as was predicted by mainstream 
economics and that organizations essentially constitute market failure. Uncertainty 
regarding economic exchange would determine which form of governance would 
be favored, an issue that was further developed in Williamson’s (1975) transaction 
cost perspective. 
Challenging the assumption of perfect information, Simon (1947) has 
shown that the way in which economic actors deal with uncertainty regarding 
economic exchange is crucial for understanding economic behavior. Stressing that 
economic agents were at best ‘boundedly rational’ when engaging in economic 
exchange, Simon paved the way for a new line of research investigating the origins 
and consequences of uncertainty that were produced by imperfect information. 
Building on Simon’s endeavors, Cyert and March (1963) showed that economic 
exchange within organizations remained problematic due to conflicting interests of 
the individuals involved. At the intra-organizational level Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) have argued that firms attempt to buffer against exchange uncertainty by 
creating organizational slack preferably at the expense of their transacting partners. 
In doing so, the environment could be ‘negotiated’ in an attempt to offset the 
uncertainty stemming from the environment. 
What became apparent from these strands of research was that under 
conditions of uncertainty economic actors were inclined to adopt different 
behavior than would have been sensible with the benefit of perfect foresight. 
Under conditions of uncertainty producers were left in the dark as to what to 
produce and consumers were left unsure about what would be the best buy. In 
order to offset the costs that would be incurred in a state of imperfect information, 
organizational scholars have stressed the importance of socialization among 







under conditions of uncertainty. In this regard it has been stressed that in the face 
of uncertainty organizations may start mimicking each other thereby giving in to 
isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).2  
Yet organizations are not the only actors in markets who may engage in 
mimicking behavior. When faced with uncertainty, consumers are likely to copy 
each other and display herding behavior as well. In fact consumers and producers 
share a significant source of uncertainty, namely the uncertainty regarding 
exchange value. It is this uncertainty that will be explored in this thesis. And it is 
this uncertainty that is posited to significantly impact strategic decisions at the firm 
level.3 
For these purposes it may be instrumental to start with a discussion of the 
work of Darby and Karni (1973). They differentiated three classes of products 
depending on the moment at which the uncertainty regarding the value contained 
by the product could be alleviated. Products of which the value could be readily 
ascertained prior to the purchase were labeled ‘search goods’; products of which 
the value became transparent only after consumption were named ‘experience 
goods’; and products of which the value would remain ambiguous even after 
consumption were called ‘credence goods’. 
Akerlof (1970) showed that when economic value was difficult to ascertain 
by buyers there was ample room for suppliers to exploit this situation. This would 
incur costs of exchange not only for the consumers but also for bonafide suppliers 
and this situation would leave the market at a suboptimal state in the long run. 
Following earlier suggestions stemming from the sociological discipline (Simmel, 
1955; Douglas, 1986) it is increasingly recognized within organization science that 
institutions are constructed to mitigate the adverse effects of uncertainty. Aldrich 
and Fiol (1994) have argued that in the formative years of an industry 




that they are perceived as proper transaction partners. Leaving aside notable 
exceptions (see for instance the anomaly uncovered by Westphal, Gulati & 
Shortell, 1997), the view that organizational legitimacy can serve to secure 
organizational survival gained currency in the extant literature. Rao (1994) has 
shown that in the early years of the automotive industries the outcome of 
competitive processes were strongly linked to competitive car races which served 
to install consumer confidence in the market for automobiles. 
An important contribution to the literature was the idea that institutions 
can be impersonated rather than being abstract entities. Hirsch (1972) discerned 
‘mediated markets’ in which particular institutional actors gave explicit accounts of 
the value contained by the product in particular markets that served to guide 
prospective customers. Zuckerman (1999) developed the idea that being perceived 
as a legitimate competitor in the eyes of these intermediaries could serve to 
enhance organizational vitality. Rao (1998) has shown how the creation of 
consumer watchdog organizations significantly influenced competitive processes. 
Failure to comply with the criteria stipulated by such institutions could jeopardize a 
firm’s longevity. Anand and Peterson (2000) have shown that an under-
representation of a particular class of products by intermediaries led to erroneous 
decisions by competing organizations, corroborating that such intermediaries not 
only served to give guidance at the consumer level on what to buy but also to 
provide benchmarks on what to produce at the firm level. 
To analyze how value is understood in competitive processes, this thesis 
will employ the conceptual framework of the selection system (Debackere, 
Clarysse, Wijnberg & Rappa, 1994; Wijnberg, 1995; Wijnberg & Gemser, 2000; 
Wijnberg, 2004; Priem, 2005). Selection systems describe competitive processes in 
terms of actors who are being selected (the selected) and actors who are doing the 
selecting (the selectors). In every industry a particular selection system can be 







then proceed to evaluate these selected products on the basis of the criteria they 
deem relevant. The selectors are in effect mitigating the uncertainty regarding the 
value of products that exist on the part of (prospective) consumers. 
While acknowledging that other forms of uncertainty can be discerned, 
this thesis asserts that it is the uncertainty regarding economic value that drives 
economic behavior. Uncertainty regarding economic value sets the parameters of 
economic exchange as it significantly impacts the way in which both suppliers as 
well as their prospective customers behave and interact. Thus for a fuller 
understanding of economic exchange an inquiry is needed, uncovering how 
economic value is determined in markets. In doing so, this thesis aims to elucidate 
how competitive processes at the industry level evolve, while fully recognizing how 
value is determined in markets. While making extensive use of the insights 
provided by the marketing discipline, consumer behavior will be considered only 
when deemed relevant for explaining competitive behavior at the industry level. As 
such, this thesis positions itself firmly within the organization science discipline.  
Special attention is paid to how firms can further their interests by 
employing strategic management. Furthering arguments put forth by the Resource 
Based View (RBV) of the firm (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986) this 
thesis aims to show firms can strategically use their portfolio of resources in order 
to gain favorable terms of exchange. Consequently, the research design of this 
thesis has been geared to uncover how firms adapt their strategic behavior in 
response to the way in which uncertainty regarding exchange value is mitigated by 
institutions with special reference to selection systems. The concept of the 
selection system is further developed in this thesis and used as a frame of reference 
to analyze competitive processes. To this end I have - in close collaboration with 
my co-authors - undertaken four independent studies that capture the essence of 




competitive advantage in the face of uncertainty regarding the exchange value. The 
first study examines how the command over resources that can mitigate the effects 
of uncertainty regarding exchange value affects the means of appropriation in 
vertical exchange relationships. The second study investigates how the legitimacy 
of an organization may be contingent upon the extent to which it persuades 
relevant stakeholders to commit their resources, thereby aligning their interests 
with those of the focal organization and consequently enjoying more favorable 
terms of exchange. The third study endeavors to uncover how firms can attempt 
to undermine the effectiveness of resources held by their rivals that can mitigate 
the effects of uncertainty regarding exchange value. The fourth study presents a 
theoretical discussion of the conditions under which resources can bestow a firm 
with a competitive advantage given that exchange value may have various degrees 
of transparency. All four studies are discussed in greater detail below where an 
overview of the thesis is provided. 
All three empirical studies are conducted within the realms of the music 
industry; the fourth study is a theoretical investigation. Although I posit that the 
results presented in this thesis have implications for industries in general, I have 
made a motivated choice to choose this particular research setting. Firstly, the 
cultural industries and the music industries in particular display a wealth of data 
that could be readily investigated for the purposes of this investigation. Vying for 
the favor of the relevant selector has been especially pronounced in the history of 
the music industry (Hirsch, 1969; Segrave, 1994). As will be elucidated at greater 
length in the chapters that follow, a firm’s competitive status gained significantly 
when being acknowledged by gatekeepers, such as the present day DJs and VJs. 
Secondly, the music industry has until recently received surprisingly little attention 
from scholars of management and organization. This is all the more peculiar 
considering the fact that it currently constitutes a multibillion dollar industry. 







economy in which the music industry features prominently, this reservation on the 
part of the academic community has become untenable. Thirdly, and not 
unimportantly, the choice for the music industry was a choice for an industry in 
which I had an intrinsic interest. I was keen and intrigued to study its multi-faceted 
(and often surprising) aspects. And although I do not have any direct personal 
involvement - and do not envy the people who join me in a karaoke session and 
are subsequently exposed to my occasional wailing - the music industry was a joy 
to study, coming close to the notion of ‘sample of convenience’. 
In meeting its objectives this thesis was structured as follows. The first 
study (Chapter 2, which I co-authored with Charlie Carroll and Nachoem 
Wijnberg) investigates the value system, which is regarded as the sum of all 
economic exchange relationships that make up an industry. This allows an analysis 
of how value is added at every stage and subsequently exchanged from industry to 
industry, finally culminating in the final product. Stressing that the notion of value 
is contentious, this study focuses on how each industry that participates in the 
creation of the final product makes an appraisal of its own contribution as well as 
the contribution of the neighboring industries with which it entertains an exchange 
relationship. Contending that not necessarily all of the value may be appropriated 
by the one who created it, the concepts of value creation, value capture, and value 
protection are employed to explain new entry and vertical integration. It is posited 
that if, at one stage of the value system, the share of value captured is 
disproportionately higher than the share of value created, ‘value chain envy’ will 
ensue. This value chain envy will result in new entry and vertical integration 
towards that desirable stage provided that the means of value protection available 
to the incumbents can be overcome. Within the popular music industries, the value 
created at the stage of music publishing has diminished steadily over the course of 




triggered value chain envy both inside and outside of the value system. In order to 
further investigate these issues a structured questionnaire was constructed and 
subsequently administered to 146 companies that were registered with the Dutch 
Chambers of Commerce. Especially in the light of the complex issues that were the 
focus of this line of research, an explicit choice was made for a survey of this 
nature. Survey methods are deemed to allow a more fine-grained investigation 
yielding data that is more detailed and insightful than by relying on secondary data 
(McGrath, 1981). The data presented in this chapter show high levels of vertical 
integration into that desirable stage originating primarily from the stages upstream 
in the value system, while the level of new entry has been comparatively low. At 
the same time, the data indicate that the recent introduction of new information 
communication technologies (ICT) have not significantly affected the levels of new 
entry and vertical integration into music publishing. 
The third chapter (which I co-authored with Ming Ming Chiu and 
Nachoem Wijnberg) investigates how various types of legitimacy affect the 
performance of 215 new entries, stemming from 131 firms active in the Dutch 
music industries. The basic tenet of this paper is that the performance of 
organizations is to a large extent determined by the legitimacy it enjoys in the eyes 
of the internal and external constituencies. As such, legitimacy is viewed to mitigate 
the uncertainty on the part of the relevant stakeholders by instilling a certain level 
of confidence that the new venture is legitimate, proper and appropriate. Arguing 
that at the outset of a new venture the entrepreneur lacks a track record to 
showcase legitimacy of its actions, other markers of legitimacy are used instead. 
Therefore we posit that previously assumed entrepreneurial roles and 
entrepreneurial objectives are important for signaling the new venture’s legitimacy 
in its formative years. Logit/Probit/Gompit regressions, path analyses and 
structural equation modeling of structured questionnaire data indicate that 







entrepreneurial roles and entrepreneurial objectives. The findings give rise to 
notion that upon new entry, not an organization’s actions but its past (roles 
assumed by the entrepreneur) as well as its future (entrepreneurial objectives) 
function as adequate markers for legitimacy. 
Building on a well-documented case in the history of the music industry, 
the fourth chapter (which I co-authored with Nachoem Wijnberg) discusses how 
the selection system can be used to describe the interaction between firms that are 
in competition and actors that are in the position to affect this competitive process 
by asserting the value of rival products. As explained before, the latter are called 
the ‘selectors’ and the first are the ‘selected’ in a particular selection system. For a 
comprehensive understanding of how the value of competing products is 
determined, it is important to realize that selectors themselves can compete with 
each other. This allows for the possibility of mutually beneficial alliances between 
particular groups of firms and particular groups of selectors to be forged aimed at 
influencing the respective competitive processes that both are involved in. If such 
alliances occur it can be a sensible strategy to make an attempt to undermine the 
influence of the selectors allied with one's competitors. The main purpose of the 
chapter is to better understand the strategic option of actively engaging in the 
competitive process between selectors. Attention will be paid to the relationships 
between the viability of this particular strategic option, the competitive positions of 
the actors pursuing it and the ways in which the perception of such involvement 
affects the value of the goods and services in question. In this chapter authenticity 
is operationalized as a product-characteristic, which varies in importance from 
product to product. Authenticity as a product characteristic is deemed to be 
especially important in the cultural industries, because the consumption of a 
cultural product often serves to establish or maintain the social-psychological 




evaluated by the relevant selectors, who determine the value of products in 
competitive processes. One outstanding feature of authenticity as a product-
characteristic is that, in order to determine authenticity, the selectors themselves 
have to be acknowledged as authentic as well. The empirical part of this chapter 
shows how in the 1950s the smaller independent record companies were relatively 
successful by allying themselves with the DJs of local radio stations, who proved to 
be the dominant selectors of the period. This heralded a slump in sales for the 
major record companies. The major record companies managed to re-establish 
their competitive advantage by discrediting the authenticity of these DJs, as 
selectors of music, by publicly linking these DJs to commercial bribery by means 
of the congressional hearings. 
The fifth chapter (which I co-authored with Nachoem Wijnberg) presents 
a theoretical discussion of the Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm building on 
the increasingly voiced criticism that it does not adequately address the relationship 
between resources and value. This chapter proposes a trichotomy of criteria – ‘ante 
rem’, ‘in re’, and ‘post rem’ - that allows resources to be evaluated on their 
functional role in competitive processes. This approach has important implications 
for the extent of specialization among competing firms, the bundling and 
unbundling of resources and the boundaries of the firm. 
In summary, this thesis sports a collection of essays exploring how 
uncertainty regarding value affects how economic exchange materializes. 
Acknowledging the importance of economic institutions that mitigate the 
uncertainty regarding value, this thesis posits that economic exchange typically 
occurs in a non-random fashion, thereby challenging the mainstream economic 
premise that exchange takes place among mutually anonymous actors. Recognizing 
that the demand side has a pronounced preference for products whose value is 







strategic behavior vis-à-vis these institutions in order to favorably influence the 





2 Value Chain Envy: Explaining New 





This paper aims to investigate the origins and the consequences of profit 
differentials among stages within a single value system (Porter, 1985). By applying 
the concepts of value creation, value capture and value protection (Foss, 2003) 
(Foss & Foss, 2002) to the vertical setting of a value system, the occurrence and 
viability of vertical integration and new entry are explained. 
So far, the origins of profit differentials have been investigated within two 
streams of literature. The strategic management literature endeavors to explain 
profit differentials among firms, while the industrial organization literature 
attempts to explain those differentials among industries. Within the strategic 
management literature, profit differentials among firms have been linked to the 
ownership of particular resources (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986; Montgomery & 
Wernerfelt, 1988; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Conner, 1991; Peteraf, 1993), and 
capabilities (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Teece, Pisano & 
Shuen, 1997) that bestow a firm with the ability to create and sustain a competitive 
advantage vis-à-vis its rivals. The industrial organization literature, on the other 
hand, links profit differentials among industries to the existence of barriers to entry 
(Bain, 1956) or mobility (Caves & Porter, 1977) that enable incumbent firms in 








While both approaches serve to better understand the origins of profit 
differentials, they have thus far largely neglected the vertical dimension of the value 
system in which a particular industry is embedded. In contrast, the present paper 
emphasizes the vertical dimension, considering horizontal competition in the 
context of vertical relations. We use insights from both theoretical approaches 
mentioned above, as well as the conceptual framework of the selection system 
(Wijnberg, 1995; Wijnberg & Gemser, 2000). Selection systems seem a particularly 
useful tool for analysis as they provide a shorthand description of how value is 
created in competitive processes. The basic premise is that rival firms compete to 
create value for the final customers and in doing so hope to become chosen by the 
relevant selectors. As such, the selectors can greatly influence the outcome of 
competitive processes. 
The central proposition advanced in this paper is that the desirability of 
being located at a particular stage of the value system is determined by the ratio 
between captured and created value at that particular stage. Firms at each stage 
create a share of the value of the final product. At the same time, these firms are 
able to capture a share of the exchange value (i.e., the price that has been paid for 
the final product). If firms at a given stage tend to capture more value than they 
create (i.e., the ratio between captured and created value is greater than 1 for that 
stage), then actors in other stages of the value system could experience value chain 
envy and hence be motivated to vertically integrate into that desirable stage. Actors 
outside of the value system can also experience value chain envy; this will trigger 
new entry into the value system. The feasibility of both these strategic responses, 
however, depends on how well value is protected at the desirable stage.  
This approach looks at vertical integration and new entry as essentially 
equivalent phenomena: the initiation of a new business activity, be it from within 




accompanying previous endeavors. One contribution of this approach is that 
vertical integration is not viewed from a single-firm perspective, as is standard 
practice especially within transaction costs economics, but from the perspective of 
the overall value system. A single-firm perspective on vertical integration becomes 
problematic as it assumes a ceteris paribus clause to hold for the remainder of the 
value system, thereby disregarding the fact that competing firms at other stages 
might be just as keen to realize similar goals. This could potentially thwart a given 
firm's attempts at vertical integration. This ceteris paribus clause is implicitly 
incorporated, whether looking at vertical integration as a response to uncertainty 
(Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), communication costs (Casson & 
Wadeson, 1998; Wadeson, 1999), or hold-up problems (Klein, Crawford & 
Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1985). 
A second contribution pertains to the literature on new entry, as it rarely 
investigated how barriers to entry differed between the various stages of value 
system of which an industry forms a part. As such, the approach presented here 
might provide a more encompassing theory of both the origins and consequences 
of profit differentials within value systems, thereby complementing the existing 
explanations of vertical integration and new entry (Winter, 1984). 
 
2.2 Theory 
2.2.1 Value Creation, Protection & Capture 
Within the strategic management literature, the concept of value plays a 
pivotal role in the study of a sustainable competitive advantage. To explain profit 
differentials between firms one needs to take into account not only the creation of 
value but also the available means of appropriating this value in a competitive 
context (Zajac & Olsen, 1993). In this regard the distinction made by Bowman and 







value creation as the contribution to the utility of the final good to end users and 
value capture as the difference between revenue and cost retained by the firm. For 
the purposes of the present paper, however, revenue should be understood as the 
price paid by the buyer downstream, while cost is equated to the price paid to 
suppliers upstream. Foss (2003) noted that in addition to creating and capturing 
value, firms also deploy resources to protect themselves against the threat of 
competitive imitation (value protection). 
The distinction between the creation, capture and the protection of value 
seems useful for a closer examination of vertical relationships that exist within the 
value system. Firms are generally regarded to compete with firms occupying the 
same stage(s) in the value system, and success in this dimension is a prerequisite 
for profit. However, as actual transactions take place with firms upstream and 
firms downstream in the value system, it is this vertical dimension along which a 
firm’s profits are actually generated. Thus, firms can be considered as being 
engaged in competition along two axes: horizontally, by preventing competitive 
imitation of this value creating activity through value protection; and vertically, by 
realizing profits from this value creating activity through value capture. 
In the literature, value creation is usually not treated as a contentious issue. 
Standard textbooks equate the value of a product with the economic value to 
consumers, defining how much a consumer is willing to pay for the final product 
(Kotler, 2000). Yet how much a consumer is willing to pay is not exogenous to the 
competitive processes that firms are involved in, but can be said to be determined 
by the set of relevant selectors (Wijnberg & Gemser, 2000). In any given industry, 
a particular selection system can be discerned describing how the selected (rival) 
firms are competing with each other to satisfy the preferences that have been set 
for a particular product by the relevant selectors. In a market selection system, the 




possible (Wijnberg & Gemser, 2000). The producers (rather than consumers) 
function as selectors in a peer selection system. In an expert selection system, a third party 
(neither the consumer nor the producer) is given the task of assessing value using 
specialized knowledge and/or distinctive abilities. An example of expert selection 
would be physicians prescribing a particular pharmaceutical product to their 
patient. The physicians are neither the consumers nor the producers of the 
medicine, yet they are the relevant selectors because they determine the use value 
of the product. Hence, pharmaceutical firms are vying to win the favor of these 
selectors.  
Within a vertical setting, it can be said that the value system is basically a 
series of vertically aligned (sub)markets, each with its respective set of selectors. 
The ones judging the final product are the perhaps the dominant set of selectors 
within the value system. The selectors in the (sub)markets upstream attribute value 
to resources partially based on the anticipated contribution that they will make to 
the overall value of the final product. However, selectors at each stage might 
additionally have unique sets of criteria for assessing created value, and they might 
try to influence the selectors that determine the value of the final product. As will 
become obvious from the discussion of the music industries, particular selectors 
play a crucial role in determining the value of the final product of the value system 
of the music industries and hence a crucial role in determining the outcome of the 
dynamics of the value system. 
 Protecting value is mainly a horizontal activity as it is concerned with 
preventing competitive imitation of (potential) competitors. Horizontal 
competition takes place among firms with similar value chains and operating 
within the same stage(s) of the value system. As has been emphasized by both the 
advocates of the resource based view (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986; 
Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Conner, 1991; Peteraf, 







Winter, 1982; Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997; 
Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Conner, 1991; Peteraf, 
1993), firms can only maintain superior performance by warding off competitive 
imitation (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997; Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). Several 
means of value protection have been discussed in the literature that have proven to 
be effective to prevent competitive imitation. They can either be formal, taking the 
shape of institutionalized monopolies such as patents (Mansfield, Schwartz & 
Wagner, 1981; Levin, Klevorick, Nelson & Winter, 1987; Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, 
2000) and copyrights (Towse, 2000) or be non-formal, such as causal ambiguity 
(Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Reed & DeFillippi, 1990), isolating mechanisms 
(Rumelt, 1984), the threat of loss of reputational capital (Gemser & Wijnberg, 
2001) or economies of scale (Levy, 1985; Mankiw & Whinston, 1986). 
Capturing value - like creating value - is mainly associated with the vertical 
dimension of the value system. It depends on the bargaining power vis-à-vis 
neighboring stages: buyers downstream and suppliers upstream (Priem, 2001). The 
amount of value being captured at the respective stages of the value system is the 
outcome of the competitive processes taking place among firms with dissimilar 
value chains located at different stages of the value system. Therefore profits are 
ultimately made vertically and not horizontally, as the product passes through the 
sequence of supplier-buyer relationships that make up the value system.  
Teece (1986) was among the first to present a more integral approach to 
the relationship between creation, capture and protection of value within a vertical 
setting, albeit implicitly. He described how inventors, although being the owners of 
patents, were unable to market their products successfully because the competition 
controlled the complementary assets in the areas of marketing and distribution that 
were required to commercialize the product. The full exploitation of the invention 




complementary assets further downstream. Teece notes, however, that patents as a 
means of protection may only ward off competitive imitation for a limited period 
of time, as the competition can eventually innovate their way around the original 
invention. One way to resolve this problem quickly is through the acquisition of a 
firm that holds those complementary assets. However, acquisition is not always a 
realistic option - especially for small and medium-sized companies (SMEs). It 
might be more feasible to form alliances with (rather than taking ownership of) 
firms holding the complementary assets (Shane, 2001). As will be discussed further 
on, seeking alliances has been the strategy of choice for the suppliers of creative 
inputs in the music industries. 
2.2.2 Value Chain Envy 
Teece’s (1986) conceptualization of complementary assets provides some 
useful insights for analyzing the vertical relationships among firms. However, its 
application within the current context remains problematic. Firstly, the 
complementary assets as used in Teece’s analysis are defined in an ambiguous 
fashion and seem to be employed alternately to describe value creation, protection, 
and capture. Initially, Teece (1986, 1992) defines complementary assets as 
marketing and distribution channels, which basically refer to value creating 
activities at stages further downstream. Further on, however, Teece (1986: 290) 
used complementary assets as if they were means of value protection, providing 
barriers to imitation by (potential) rivals of the innovator. In the same 1986 paper 
(see, for instance, p.295, p.299), the concept of complementary assets is employed 
to denote value capture when he concludes that the initial inventors may not be 
able to enjoy the returns of an invention if they lack the necessary complementary 
assets. Secondly, although Teece did discuss value creation, protection and capture 
in a vertical context, the focus of his analysis remained on the horizontal 







within the value system). When the complementary assets in other stages are 
relevant, then Teece holds the focus on the (horizontal) competitive battle and 
argues that that battle will be won by the firm that is the first to lay its hands on 
those complementary assets. Moreover, Teece also takes a single firm perspective 
that does not take into account the perspectives of the firms elsewhere in the value 
system. A niche associated with a valuable complementary resource might attract 
the interest of firms from both ends of the value system. Battles among a set of 
rivals upstream might run headlong into the battles raging among a separate set of 
rivals downstream as players both above and below the attractive niche struggle to 
enact conflicting views of the structure of the value system.  
In contrast to Teece’s approach, the struggle to capture value is portrayed 
in this paper as a constant ‘tug-of-war’ among vertically related actors within the 
value system. Just as industries differ with respect to the availability of the means 
to capture value (Cockburn & Griliches, 1988), the various individual stages in the 
value system can, and usually will, differ with respect to the availability and efficacy 
of the means to capture value. Figure 1 illustrates value creation and value capture 
at the different stages of a hypothetical value system involving ‘Product X’. There 
are four stages in this hypothetical value system: the suppliers of primary input, the 
producers, the distributors, and the retailers.  
Value creation in this context relates to the distinct value creating activities 
as the product passes through the different stages at which value is added, 
eventually accumulating into the value held by the final product, as perceived by 
the final set of selectors. As such, each stage will contribute - in the eyes of the 
final selectors - a particular percentage of the created value contained by the final 
product. Graphically, in Figure 1 the length of the gray bar represents the share of 
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Capturing value from ‘Product X’ depends on the relative bargaining 
power a firm enjoys vis-à-vis firms at neighboring stages: the buyers downstream 
and the suppliers upstream. As such, capturing value is the outcome of the 
competitive processes taking place among firms with dissimilar value chains. As 
mentioned earlier, profits are ultimately made vertically, not horizontally, as the 
product passes through the sequence of supplier-buyer relationships that make up 
the value system. Again, the amount of value capture in the value system as a 
whole is expected to equal to the final exchange value (the price paid for the final 
product). The black bars representing the percentage of that total value that is 
captured within each stage. 
The value system can be considered to be in equilibrium when at all stages 
the ratio capture/creation = 1. However, as firms strive for a maximization of their 







share of value capture, they create a ‘tug of war’ among the different stages within 
the value system. Once firms residing at particular stages of the value system, such 
as the retailers of ‘Product X’ in our hypothetical example, are able to skew the 
proportion between value captured and value created at their stage in their favor, 
the value system will be out of equilibrium. This disequilibrium could in turn give 
rise to value chain envy. That is, actors in other stages might envy and/or resent 
those who are able to capture a disproportionately large share of the exchange 
value relative to the share of the use value that they create.  
The potential new entrants (actors currently outside of the value system) 
presumably would also show a preference for stages in which the share of value 
that can be captured is greater than the share of value that must be created. 
However, the overall desirability and feasibility of both vertical integration and new 
entry will be greatly influenced by the means of value protection employed by the 
incumbents of those stages. Notably, value protection only becomes relevant after 
the relationship between value creation and value capture has resulted in making a 
stage desirable. The availability of strong means of value protection per se says 
little about the attractiveness of a stage. 
 
Proposition 1: If, at one or more stages of the value system, the share of value 
captured is disproportionately higher than the share of value created, then the frequency of new 
entry and vertical integration into these stages will be high relative to the other stages, provided 
that the means of value protection available to the incumbents can be overcome. 
 
As explained above, the value system is said to be out of equilibrium when 
one or more stages have a ratio of value capture to value creation that is greater 
than 1. However, a value system that is out of equilibrium will always contain one 




than 1. These stages are inhabited by actors who are losing the ‘tug-of-war’; some 
of the value that they have created is captured elsewhere in the value system. In 
Figure 1, the distributors represent such a stage. Presumably, value chain envy is 
strongest among the actors at this stage since they are not able to recoup the value 
they have created. Consequently, the actors at this stage would have the greatest 
propensity to vertically integrate. Of course, the means of value protection at the 
more desirable stages would influence both the number and the success rate of 
those vertical integration attempts. In Figure 1, the distributors might want to act 
on their value chain envy by vertically integrating into retailing. This leads to the 
second proposition.  
 
Proposition 2: The actors in stages at which the share of value captured is lower than 
the share of value created will have the greatest propensity to vertically integrate into other stages 
provided they can overcome the relevant means of value protection. 
 
Note that if firms residing at a certain stage are systematically unable to 
capture the share of value that is equivalent to the share they create in the eyes of 
final selectors, it does not necessarily imply loss making – even in the long run. A 
price that is less than just, in terms of the ratio between value capture and value 
creation, can still very well be above break-even. Therefore, the distributors of 
product X may very well be profitable. The reverse can also hold: capturing more 
value than is created at a particular stage is not a guarantee to make profit, it only 
allows a firm a greater potential, compared to firms at less advantageous stages, of 
making a profit. At the same time, it certainly is true that some firms at every stage 









2.3 The Recorded Music Industries 
 
While these propositions are applicable to any value system, the music 
industries provide a particularly attractive setting for studying value creation and 
appropriation. Crossland and Smith (2002) have analyzed how value is created in 
the fine arts industry. Miller and Shamsie (1996) have investigated how value is 
captured in the movie industry. Gemser and Wijnberg (2001) have looked at issues 
of value protection in the design industry. Although the literature on the music 
industries is voluminous, and both value capture and value protection have 
received much scholarly attention (Towse, 2000),(Caves, 2000) no systematic 
analysis has been undertaken to study the implications of the relationships between 
value creation, value capture and value protection for the dynamics of the value 
system as a whole. 
To fully understand the dynamics of this value system, an historical 
perspective is necessary. Notably, two waves of technical innovations induced 
Schumpeterian shocks that fundamentally changed the way business was done in 
the value system: the advent of analog recordings and the subsequent advent of 
digital recordings. These innovations therefore provide meaningful transition 
points, separating three distinct historical phases in the evolution of this value 
system. 
2.3.1 Phase 1: Prior to Recorded Music 
Prior to the advent of recorded music, popular melodies were purchased 
in the form of published sheet music so that they could be reproduced in other 
theaters or at home (Caves, 2000). During this era, composers were typically 
contracted by music publishers, who took on the activities of printing and 




publishers endeavored to make the composition a commercial success through 
marketing activities. The most effective way to do so was by convincing popular 
singers or bandleaders to play their songs, because the average consumer would 
follow their lead. In effect, popular singers and bandleaders functioned as the 
relevant selectors, determining the value of a particular song (Segrave, 1994). As 
such, the value system in this area basically consisted of five distinct value-creating 
activities: composing, writing lyrics, performing, music publishing, and retailing. 
The main form of value protection for music publishers was based on 
economies of scale. These had proven to be an effective means of warding off 
competitive imitation since as early as the 18th century (Scherer, 2001). As a 
consequence, composers could generally not invade the stage of music publishing. 
Although copyright was already installed as a legal institution and consequently 
provided ample value protection to the composer, it did little in terms of capturing 
value. Rather than risking a song to be left idle, the composers generally traded 
part of their entitled copyright royalties in order to get a song published (Caves, 
2000). Thus rather than protecting the interests of the composers and the lyricists, 
copyright proved to be a useful tool for music publishers to prevent competitive 
imitation by their rivals (Segrave, 1994).  
With respect to value capture, most composers were receiving a meager 
salary. The plight of lyricists in those days was even worse, as they were hardly 
remunerated for their efforts (Segrave, 1994). The publishers, because of their 
relationships with the relevant selectors, were the ones who could make a song 
successful and also the ones who captured most of the financial rewards. When the 
music publishers were not ‘adequately’ rewarded, the chances of a song becoming 
a hit single were greatly diminished (Caves, 2000). Even when the composers and 
the lyricists came to enjoy more economic independence during the 1920s and 
1930s, music publishers still retained substantial bargaining power. The revenue 







composer/lyricist. This 50-50 split regarding value capture became institutionalized 
as this essentially fixed division of royalties was enforced by newly founded 
organizations such as ASCAP (American Society of Composers, Authors, and 
Publishers) (Caves, 2000).  
2.3.2 Phase 2a: Recorded Music 
The arrival of analog recording technology significantly changed the way 
in which music was produced and consumed. It created a market for recorded 
music that partly replaced the conventional demand for sheet music and live 
performances. Moreover, manufacturing multiple copies of a sound recording 
required additional value creating activities: the recording and reproduction of 
sound. Existing value-creating activities were greatly affected as well; the methods 
of publishing, distribution, marketing, and retailing had to be substantially revised 
to meet the demands of the market for sound recordings.  
 
 













The value system that emerged is depicted in Figure 2. Each stage denotes 
a particular value creating activity. Composers create the musical work and the 
lyricists write the text. The performing artists play the music ‘live’ in concert or in a 
recording studio. The music publishers publish sheet music and are responsible for 
the collection and administration of royalties derived from the musical work. The 
record companies are responsible for the sound recording, reproduction, and 
distribution of the musical work in the form of records, compact discs, etc. Finally 
the retailing sector sells the sheet music or sound recording to the final consumer5. 
A development that ran parallel to the introduction of recording 
technology was the emergence of a broadcasting system. After initial skepticism, 
the record companies embraced radio as the preferred outlet for their marketing 
endeavors (Caves, 2000). Consequently, the popular bandleaders were largely 
replaced by radio DJs (and later VJs) as the relevant selectors, determining the 
value of the final product. Getting a song on the air proved vital for realizing 
record sales, and accordingly the record companies competed for the favor of the 
DJ (Peterson & Berger, 1975). 
In terms of value protection, the major record companies enjoyed vast 
economies of scale in the areas of recording, reproduction, and distribution 
(Burnett, 1996; Kretschmer, Klimis & Choi, 1999; Caves, 2000). This limited the 
number of players that could effectively carry out these activities (Burke, 1997). 
While the so-called independent record companies did exist, they found it 
necessary to form strategic alliances with major record companies in order to 
release a song internationally (Lopes, 1992). These alliances provided the majors 
with short-term financial benefits. Perhaps more importantly, the alliances allowed 
the majors to monitor the innovative behavior of the independent record 
companies (Hesmondhalgh, 1996) and consequently make better-informed 







The economies of scale in recording, reproduction, and distribution also 
enabled the majors to successfully enter publishing. Since the artists depended on 
the record companies for these scale advantages to make their copyright 
economically valuable, they had to accept deals that allowed the record companies 
to exploit the artists’ copyrights. Ironically, copyrights became a means of value 
protection at a different stage of the value system than was originally intended 
(Kretschmer, Klimis & Wallis, 1999). 
In terms of value capture, it became indispensable to have closely knit 
relationships with the broadcasters--the relevant selectors in the era of recorded 
music. Since thousands of new songs are released every week, DJs were not able to 
personally evaluate each and every one when developing their weekly play lists 
(Vogel, 1998). Hence, DJs generally created a shortlist based on the ‘advice’ of the 
record companies. The record companies would plug certain songs to get them 
played and if this ‘advice’ was accompanied by monetary (or other) incentives, the 
chance of getting a song on the air was greatly enhanced (Peterson & Berger, 
1975). The major record companies used their strong relationships with the 
broadcasting industry to skew the distribution of profits in their favor (Peterson & 
Berger, 1975; Peterson & Berger, 1996; Rothenbuhler & Dimmick, 1982; Burnett, 
1992; Alexander, 1996; Burnett, 1996). This was a good investment for the record 
companies since airtime generally had a positive influence on sales.  
The major recording companies could influence the relevant selectors in 
the broadcast industry and they also used economies of scale to limit the number 
of rivals at that stage. This control of the downstream end of the value system gave 
the majors enormous bargaining power vis-à-vis the creative talent upstream in the 
value system. Vogel (1998) referred to this as a ‘dealmaker's delight’. If composers 
and musicians wanted to get their music heard, they had to go through the record 




the early stages of their careers, preventing them or rival record companies from 
capturing the rewards of stardom if the musicians eventually became commercially 
successful (Kretschmer, Klimis & Choi, 1999; Cameron & Collins, 1997). 
2.3.3 Phase 2b: Music-Publishing and Value Chain Envy 
Although music publishers traditionally made a considerable contribution 
to the success of a song, their role has greatly diminished after the introduction of 
recording technologies in the 1960s. Since that time, the functions of marketing 
and promotion have shifted from the publishers to the record companies (Negus, 
1992). The publisher’s role was further diminished by the cultural changes 
associated with rock music. Music publishers had traditionally provided performers 
with a musical repertoire developed by contracted composers (Caves, 2000). 
However, the reputation of rock stars increasingly became based on their ability to 
voice their own feelings and beliefs (Frith, 1996). This led to the prevalence of the 
singer-songwriter; performers became self-sufficient in this regard by composing 
their own material. This trend towards vertical integration in the artistic end of the 
value system caused further complications for music publishers. Singer-songwriters 
also were less willing to let publishers sell their songs to other performers because 
those performers were rivals for the singer as well as being customers of the 
songwriter (Caves, 2000). Music publishers increasingly functioned as brokers 
between the musicians and the recording companies instead of between the 
composers and the performers (see Figure 2). Eventually, the role of music 
publishers was reduced to just the administration and collection of copyright 
royalties (Caves, 2000). 
Yet another impact of recording technology was that musical composition 
shifted from creating a melody to creating a ‘sound’ (Frith, 1996). An effective 
reproduction came to depend on a variety of new creative capabilities, such as: 







Becker, 1982). Consequently, sales of sheet music declined, as sheet music was no 
longer sufficient for reproducing a song. To make matters worse, it was no longer 
even necessary to create the sheet music. In 1976, a new copyright act was passed 
in the United States no longer requiring a song to be fixed in sheet music; a song’s 
sound recording became sufficient to create copyright protection (Caves, 2000).  
Notably, while the share of value creation from music publishers 
dramatically declined, their share of value capture remained at the level that was 
institutionalized by rights clearance organizations such as ASCAP in the 1920s: 50 
percent of the composer's royalty income (Vogel, 1998; Butler, 2000; Caves, 2000). 
Moreover, as the recorded music industries became increasingly reliant on the 
exploitation of music not as a commodity but as a right (Frith, 1987), the 
intellectual property rights connected to music publishing became increasingly 
lucrative, generating over 3 billion US$ worldwide in 1990 (Burnett, 1996). 
Copyright as a means of value protection has been extended well beyond its 
original use of preventing sheet music to be copied. Whenever a song is played on 
the radio, included in a movie or documentary, or reproduced as a record, the 
music publisher derives royalty income from the copyrights. Thus, the stage of 
music publishing has become an obvious target for value chain envy in the value 
system: its institutionalized share of value captured is disproportionately high 
relative to its contemporary share of value creation.  
Yet, as publishing rights entitled the publisher to a percentage income 
from the royalties of a song, little income was generated where sales volumes were 
small. Scale was still essential for profitability. This meant that scale also remained 
as a means of value protection. However, it was difficult to achieve scale 
advantages solely in publishing. Economies of scope became increasingly relevant, 
and publishing increasingly became linked with other stages in the value system in 





2.3.4 Phase 2c: Vertical Integration and New Entry in Music Publishing 
 
As a consequence of the increased desirability of music publishing, other 
actors in the value system were tempted to vertically integrate into this stage. In 
particular, the major record companies stepped up their acquisition of successful 
publishing houses (Huygens, 1999). These majors could do so because they could 
achieve the economies of scale, especially in reproduction and distribution, which 
were necessary in music publishing. Backward integration by the major recording 
companies into the music-publishing sector has been remarkable over the last 15 
years: Sony-CBS bought Blackrock (1987), Big Tree International (1989), and 
Conway Twitty (1990)6; BMG-RCA purchased Doubleday (1986), Dell (1986), and 
Lodge Hall/Milsap (1989); EMI took control over SBK Entertainment (1989), 
Combine Music (1989), and Filmtrax (1990); MCA obtained Mayday Mediarts 
Music (1989); PolyGram acquired Musiplex (1987), Lawrence Welk Music Group 
(1988), and Sweden Music AB/Polar Music (1989), Warner Incorporated Chappell 
Music Group (1987) and Mighty Tree Music Group (1990). As a result of all this 
M&A activity, the music-publishing departments of the major record companies 
could offer recording artists a comprehensive contract that included all rights 
relating to a musical work (Wallis & Malm, 1984). 
The exploitation of a new business activity in the music-publishing sector 
seemed to be within reach of the entrepreneurial musician as well; the financial 
endowments needed for operating as a music publisher were small (Burnett, 1996). 
However, it was unappealing for musicians to start their own music-publishing 
company, because the economies of scale in the areas of reproduction and 
distribution were essential for a song to become commercially successful (Burnett, 







record companies were now operating their own music-publishing departments, 
their bargaining position vis-à-vis the musicians was even stronger. As a 
consequence the musicians were left with little incentive to integrate into music 
publishing as vertical integration would not yield extra means to capture value: the 
potential gain in value capture would be appropriated by the major record 
companies in the course of negotiating the record contracts because they 
controlled crucial assets further downstream. The only musicians that could 
effectively start their own music-publishing company were the established artists 
(Sanjek & Sanjek, 1991; Negus, 1992). Because of their popularity, musicians like 
George Michael and Prince enjoyed a leveraged bargaining position with regard to 
the relevant selectors (the broadcasting industry) and could consequently free 
themselves from the dependence on the major record companies (Kretschmer, 
Klimis & Choi, 1999). In terms of value capture, their popularity gave them 
leverage comparable to that of the major record companies (Bradlow & Fader, 
2001), and instead of the usual 50/50 split they could command a 20/80 division 
(Vogel, 1998) or even a 15/85 division (Negus, 1992) in their favor. The increase 
in bargaining power of these musicians left some independent music publishers 
with a very small margin indeed, as the operating costs could amount to as much 
as 12 percent (Vogel, 1998). Consequently, independent publishing firms were 
forced to take a more entrepreneurial posture by contracting less successful 
composers. Although this strategy had the potential to generate higher premiums, 
these publishing firms also had to face increased risks, as most of the contracted 
composers would never attain breakeven sales, let alone commercial success. 
Further, if successful, these independent firms became the M&A target for the 
major record companies. Since the likelihood of commercial success was small, 
vertical integration by entrepreneurial musicians as well as new entry by 




2.3.5 Phase 3: Digitized Music 
The digitization of the music industry started in the early 1980s when Sony 
and Philips teamed up to commercialize the compact disc. After overcoming their 
initial skepticism, the recording firms became convinced that the 
commercialization of the compact disc could be a potential goldmine (Nathan, 
1999). However, the introduction of digitalization in several key technologies 
(MP3, home recording technologies, and the Internet) undermined the advantages 
that could be derived from the economies of scale in the areas of recording, 
reproduction, and distribution. These were the areas in which the major record 
companies had traditionally possessed a competitive advantage.  
Traditionally, when artists were contracted by one of the majors, they were 
placed in the hands of producers and arrangers who ‘guided’ these artists. Often 
the label’s commercial objectives clashed with the artist’s sense of creative 
freedom. If that didn't make the artists mad enough, the labels’ producers and 
arrangers subsequently claimed a percentage of the royalties as compensation for 
their input.  
By the mid-1990s, personal computers became powerful enough to record 
music in a digital format. At the same time, digital recording software was 
developed, enabling musicians to move up from making poor quality tape 
recordings to making high quality digital recordings. This technology significantly 
reduced recording costs. Having access to sequencing and audio recording 
software at home also enabled musicians and composers to exert greater artistic 
control over their work. They could ‘master’ a composition without the 
interference of a major label. A major label was no longer necessary for product 
development.  
The introduction of the MP3 format also had a dramatic effect on the 
value system. The MP3 format was invented in 1989 by the German Fraunhofer 







data storage and data transmission by compressing the original recording to 5-10% 
of its original size. MP3 technology therefore played a pivotal role in driving down 
the costs of the reproduction and the distribution of a musical work. In 
combination with the opportunities offered by the Internet, MP3 technology laid 
the foundation for the success of peer-to-peer file sharing networks such as 
Napster (Alexander, 2002). Albeit largely an illegal activity, consumers could now 
perform the value creating activities of reproduction and distribution themselves 
(Alexander, 2002). As a result, the subjective use-value that the end-consumer 
placed on music reproduced and distributed by others (e.g. the record companies) 
dropped dramatically (Gallaway & Kinnear, 2001).  
This turn of events indicated that the efficacy of economies of scale and 
copyright as means of value protection had been drastically reduced. Hence other 
agents inside and outside of the value system were now able to engage in 
competitive imitation in stages that they previously could not enter. This had three 
far-reaching implications for the competitive environment, especially with regard 
to the stages of recording, reproduction, and distribution. Firstly, the marginal 
costs involved in the reproduction and distribution of a musical work have been 
greatly reduced because of ICT (Shapiro & Varian, 1999). As a consequence the 
economies of scale that the major record companies have enjoyed in these fields 
may be strongly diminishing, as some authors have argued (Dolfsma, 2000). Shirky 
(2001: 144) argues “[d]igital reproduction pushes those economics to the breaking point.” In 
this sense ICT proved to be the enabling technology for Napster and other file-
sharing networks to become a success. Secondly, the (sunk) costs of recording a 
musical work have declined substantially by using digital recording technology 
(Leyshon, 2001). This sprouted the widely observed phenomenon of home 
recordings by the artists themselves. Thirdly, copyright as a means to ward off 




yet to produce a viable response to ensure that copyrighted material cannot be 
illegally published, broadcast, rewritten, reproduced, or redistributed. As a 
consequence, illegal competitive imitation has been rampant at many stages of the 
value system; be it the composers using illegitimate samples taken from their peers, 
Internet radios broadcasting songs without offering the usual remuneration, or the 
consumers engaging in illegal downloads via peer-to-peer networks.  
Given the fall of these protective barriers and the perception that the 
share of value captured is disproportionately high compared to the share of value 
created in music publishing, an increase in new entry and vertical integration into 
music publishing is expected. Applying proposition 1 to the particular 
circumstances of the music industries gives us Hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Given that the share of value capture is disproportionately high given 
the share of value creation in music publishing and that the means of value protection can be 
overcome using information communication technologies, new entry and vertical integration into 
this stage should occur frequently relative to other stages.  
 
The creative artists in the upstream stages of the value system (composers, 
lyricists and performers) often perceive the record company's influence on 
(commercialization of) their work as reducing (rather than adding to) the subjective 
use-value of end product. This resentment on the part of artists regarding value 
creation is accompanied by their resentment regarding value-capture: the record 
company claims a large portion of the royalties as compensation for what artists 
might perceive as unwanted, value-destroying input. Indeed, given the enormous 
bargaining power of the major record companies, the creative artists generally do 
not fare well in the tug-of-war for shares of the value captured. Since their share of 
value captured is small relative to their share of value created, creative artists are 







of royalties, music publishing would be one obvious target of their value chain 
envy. Applying proposition 2 to the particular circumstances of the music 
industries gives us Hypothesis 2. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Composers, lyricists and performers will have the greatest propensity to 
vertically integrate since the share of value captured at those stages is disproportionately low 
relative to the share of value created, and information communication technologies have 
undermined the means of value protection for the more desirable stages of the value system.  
2.4 The Music Industries in the Netherlands 
While much of the literature on the music industry describes the U.S. 
context, the structure observed in the Netherlands is similar in many respects. The 
major record companies in the Netherlands are the same as in the U.S. market. 
The Dutch music industry is marked by a high level of foreign content; close to 80 
percent of the music that is bought is imported. These major record companies 
also market most of the Dutch content. Apart from their advantages in 
reproduction and distribution the major record companies also have strong 
relationships with the Dutch broadcasting industry, just as they do in the U.S. 
Indeed, the Dutch headquarters of all the major record companies are located in 
the vicinity of Hilversum (the center of radio and television broadcasting in the 
Netherlands). Like in the U.S., the musicians and other smaller players are 
generally dependent on the cooperation of the majors for handling downstream 
activities. Although Dutch copyright law differs from that of the U.S., the 
economic effects of copyright law for the music industries, and music publishing in 
particular, are comparable in nature and significance. Therefore the Dutch case 





There were 884 firms listed with the Dutch Chambers of Commerce as 
music publishing companies or music reproduction companies in 2002. Due to 
financial and time constraints, 600 companies were randomly selected. An 
introductory letter was sent to each of these firms prior to a telephone interview. 
Three attempts were made to contact every company during regular business 
hours. If this did not result in a response, two further attempts were made after 
regular business hours. Usable data were obtained from telephone interviews with 
146 of these firms (see Table I). The core of the questionnaire addressed the 
nature and scope of the activities that the respondent firm had undertaken 
throughout its existence.  
The characteristics of the population made it difficult to contact many of 
these firms. First, many of these companies turned out to have no employees, so if 
the owner was absent nobody could answer the phone. Second, many of the day-
to-day activities of these businesses take place away from the office (e.g., 
contacting prospective artists, making sound recordings). Third, many of these 
firms are not the primary sources of income for the owners. Since the owners were 
often employed elsewhere, almost 25 percent of the interviews were administered 
after six o'clock in the evening.  
 
Table I: Interview Response Rates 
Response 146 
No Contact 328 
Non-music 48 
Bankrupt 19 
No Relevance 22 
Refusal 37 








Close to 80 percent of the questionnaires were answered by the founder, 
the owner, or the CEO of the company. Most of the companies were very small; 
over 90 percent of the respondents had fewer than five employees. The median 
category with regard to turnover was 50-150 thousand euros for 2001.  
2.4.2 Results 
Table II summarizes the findings on the level of new entry and vertical 
integration. Since many of the companies were already vertically integrated to some 
degree, they are represented in more than one stage of the value system. Thus, 
column totals in Table II can exceed the number of companies interviewed. Yet 
other companies within the sample are not represented in Table II, as these were 
the result of founders setting up another company at the same stage of the value 
system, therefore being neither vertically integrating actors nor new entrants. 
The frequencies of vertical integration and new entry are highest for the 
stages of music publishing and reproduction as predicted in Hypothesis 1. 
However, this might simply be due to a sampling bias since the sample was drawn 
from the population of Dutch firms currently active in these two stages. What is 
interesting is the relative frequency of new entry and vertical integration as the 
preferred entry mode into the different stages of the value system. Almost all new 
businesses in the upper end of the value system (composing, writing lyrics, and 
performing) are the result of new entry rather than vertical integration. At the 
lower end of the value system, however, the reverse was observed: almost all new 
businesses in publishing, recording, reproduction, distribution and retailing 





Table II: Entry Mode in the Music Industries 
 Activities New Entry % Vertical Integration % Total % 
 Composing 5 83% 1 17% 6 100
 Lyrics 1 100% 0 0% 1 100
 Performing 7 70% 3 30% 10 100
 Publishing 5 11% 42 89% 47 100
 Recording 7 19% 30 81% 37 100
 Reproduction 3 19% 13 81% 16 100
 Distribution 1 7% 14 93% 15 100
 Retailing 3 19% 13 81% 16 100
 Total 32 22% 116 78% 148 100
 
The vast majority of the newly founded companies in publishing were the 
result of vertical integration (42 out of 47). Figure 3 summarizes these findings on 
vertical integration (VI) into publishing at the outset of the firm. Notably, forward 
integration (from the artistic end) into publishing is very popular. Over three 
quarters of these actors had a background in composing and performing. In 











A similar picture emerges when taking into account all 60 observed cases 
of vertical integration into publishing (see Table III). Again, the columns do not 
add up to 100% because the firms typically were engaged in more than one activity 
when integrating into publishing. Notably, the rate of vertical integration into 
publishing remained stable over the three time-intervals. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, 
it appears that digitalization has not opened the floodgates for vertical integration 
and new entry into publishing.  
Lyrics (54.7%)












Table III: Vertical Integration (VI) into publishing  
over three different time periods 
 Before 1992 1992-1997 1997-2002 Total 
15 14 14 43 
Composing 71.4% 70.0% 73.7% 71.7% 
16 9 9 34 
Lyrics 76.2% 45.0% 47.4% 56.7% 
16 14 15 45 
Performance 76.2% 70.0% 78.9% 75.0% 
14 10 12 36 
Recording 66.7% 50.0% 63.2% 60.0% 
9 5 9 23 
Reproduction 42.9% 25.0% 47.4% 38.3% 
9 6 7 22 
Distribution 42.9% 30.0% 36.8% 36.7% 
8 8 5 21 
Retail 38.1% 40.0% 26.3% 35.0% 
 21 20 19 60 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
It appears that innovations in ICT did not trigger forward integration into 
publishing; composers, lyricists, and performing musicians reported that neither 
digitalization nor the Internet were important in decisions to move into publishing 
(see Table IV). However, a somewhat mixed picture emerges regarding the 
importance of digitalization for the lower end of the value system. The Internet 
has gained in importance in terms of explaining decisions to backward integrate 








Table IV: Importance of ICT  












  Agree Disagree Agree Disagree Agree Disagree Agree  Disagree 
Comp. 6 7 2 11 6 4 5 4 
Lyr. 3 5 2 6 3 2 3 1 
Perf. 6 7 2 11 5 6 5 5 
Rec. 3 6 1 8 4 4 5 2 
Repr. 1 3 0 4 2 3 5 0 
Distr. 3 2 0 5 2 1 3 0 
Ret. 2 5 0 7 1 0 2 0 
2.5 Discussion 
The findings are somewhat mixed. The publishing and recording stages 
did show the highest frequencies of vertical integration and new entry, but this 
pattern might simply be due to sampling bias. Further, the advent of digital 
technologies has not yet triggered an increase in these frequencies. Thus, no strong 
support could be found for Hypothesis 1. 
However, the vast majority of firms that vertically integrated into 
publishing came from the stages upstream in the value system associated with the 
creative artists (i.e., composers, lyricists, performers). This is consistent with the 
argument put forth regarding value chain envy: by integrating into music 
publishing, the creative artists could hope to capture more of the value they 
created (in particular, the income from royalties). Similarly, of the 82 music 




their own compositions and 56% were publishing their own lyrics under the 
umbrella of their own publishing company. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2.  
One notable caveat is that nearly all of the newly founded firms in music 
publishing are very small firms; most of them have no employees and earn little 
income. Although this suggests that venturing a new business in music publishing 
does not require substantial financial endowments on the part of the entrepreneur, 
it also indicates that the means to capture value of these new publishing houses are 
not impressive. Thus, while “the publisher’s role has contracted to the point that anybody can 
be a music publisher” (Caves, 2000), effective value capture remains out of reach for 
most.  
This might explain the lack of support for Hypothesis 1. Although ICT 
has had an effect on scale advantages in the field of recording, reproduction, and 
distribution, it hardly seemed to have an impact on the levels of new entry and 
vertical integration towards publishing. This suggests that there may have been 
another barrier to entry, other than the scale advantages, which were underlying 
Hypothesis 1. Thus the explanation for the advantageous position of the majors 
should be found in an area that has not (yet) been affected by the introduction of 
ICT. Other than scale advantages, the major record labels have for long enjoyed 
strong relationships with the relevant selectors in the broadcasting media (program 
director, DJs, VJs, etc.). These relationships have long been regarded to yield a 
decisive competitive advantage to the majors (Peterson & Berger, 1975) and allow 
them to effectively translate their possession of music publishing rights into 
profits.  
The developments with regard to ICT do not seem to have affected these 
relationships and the resulting competitive edge of the majors. The situation could 
become different if the Internet could lead to significant changes in the 
determinants of competitive success, and therefore, of the selection systems, in the 







start buying CDs or pay to download music that has first become popular among 
users of (illegal) download services instead of music that is frequently played on 
radio and television. However, there is yet little evidence of such a development 
taking place. 
2.6 Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Research 
The main theoretical argument of this paper was that the desirability of 
establishing a value chain at a particular stage in a value system depends on the 
relationship between the value that can be created and the value that can be 
captured at that particular stage. When a value system is in equilibrium, the ratio 
between the shares of value capture and value creation is equal to 1 for all stages. If 
this ratio deviates from 1 in some stages, then the value system is out of 
equilibrium. Our argument is not applicable to a value system in equilibrium but 
serves to explain vertical integration and new entry in a system that is out of 
equilibrium. When the system is in disequilibrium, value chain envy will motivate 
firms to invade the more desirable stages of the value system, either through new 
entry or vertical integration. The feasibility of establishing a value chain at a 
desirable stage depends on the efficacy of the means to protect value at that 
particular stage. 
With regard to the two theoretical approaches we described in the 
introduction and the theory section, this paper can be considered to have provided 
a contribution to a synthesis by providing a framework to explain the origins and 
consequences of profit differentials within a value system by explicitly linking 
possession of resources to create, protect and capture value with barriers to entry, 
horizontally as well as vertically. We used and extended Teece’s insights about the 
interaction between competition at the stage of the producer and the relationships 




criticize the ambiguousness of his term complementary assets, we also found that 
complementary assets have had great significance for the developments in the 
music industry. Precisely by distinguishing the roles these assets can play in respect 
to creating, protecting and capturing value at different stages of the value system, 
the essential causes and effects of industrial dynamics can be more usefully studied. 
In this paper, the concepts of value creation, capture, and protection 
within value systems have been employed to analyze recent developments in the 
recorded music industries, particularly those affecting the stage of music 
publishing. Over the course of the 20th century the value created at the stage of 
music publishing diminished steadily, while the value captured remained high, 
making this stage highly desirable. On the basis of the proposed theoretical 
framework one could expect value chain envy to trigger new entry and vertical 
integration towards that stage. Only the major record companies managed to do so 
successfully, precisely because they managed to translate their strengths at the 
stages of recording and distribution into value protection at the stage of 
publishing.  
This situation seemed likely to change with the introduction of new 
information communication technologies in recent years, which led to a significant 
erosion of the competitive advantage held by the major record companies in the 
areas of recording, reproduction, and distribution. This in turn was posited to lead 
to a decrease in the efficacy of value protection and the corresponding height of 
barriers of entry at the desirable stage of publishing. However, upon closer 
examination of  146 companies active in the Dutch music industries over the 
period 1992-2002, a somewhat more nuanced picture emerges. Although most 
vertical integration could be traced back to stages where the value chain envy was 
most prominent, ICT seemed hardly to be an enabling technology for establishing 
oneself  as a music publisher. Based on our data it would seem that the reason why 







of music publishing may after all not be based on their scale advantages in the 
areas of recording, reproduction, and distribution but rather on their relationships 
with the relevant selectors, i.e. the broadcasting industry, which the smaller players 
still seem to lack. Even after the introduction of ICT it seems that one needs 
relationships with the relevant selectors before being able to compete effectively at 
the stage of music publishing. 
The reasoning presented in this paper offers a number of suggestions for 
further research. Firstly, the empirical results presented in this paper, and the 
conclusions that could be drawn from them, provide further support for 
approaching the phenomena of vertical integration and new entry from an integral 
perspective. As is evident from our data the majority of entrants originate from 
other stages within the same value system. Both true ‘de novo’ entrants and 
entrants coming from within the same value system can be considered to have 
acted on similar grounds, responding strategically to observed disproportions 
between creation and capture of value. This strongly supports the argument for 
approaching all categories of entrants – whether ‘de novo’, ‘de ipso’, ‘de alio’ 
(Carroll, Bigelow, Seidel & Tsai, 1996) or vertically integrating agents – from a 
unified theoretical perspective. 
Secondly, this study directs attention to the vertical distribution of assets 
and resources and their relationship to how value is created, captured and 
protected. This approach could extend the usefulness of the resource based view, 
taking into account all resources at all stages of the value system to explain the 
competitive advantage a firm can derive from its particular set of resources. 
Thirdly, by taking the role of the selectors into more systematic account 
the way in which firms establish or scale barriers to entry could be explained more 
coherently. It seems natural, when looking at barriers to entry from the RBV 




make it more likely that the relevant selectors will be willing to evaluate the 








3 Where Are You From? Where Are You 
Going? Legitimacy, New Entry, and 
Performance in Popular Music 
  
3.1 Introduction  
New entry is about taking risks. Bain (1956) noted that entry barriers – 
and the risk of failure they constitute - are proportional to each entrant’s 
competences and resources. This implies that the risk associated with the entrant’s 
new venture is inversely related to the entrant’s initial portfolio of assets (Bruderl 
& Schussler, 1990). Furthermore, stakeholders who perceive a particular venture to 
be risky are less likely to avail other critical assets to the firm, which in turn 
increases the risk of failure. 
Stinchcombe (1965) labeled the difficulties that a new entrant encounters 
in its early years of existence as the ‘liability of newness’.7 Subsequently, 
institutional theorists have argued that at the core of this liability lies the fact that 
new entrants lack the taken-for-grantedness that incumbents enjoy (Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994). This lack of familiarity causes relevant stakeholders to be extra cautious 
before committing themselves to the new venture. As a result new entrants often 
find it cumbersome to procure the necessary resources (Williamson, Cable & 
Aldrich, 2002). By adopting customary rules and practices, a new entrant can signal 
its legitimacy and thereby mitigate the adverse effects of unfamiliarity (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). Lack of such institutional support is a prime cause for early 




organizational legitimacy has helped explain differentials in firm survival and 
growth (Carroll, Bigelow, Seidel & Tsai, 1996). 
Acknowledging its far reaching consequences for an organization’s 
viability, many scholars set out investigating the origins of legitimacy. This line of 
research culminated in a fundamental disagreement with regard to whether or not 
organizational legitimacy is malleable, i.e. whether or not it can be placed under 
managerial control. Broadly speaking, there are two contrasting views: the strategic 
approach and the institutional approach (Suchman, 1995). Advocates of the 
strategic approach argue that organizational legitimacy stems from a firm’s 
deliberate endeavors to ensure that it develops in lockstep with its environment 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Delmar & Shane, 2004). This 
reading entertains a view of legitimacy as an operational resource that the 
organization can allocate to advance its interests. Proponents of the institutional 
approach, however, emphasize that organizational legitimacy is the result of a 
collective structuration effort that exceeds, both in scale and scope, the legitimating 
strategies of individual firms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
This debate may remain unresolved because several key issues are not 
adequately addressed and opaque definitions and conceptualizations remain. 
Firstly, what needs to be legitimated? Secondly, legitimated by whom? And thirdly, 
legitimated to what end? With regard to the first issue, various elements of the 
organization require legitimation, including: the product (Rao, 1994), the procedure 
(Scott, 1977), the economic role (Baker & Faulkner, 1991; Rao, Monin & Durand, 
2003), the organizational form (Hannan & Carroll, 1992), and the industry (Aldrich 
& Fiol, 1994). The second issue concerns identifying the sources of legitimacy, 
which grant the firm - or certain aspects of it - acknowledgement and recognition 
in the eyes of stakeholders. Legitimacy comes in as many forms as there are 
sources, including: credentialing mechanisms (Rao, 1994; Zuckerman, 1999), social 







Hoang & Hybels, 1999; Higgins & Gulati, 2003), listings in the public directories 
(Singh, Tucker & House, 1986) and media attention (Pollock & Rindova, 2003). 
These have all produced proxies for organizational legitimacy. The third issue is 
the purpose of legitimacy: to instill enough confidence in the new organization so 
that third parties will economically align their interests with those of the firm. As 
such, legitimacy mitigates the uncertainty of consumers (Rao, 1994) and financial 
partners (Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Pollock & Rindova, 2003). 
Although higher levels of legitimacy are often linked with increased 
performance, the results are mixed (Westphal, Gulati & Shortell, 1997). Gimeno, 
Folta, Cooper & Woo (1997) have argued that the ambiguity of this relationship 
might stem from internal and external constituents allowing low-performing but 
legitimate ventures to endure while curbing high-performing but illegitimate 
ventures. This line of reasoning is crucial for it nuances the presumed 
unequivocalness of the relationship between legitimacy and performance. 
Constituents might view an organization as legitimate precisely because it is not (or 
limitedly so) profitable. This implies that the relationship between organizational 
legitimacy and its performance is not as straightforward as earlier was presumed. 
This directs attention to how performance as an indication of success is measured 
and operationalized. Performance usually is defined in terms of financial success - 
also in this paper - but it is important to note that entrepreneurs as well as external 
stakeholders can strive for other outcomes apart from financial ones and that this 
may well have an impact on the observed relationships between legitimacy and 
performance. 
Exploring the relationship between legitimacy and performance becomes 
even more arduous in the case of new firms because the newness of the firm 
hinders to a great extent the detection of bonafide markers for legitimacy. When 




desirability, propriety, and appropriateness of the actions of an organizational entity 
(Suchman, 1995). Yet at the outset of the firm it is unlikely that many actions have 
been undertaken and as a result it seems improbable that the stakeholders use 
them as proxies when evaluating legitimacy. Not only have actions still to be 
realized; starting entrepreneurs typically undertake them a random fashion and at 
different stages of the venture creation (Block & MacMillan, 1985; Carter, Gartner 
& Reynolds, 1996). This implies that developing a consistent portfolio of actions in 
the eyes of the relevant stakeholders takes time. Thus the actions undertaken by 
the entrepreneur are unlikely to form a reliable set of indicators for the new 
venture’s legitimacy. Therefore it is likely that in the initial stages of the venture 
other markers are used to measure the legitimacy of the new venture. 
This paper emphasizes that it is the entrepreneurial objectives and the 
entrepreneurial experience of the new organization that are subjected to evaluation in 
the legitimating processes. The underlying rationale is that both entrepreneurial 
objectives and entrepreneurial experience can be judged by internal and external 
constituents to be more (or less) legitimate for the type of venture that the 
entrepreneur likes to pursue. The past, in terms of the relevant entrepreneurial 
experience, and the future, in terms of where the entrepreneur envisions to take 
his/her business, are the metaphors with which the prospective entrepreneur 
makes an attempt to rationalize why all relevant stakeholders – including the 
entrepreneur him or herself – should align their interests with those of the new 
venture. 
In this paper we define entrepreneurial experience as having assumed 
relevant roles in the past. Consequently, we will argue that these roles form the 
basis for garnering legitimacy and therefore for securing resources and eventually 
performance. Stinchcombe (1965) suggested that it was precisely the lack of 
familiarity with new roles that generated the liability of newness on the part of the 







constituents (Baker & Faulkner, 1991) but also by internal constituents, most 
notably the entrepreneur, (Harvey & Evans, 1995) on their desirability, propriety, 
and appropriateness. 
Yet prior experience is not all the entrepreneur brings to the firm. The 
entrepreneurial objectives should be in tune with what the internal and external 
constituents see as desirable, proper, and appropriate before they can be persuaded 
to commit their resources to the firm. For instance, venture capitalists actively 
monitor the motivation of the entrepreneur and adapt their investment strategy 
accordingly (Wijbenga, Postma, van Witteloostuijn & Zwart, 2003; Shane, Locke & 
Collins, 2003). It is therefore not surprising that entrepreneurial motivation has 
had differential effects on firm growth and survival prospects (Birley & Westhead, 
1994). 
This study sets out to investigate the effects of entrepreneurial objectives and 
entrepreneurial experience as markers of organizational legitimacy. For both we assume 
that the legitimacy of the entrepreneur will be conferred onto the new organization 
as has been suggested before (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). With regard to 
entrepreneurial experience, we have identified several key roles: prior founding 
experience, prior industry experience, prior experience in supplying industries, 
prior organizational experience, and prior market experience. With regard to 
entrepreneurial objectives, we have formulated several goals that the entrepreneur 
can pursue via the creation of the new venture. 
In the subsequent section we will derive from the literature on new entry a 
number of proxies that can signal the new venture's level of legitimacy. We analyze 
questionnaire data gathered from 131 companies active in the Dutch music 
industries. We examine entry modes into three different industries: 1) the music 
publishing industry, 2) the recording industry, and 3) the reproduction industry. 




entrants (measured in terms of profit growth and turnover growth). After 
discussing the results, we consider their implications for our understanding of 
organizational legitimacy. 
3.2 Theory 
In this section, we review the literature on new entry. In doing so, we 
explore and develop various theoretical perspectives that suggest specific 
relationships between indicators of legitimacy and the performance of new 
entrants. 
 
3.2.1 Entrepreneurial Roles: Prior Founding Experience 
The impact of prior founding experience on the growth and development 
perspectives for the new venture has been extensively studied in the 
entrepreneurship literature, but yielded conflicting results (MacMillan, Zemann & 
SubbaNarasimha, 1987; Starr & Bygrave, 1992; Westhead & Wright, 1998). 
Although, habitual founders are more likely to have a better grasp of what it takes 
to start a new organization, prior founding experience can also constitute a ‘liability 
of staleness’ when entrepreneurs develop a blind spot and fail to recognize and 
resolve critical issues (Starr and Bygrave, 1992). This liability is especially critical 
for entrepreneurs who have failed in previous ventures. Despite their past failures, 
other lines of research point out that these entrepreneurs likely retained their social 
networks and knowledge (Alsos & Kolvereid, 1998). As a result, they likely enjoy 
more legitimacy than inexperienced new entrants in the eyes of their financial 
partners and other crucial stakeholders. Due to their experience, habitual 
entrepreneurs are more likely to identify innovative business opportunities than 
their novice counterparts (Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright & Binks, 2003). Therefore 
it was argued that venture capitalists and providers of private equity show greater 







businesses than other entrepreneurs. This implies that past organizational founding 
experience is a marker of legitimacy. 
3.2.2 Entrepreneurial Roles: Prior Organizational Experience 
Although entrepreneurship has been predominantly associated with small 
and new firms, the literature has acknowledged the importance of corporate 
sponsored ventures as well (Zahra, 1991; Antoncic & Hisrich, 2001). Various 
studies have found evidence that corporate sponsored ventures typically 
outperformed independent entrants (McDougall, Robinson, Richard & DeNisi, 
1992; Zahra, 1996). When embarking on an entrepreneurial opportunity, well-
endowed firms often face a strategic choice: to enter a new industry through 
acquisition or through internal venturing. The preferred mode of entry often 
depends on the optimal organizational context for capitalizing on the mother 
company's competences (Yip, 1982). 
We propose that the performance of the new venture depends on the 
extent to which the entrepreneur can draw on the accumulated experience (and 
resources) of the mother organization. Wealth of experience can signal the 
legitimacy of the new venture towards the internal and external constituency. Thus 
it seems probable that the entrant’s role as an intrapreneur has significant impact 
on the legitimacy of the new venture and therefore will positively affect its 
performance. 
 
3.2.3 Entrepreneurial Roles: Prior Industry Experience 
Entrants with expertise in the target industry may also enjoy greater 
legitimacy than those lacking that expertise. Having industry-specific human capital 




Witteloostuijn, 1998). As such, it is unsurprising that new entry initiated by 
companies already present in an industry typically outperformed newcomers from 
outside (Dobrev, 2001). New entrants may have acquired crucial knowledge while 
working at other firms inside the industry (insiders). Such ‘prior knowledge’ may 
greatly aid the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities (Shane, 2000). As a result, 
insiders were more likely to attract external financing than those who had not 
(Burton, Sørenson & Beckman, 2002). Meanwhile, outsiders come in two varieties: 
those entering from related upstream or downstream industries (related outsiders) 
and those entering from unrelated industries (complete outsiders). Unlike complete 
outsiders, related outsiders are more likely to know about the industry’s 
idiosyncratic practices and routines and are hence more likely to attain a higher 
level of legitimacy. This is consistent with the sociological literature on roles, which 
argues that having prior experience with a specific role increases the viability of 
taking on related roles (Baker & Faulkner, 1991; Rao, Monin & Durand, 2003). 
Moreover, Baker and Faulkner (1991) argued that having assumed related roles 
might raise legitimacy and thus the chance of garnering critical resources. 
Following this line of reasoning we posit that having prior industry experience is 
an indicator of legitimacy that benefits the entrepreneur. 
3.2.4 Entrepreneurial Roles: Prior Experience in Supplying Industries 
Capturing adequate inputs is critical for new entrants. At best, they must 
compete with incumbents who have longstanding relationships with suppliers 
(Stinchcombe, 1965). At worst, new entrants try to establish themselves in a new 
industry, without any beaten paths to established and trustworthy suppliers and 
without any incumbent role models for their procurement strategies (Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994). Furthermore, information asymmetry between the entrepreneur and a 
potential supplier can threaten the availability of crucial resources (Shane & Cable, 







themselves commercially to the new venture, and share its uncertain economic 
fate. This risk is higher when new entrants have few chances to prove themselves 
vis-à-vis their prospective suppliers. Given the uncertainty of the commercial 
success of the new entrant, suppliers may prefer dealing with entrants that display 
in-depth knowledge of the goods and services that the suppliers have on offer. Not 
only does such knowledge demonstrate professionalism, it is also likely to raise the 
expectations on the part of the supplier that the entrepreneur will succeed, thereby 
decreasing the likelihood of bankruptcy and failure to pay for procured products. 
Therefore, new entrants that enjoy such legitimacy are less likely to incur 
procurement problems than those lacking that legitimacy. This suggests that having 
assumed roles that indicate superior knowledge of suppliers’ business activities are 
also markers of legitimacy. 
3.2.5 Entrepreneurial Roles: Prior Market Experience  
New entrants have yet to establish their legitimacy towards their 
prospective market. Especially in markets in which consumers have difficulty 
assessing the value of the competing products, the potential value of a new 
entrant’s product is not immediately recognized. Product critics often mediate such 
markets, and their evaluation often decides the outcome of competitive processes 
(Hirsch, 1972; Zuckerman, 1999). Product comparisons are especially critical in the 
formative years of an industry (Rao, 1994) and typically retain their value in more 
established industries (Eliashberg & Shugan, 1997; Anand & Watson, 2004). Third 
parties often serve as product critics, but producers can also do so by evaluating 
their competitor’s products (Wijnberg & Gemser, 2000). Such evaluations do not 
necessarily take the form of an explicit rating of competing products in terms of 
‘evaluative schemas’ (Hsu, 2004). As showcasing is seen as a form of endorsement, 




effectively, according to Wijnberg and Gemser's (2000) ‘selection systems’ 
framework. Thus selectors assume a double role: identifying which products to 
consider, and then evaluating these products using the criteria they deem relevant 
(Zuckerman, 1999). Distinguishing between the two roles, identification and 
evaluation, suggests that legitimacy, especially for new entrants, may depend on the 
dominant set of selectors noticing them and recognizing them as valid competitors. 
As Pollock and Rindova (2003) have shown, evaluations aid in constructing 
legitimacy rather than merely reflecting it, thereby affecting third parties’ risk-
taking behaviors. Yet, establishing such relationships often requires proximity and 
time, which new entrants often lack because of their liability of newness. Thus, 
having assumed roles that elicited acknowledgement by selectors likely serves as a 
marker of legitimacy for internal and external constituencies. 
3.2.6 Entrepreneurial Objectives 
Why do entrepreneurs start new ventures? Prior research differentiates 
among internal and environmental motivations for entrepreneurial behavior. 
Internal factors were largely explored by building on insights from the 
psychological discipline, notably the literature on personality traits (Allport, 1961) 
and social learning theory (Bandura & Walters, 1963). Environmental factors were 
largely understood in terms of industry driven stimulants for new entry; new entry 
as a response to a radical innovation (Schumpeter, 1950), new entry triggered by 
perceived profitability (Bain, 1956) or new entry as a reaction to an increasing 
resource space (Hannan & Freeman, 1977).  
Although these perspectives remained separate for many decades, recent 
studies have examined how the internal objectives are perceived by the external 
environment. Venture capitalists actively monitor the entrepreneur's motivation 
and adapt their investment strategy accordingly (Wijbenga, Postma, van 







(2002) argue that how the entrepreneur frames his own motivations and objectives 
in the interaction with suppliers is crucial for securing additional resources. These 
findings suggest that the objectives that underlie the initiation of the new venture 
have a dual role. They should have a self-legitimating aspect for the entrepreneur 
justifying the amount of time, resources and effort that the new organization will 
require. Additionally, the external constituency should endorse these objectives as 
legitimate reasons for the type of venture that the entrepreneur wishes to pursue. 
The immediate environment (family, potential resource suppliers, governmental 
agencies etc.) might doubt the legitimacy of a venture that it views as largely a pet 
project of the entrepreneur lacking consideration of what is desirable, proper, and 
appropriate in the external context in which the new organization is to operate. 
For this reason we assume that the intrinsically motivated entrants (as opposed to 
those seeking rent) are likely to exhibit a lower performance measured in financial 
terms precisely because the external environment will be cautious when supplying 
their resources (unless they share the non-profit driven objectives of the new 
organization). Also, intrinsically-motivated entrepreneurs gain direct psychological 
benefits from the new venture and tend to be satisfied with lower financial returns 
compared to entrants without intrinsic motivation. As such, intrinsically motivated 
entrants might have a lower financial threshold (in terms of profit and turnover 
aspirations) for deciding whether to enter an industry, and therefore these entrants 
may tend to have lower financial returns upon entry. Both arguments direct 
attention at the entrepreneurial objectives as an indicator of legitimacy. We posit 
that differences in financial performance of new entrants can be explained by 





The music industries are particularly well suited for the purposes of this 
study. As in other industries, legitimacy has been acknowledged to be an important 
factor for competitive success (Anand & Peterson, 2000; Anand & Watson, 2004). 
Successful new entry was reported for the established and well-endowed record 
companies, which invaded the music publishing industries in the 1980’s (Huygens, 
Baden-Fuller & Van-Den-Bosch, 2001). This type of new entry was typically the 
result of internal venturing or acquisition (Burnett, 1996). Although pursuing an 
entrepreneurial career is commonplace in the loosely coupled labor markets that 
most cultural industries adopted (Menger, 1999), new entry on the part of less 
legitimate actors, such as composers, proved more cumbersome (Burke, 1997; 
Mol, Wijnberg & Carroll, 2005). The only artists that could overcome the odds 
were the established stars that started their own record or publishing company 
(Sanjek & Sanjek, 1991). The underlying rationale was that performance could for 
the greater part be attributed to the possession of having closely knit relationships 
with the broadcasting industry (Peterson & Berger, 1975), attesting to the fact that 
media can bestow legitimacy on an actor (Pollock & Rindova, 2003). These 
relationships were so pronounced that they might explain the high levels of 
observed industry concentration (Peterson & Berger, 1975). When the introduction 
of digital technology lowered entry barriers for the recording and reproduction 
industries, leading performing artists entered (Canetta & Winn, 2002; Mol, 
Wijnberg & Carroll, 2005). This together with the promise of the Internet as a new 
platform for the dissemination of music (Shirky, 2001) could substantially enhance 
the viability of new entry. 
Although the majority of the academic literature focuses on the 
developments within the US, the music industries in the Netherlands resemble 
those of the US in many respects. The industries are similar in constitution, with 







These companies can economize on their international repertoire, which is close to 
80 percent of accumulated sales (NVPI, 2003). As in the US, the majors enjoy 
strong relationships with the Dutch broadcasting industry (Rutten, 1992), as 
suggested by the locations of the headquarters of the major record companies near 
Hilversum, the center for radio and television broadcasting in the Netherlands. 
And for a reason: the broadcasting industry, and especially radio, played a crucial 
role in the development of musical taste patterns in the Netherlands, explaining to 
a large extent the advent of pop music (Dolfsma, 1999). 
3.3.1 Data 
The Dutch Chambers of Commerce listed 884 respondents as music 
publishing companies or music reproduction companies in 2002. Music recording 
companies did not constitute a separate category, but were incorporated in the 
aforementioned categories. As we are primarily interested in the effects of 
legitimacy on the performance of small firms, we excluded the major record 
companies (e.g. Sony, EMI, BMG, Warner, and Universal) from our sample. 
Subsequently, we randomly selected 600 companies for telephone interviews. We 
used a structured questionnaire that was based on an earlier pilot study, exploring 
the same issues with more open-ended questions. After sending an introductory 
letter to each respondent, we called them for an interview via the telephone. If we 
did not establish a contact during the first attempt, we called an additional two 
times during regular business hours and if necessary, two additional times after 
regular business hours. Of these respondents, 131 had entered the music 
publishing, recording, or reproduction business. The respondents were typically 
the founder, the owner, or the CEO of the company. One respondent entered 
publishing and then entered recording. Otherwise, all companies entered one or 




Respondents did not answer every question, resulting in missing data (6% 
of the total data used in this study). Missing data can lead to the following 
problems: (a) loss of efficiency; (b) complication in data handling and analysis; and 
(c) biases due to differences between the observed and unobserved data (Barnard 
& Meng, 1999). To address these issues, we imputed values for the missing data 
with Markov Chain Monte Carlo multiple imputation (Rubin, 1996; Schafer, 1997; 
Schafer, 1999) using LISREL (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2002). Computer simulations 
have shown that other approaches to missing data (pair wise deletion, list wise 
deletion, mean substitution and simple imputation) do not address the above 
concerns as effectively (Brown, 1994). 
3.3.2 Variables 
This data set consists of 131 respondents’ entries into music publishing, 
recording or reproduction. It is important to note that new entry is operationalized 
as entry into a new industry. As such, new entry does not necessarily have to 
manifest itself as the creation of a new firm, but can also take form through 
expansion of current business operations (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). We used binary 
variables indicating specific periods in which new entries occurred, 1992_1997 and 
1998_2002. Entry before 1992 is indicated when both of these variables have the 
value 0. Entry variables were binary variables while profit growth and sales growth 
were ordered variables. These variables indicated whether a respondent had begun 
providing products or services in a new music industry within a given time period: 
PUBLISHING, RECORDING, and REPRODUCTION. PROFIT GROWTH and SALES 
GROWTH were ordered variables indicating the change in profits or sales within 
each time period (from start to end). Profit growth and turnover growth both 
ranged from 1 (steep fall) to 5 (fast growth). As a robustness test of the results, we 
also repeated the analyses below on binary variables POSITIVE PROFIT GROWTH 







The variable STARTUP_EXP indicated whether or not a respondent had 
founded another company before entry. 
The following binary variables indicate corporate sponsored 
entrepreneurship: CORP_SPONS and VERTICAL_INTEGRATION. CORP_SPONS 
referred to entries with over 50% of equity owned by a mother company. 
VERTICAL_INTEGRATION indicated that the entrant firm has spun off from a firm 
that is currently active in another music industry. 
The variables IPSO, INTRA, and EXTRA denoted whether or not entrants 
had work experience in the same industry (IPSO), another music industry (INTRA) 
or an industry outside of music (EXTRA)8. As some firms entered multiple 
industries at the same time, we distinguished PUBLISHING_IPSO, 
RECORDING_IPSO, REPRODUCTION_IPSO, PUBLISHING_INTRA, 
RECORDING_INTRA, and REPRODUCTION_INTRA. EXTRA serves as the baseline, 
and was indicated by values of zero in both IPSO and INTRA. For example, values 
of zero for both PUBLISHING_IPSO and PUBLISHING_INTRA indicated 
PUBLISHING_EXTRA. 
Suppliers of inputs are likely to attribute the highest level of know-how 
about their own business dealings to entrants that had experience in creating these 
inputs themselves such as melodies and lyrics. MELODY_COPYRIGHT and LYRICS-
_COPYRIGHT were binary variables indicating whether entrants were pursuing 
remuneration of one of these respective copyrights under the umbrella of the new 
venture. 
DJs on the radio or VJs on television largely mediate the market for 
popular music. Thus, airplay on the major broadcasting stations virtually secured 
subsequent sales of a song (Coase, 1979; Montgomery & Moe, 2000). As 
mentioned earlier, the success of the major record companies has been largely 




Berger, 1975). Also, live performance venues and clubs have considerable clout in 
determining the value of music, especially with regard to new musical markets 
(Scott, 1999). As an indicator of visibility among potential selectors, we analyzed 
the effect of entrants' access to these media outlets with these binary variables 
(yes/no): CONCERT_HALL, MAGAZINE, RADIO, TV, MOVIE/COMMERCIALS, and 
FOREIGN_COUNTRIES. 
When operationalizing the entrepreneurial objectives, we first consulted 
the literature on entrepreneurial motivation (e.g. Wainer & Rubin, 1969). Some 
entrepreneurs are motivated by profit or business driven arguments (Schumpeter, 
1949). Others pursue self-employment because of intrinsic motivation (Wigfield & 
Eccles, 1992). These include such diverse motivations as: the desire for power 
(Winter, 1973), the desire for autonomy (Schein, 1994), the desire to control one’s 
own time (Birley & Westhead, 1994), the need for achievement (McClelland, 1961), 
or simply the sheer discontent with previous employment (Hirschman, 1970). 
The final set of entrepreneurial objectives that were included in the 
questionnaire were based on the goals that were most often reported in the earlier 
pilot study. We operationalized the motivations of entrants using binary variables 
indicating whether a specific reason was important in the respondent’s decision to 
enter a music industry. These included financial reasons: MORE_PROFIT, 
TAX_DEDUCTION, COMMERCIALIZE_EXPERTISE, REDUCE_COSTS, 
CONTROL_SALES and DIVERSIFY and non-financial reasons: INTEREST, CONTROL-
_USE, and PUSH. CONTROL_SALES indicated that a respondent entered an industry 
to control how their music was sold. In contrast, CONTROL_USE indicated whether 
a respondent entered an industry to control how one or more products were used 
or modified in terms of content. INTEREST indicated intrinsic interest in the work. 
PUSH indicated that the entrant said that no one else could do the necessary task. 
We controlled for firm age, absolute turnover, time period of entry, and number of 








3.3.3 Reliability, Validity, and Biases 
Reliability checks of questionnaire items through similar versions of the 
same question are likely unnecessary as answers to questions are likely to remain 
the same (firm age, more profits, motivated by profits). Hence, congeneric factors 
created from tetrachoric correlation-based confirmatory factor analyses (Jöreskog 
& Sörbom, 2002) were not necessary. Furthermore, variables can change over time 
(e.g. resources, experience etc.), so collecting time-series data to test for stability 
over time would not be appropriate (McGrath, MacMillan & Venkataraman, 1995). 
Likewise, other people cannot reliably assess a person’s internal motivation, thus 
inter-rater reliability is not relevant in this case. 
We carefully examined the research literature to create our variables and 
increase our construct validity. In doing so, we build on and extend prior research. 
We addressed external validity by encouraging respondents to expand on their 
answers, allowing their detailed explanations to provide further evidence of their 
understanding of the questions and increasing confidence in their initial answers. 
Past studies show that respondents tend to be biased toward positive 
perceptions of self, e.g., increased profits (e.g. Blaine, 1994). As our questions 
focused on past events however, respondents tended to be less personally invested 
in them (Blaine & Crocker, 1993). For example, most respondents had negative 
perceptions of their new entry into the music industry. 
3.3.4 Analysis 
To estimate the effects of predictors on the ordered outcome variables 
profit and turnover growth, we used a structural equation model based on 




(Aitchison & Silvey, 1957). Ordered variables do not have fixed intervals between 
values, so using a least squares regression (which assumes fixed intervals) would 
have led to bias in the estimation of the standard errors (Finney, 1971). In contrast, 
Logit/Probit/Gompit models estimated the likelihood that a variable value is at a 
higher value rather than a lower value (e.g., 1 rather than 0). Combining 
overlapping models, such as (0, 1) and (1, 2), yields an ordered model (0, 1, 2) that 
does not require fixed intervals (Aitchison & Silvey, 1957). However, Logit, Probit 
and Gompit use slightly different underlying distribution assumptions to model the 
data. To choose the best fitting Logit, Probit or Gompit model, we picked the one 
with the lowest Akaike information criterion or AIC (Grasa, 1989). The AIC is a 
measure of goodness of fit, adjusted by a penalty that rises with the number of 
regressors in the model. The results also reported McFadden’s (1974) R2, an 
estimate of the coefficient of determination. 
We used sequential sets (Cohen & Cohen, 1983) of the 
Logit/Probit/Gompit regressions described above to estimate models for the 
outcome variables: profit growth and sales growth. We entered the variables 
according to chronology, causality constraints, and likely importance. First, we 
entered the year variables. Then, we added the above variables describing different 
types of entry. Then, we entered the industry in which the firm entered. For 
discrete outcome variables, the likelihood ratio test for significance of additional 
explanatory variables is not reliable (Goldstein, 1995). So, we used Wald tests 
instead (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993). Also, doing many tests on one set of data 
can increase the likelihood of a spurious correlation. To address this problem, we 
used Hochberg’s (1988) variation on Holm’s (1979) method. Only significant 
variables were retained in subsequent sequential regressions. 
Using ordered predictors in a least squares regression (which assumes 
fixed intervals) tends to bias the estimates of the regression coefficients toward 







Logit/Probit/Gompit for ordered outcome variables. For ordered and binary 
predictors, we used a weighted least squares structural equation model (SEM) with 
polychoric correlations, tetrachoric correlations and their asymptotic covariance 
matrix via LISREL (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2002).  
Path analysis results provided the initial candidate for the SEM. If 
different predictors were significant for the regressions predicting profit growth 
and turnover growth, we tested whether these predictors affected both outcome 
variables in the SEM. This procedure adjusts for the tendency of the regressions 
on ordered predictors to report truly significant ones as non-significant and allows 
us to test all effects simultaneously. We removed all non-significant predictors 
from the initial SEM to obtain the final SEM. The SEM included standardized 
coefficients to simplify comparison of the effects of different predictors and to 
compute direct, indirect and total effects (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). We also 
reported reduced form squared multiple correlations (SMC’s) for each outcome 
variable, comparable to explained variance, R2, the coefficient of determination 
(Cohen & Cohen, 1983).  
Researchers identified several robust SEM goodness-of-fit measures with 
Monte Carlo simulation studies (Hu & Bentler, 1995). These include the 
incremental fit index (IFI), comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI; 
also known as non-normed fit index or NNFI (Tucker & Lewis, 1973), and root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). Hu and Bentler (1999) showed 
that using a combination of one of the above fit indexes and the standardized root 
mean residual (SRMR) tends to minimize Type I and Type II errors under many 
conditions. For sample sizes smaller than 250, the following ranges can be relaxed 
somewhat, (Hu & Bentler, 1999). For RMSEA, 0.06 or less shows a good fit. A 
value between 0.06 and 0.10 indicates a moderate fit, and one greater than 0.10 




0.08 and 0.10 shows a moderate fit. Greater than 0.10 indicates a poor fit. For IF, 
CFI, and TLI, 0.96 or higher indicates a good fit. Between 0.90 and 0.96 indicates a 
moderate fit. Less than 0.90 indicates a poor fit. We reported all of these measures 
along with other commonly used ones. We estimated ordered 
Logit/Probit/Gompit models with the statistical software, E-views (Lilien, Startz, 
Ellsworth, Noh & Engle, 1995). An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical 
tests. 
3.3.5 Results 
We begin with a brief review of the descriptive results before discussing 
the preliminary regressions and the SEM. For the sake of brevity, we included only 
the central results, the Logit regressions with only the significant variables and the 
SEM.9 
 
3.3.6 Descriptive results 
We identified 215 entries into publishing, recording, and reproduction. 
Most of the companies were very small; over 90 percent of the respondents had 
fewer than five employees (see summary tables A1 and A2). About 48% had 
revenue of 50,000 euros or less while only 10% had revenues exceeding 500,000 
euros. Indeed, 34% of the respondents continued doing other jobs. These entrants 
often had copyrights (68%) but few possibilities to offer exposure via any other 
media outlets (32%), and most had related work experience but little experience 
running a firm. Most respondents had worked either in the industry they would 
enter (30% in publishing, 48% in recording, 49% in reproduction) or in a related 
music industry (63% of those entering publishing, 46% entering recording, 47% 
entering reproduction). Only 7% entered an industry without any music 
experience. However, few entrants had start-up experience (11%), experience 








Table A1: Summary tables, correlation covariance matrix and ancillary analyses 
 
Panel A. Summary table of continuous and binary variables for all 
respondents in all time periods 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Minimum Maximum 
Profit 3.33 1.14 2 5 
Turnover 3.57 1.05 2 5 
Publishing 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Vertical Integration 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Publishing Ipso 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Recording Ipso 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Melody Copyright 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Radio Access 0.45 0.93 0 3 
Motive: Interesting 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Motive: For profit 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Motive: Control Copyright Sales 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Start-up Experience 0.11 0.31 0 1 
 
Panel B. Summary table of ordered variables 
 Proportion of observations with each value 
Variable 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Profit  0 0.33 0.23 0.24 0.20 
Turnover  0 0.18 0.31 0.27 0.24 
Radio 
Access 





Table A2. Correlations, variances, and covariances of the outcome variables and the 
significant predictors.  
The lower left triangle contains the correlations. The diagonal contains the variances, and the 
upper right triangle contains the covariances. 
 
 Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. Profit 1.28 1.08 0.01 0.05 -0.18 0.08 -0.21 -0.16 0.32 -0.04 0.11 0.06
2. Turnover 0.91 1.09 0.02 0.05 -0.12 0.04 -0.23 -0.16 0.23 -0.07 0.14 0.05
3. Publishing 0.01 0.03 0.24 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.01
4. Vertical 
Integration 0.20 0.23 0.05 0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01




0.15 0.09 0.11 -0.06 -0.01 0.19 0.00 0.09 0.15 -0.03 0.05 0.02
7. Recording 
Ipso -0.39 -0.46 -0.26 -0.17 0.21 -0.01 0.22 0.04 -0.10 0.02 -0.04 -0.01
8. Melody 
Copyright -0.29 -0.32 0.00 -0.12 0.10 0.42 0.16 0.22 0.11 -0.05 -0.01 0.01
9. Radio 
Access 0.31 0.24 0.16 -0.12 -0.35 0.37 -0.23 0.24 0.85 -0.05 0.10 0.04
10. Publishing 
Ipso -0.10 -0.16 0.37 -0.11 -0.23 -0.19 0.13 -0.29 -0.13 0.15 -0.02 -0.01
11. For Profit 0.20 0.28 -0.03 0.17 -0.02 0.25 -0.16 -0.05 0.22 -0.11 0.23 -0.01
12. Start-up 
Experience 0.16 0.17 0.07 -0.08 -0.03 0.13 -0.09 0.03 0.15 -0.10 -0.06 0.09
 
 
Most entrants entered only one industry, but a substantial number entered 
multiple industries. Of these entrants, 24% entered only publishing, 27% entered 
only recording and 5% entered only reproduction. Meanwhile, 16% entered both 
publishing and recording, 2% entered publishing and reproduction, and 7% 
entered recording and reproduction. A larger percentage, 19%, entered publishing, 
recording and reproduction. Overall, these entrants were moderately successful. 







and fell during 32% of them. Meanwhile, turnover rose during 51% of entries, 
remained the same for 31% of entries, and fell during 18% of entries. 
The final SEM gave support for considering three of the proposed roles 
important for achieving performance, while two others did not seem to have the 
impact the theory suggested (see table 1, table 2, and figure 1). Entrants via vertical 
integration had higher profit growth and higher turnover growth than other 
entrants did. However, corporate sponsorship was not a significant predictor. 
Meanwhile, entrants with start-up experience had positive but borderline non-
significant effects (p = .08 for profit growth and p = .12 for turnover growth) and 
therefore start-up experience was not included in the final SEM. Consistent with 
the regression results, recording ipso and publishing ipso entrants had lower profit 
growth and lower turnover growth compared to other entrants. Likewise, entrants 
with melody copyrights had lower profit growth and lower turnover growth than 
other entrants had. Entrants that had assumed previous roles that provided access 
to the radio broadcasting system had higher profit growth and higher turnover 
growth than the other entrants. Lastly, entrepreneurial objectives affected profit 
growth and turnover growth. Entrants motivated by intrinsic interest experienced 
lower profit growth while those motivated by desire to control sales of their 
copyrights had higher profit growth compared to other entrants. However, the 
turnover growth of these entrants did not differ from those of other entrants. In 
contrast, entrants driven by a profit motive had higher turnover growth but did not 





Table 1. Significant, unstandardized parameter coefficients Ordered Logit 
Regressions predicting PROFIT GROWTH (with standard errors in 
parentheses) 
     
Predictor Model 1  Model 2  
Vertical Integration 1.463 * 1.338   
 (-0.733)  (-0.73)  
Start-up Experience 1.098 * 1.031    
 (-0.548)  (-0.549)  
Recording Ipso -1.238 **  -1.402 *** 
 (-0.381)  (-0.393)  
Melody Copyright -1.656 *** -1.69 *** 
 (-0.414)  (-0.415)  
Interesting -1.255 *** -1.364 *** 
 (-0.37)  (-0.377)  
Control Copyright 
Sales  
1.459 *** 1.575 *** 
 (-0.426)  (-0.435)  
Publishing Entry   -0.722 *  
      (-0.364)   
McFadden’s R2 0.162  0.173  










Table 2. Significant, unstandardized parameter coefficients 
Ordered Logit Regression predicting TURNOVER GROWTH  
(with standard errors in parentheses) 
Publishing Ipso -1.105 *    
 (0.494)    
Recording Ipso -1.501 ***   
 (0.391)    
Melody Copyright -1.849 ***   
 (0.422)    
Radio Access 0.475 *    
 (0.195)    
For Profit Motive 0.764 *    
 (0.365)    
McFadden’s R2 0.169    
Akaike Info Criterion 2.396    
 


















































































































































































Access to the various media outlets showed the largest effects on both 
profit and turnover growth. Having radio access had the highest total positive 
effects on both profit growth (0.279 = 0.297 + [0.204 * -0.088]) and turnover 
growth (0.235). Meanwhile, owning a melody copyright had the largest negative 
effect on both profit growth (-0.342) and turnover growth (-0.338). Overall, this 
model showed a good fit to the data, explaining 34% of the profit growth variance 
and 34% of the turnover growth variance (see figure 1). None of the control 
variables (age, absolute turnover, and number of employees of the company) had a 
significant effect on profit and turnover growth upon entry. Goodness of fit 
statistics and other statistics often reported can be found in table 3 below. A 
robustness test of the above analyses with the binary profit growth and sales 
growth variables (POSITIVE PROFIT GROWTH and POSITIVE SALES GROWTH) 
showed similar results. Other results are available upon request. 
 
Table 3: Figure Captions  
Structural equation model showing the standardized coefficients of predictors’ 
effects on profit and turnover growth of respondents entering music publishing, 
recording and reproduction. 
  
Goodness of fit statistics:  
SRMR  .076 
CFI  .966 
IFI  .96 
TLI  .928 
RMSEA  .057 
  
Reduced form SMCs  
Profit growth  .340 
Turnover .342 
  
Other statistics often reported  
χ2 (37)  26 
p  .073 
AGFI  .876 





Overall, the results support the view that the entrepreneurial roles and 
entrepreneurial objectives affect firm performance upon entry into a new industry. 
The various roles that the entrepreneur has assumed in the past profoundly 
impacted the profit and turnover growth perspectives upon new entry. Assuming 
the role of intrapreneur seems to empower the entrepreneur as vertical integration 
had a positive effect on performance. Although corporate sponsorship was not 
significant, the general indication is that new entries starting from an existing 
organizational setting tend to fare better than others. This suggests that legitimacy 
may be more easily garnered by entrepreneurs in their role as intrapreneur than 
others because the internal and external constituency may credit them with a 
higher level of desirability, propriety, and appropriateness. The fact that prior 
entrepreneurial experience did not constitute a role that was significant for 
performance upon new entry may remain inconclusive but it was positive and 
borderline non-significant. 
Surprisingly, prior industry experience had a negative effect. It seems 
counterintuitive that previous experience in the industry lessens one’s legitimacy. 
Specifically, Jones (2001) found that using knowledge acquired during previous 
employment affiliations proved crucial for effectively establishing and securing 
legitimacy for new entrants. One possible explanation of this puzzling result is 
negative selection. Employees who perform well will rise through the ranks of the 
major organizations. In contrast, employees who do not will quit or be fired, and 
they are more likely to start their own firms (Hirschman, 1970). The chances of 
these entrepreneurs-by-default would be even worse if they were contractually 
bound, as is quite common in the music industries, not to employ the network of 
contacts they had built in their previous jobs. If such a process occurs, or at least is 
assumed to occur by significant stakeholders, it could explain the negative 







Having assumed roles in the past that yielded relationships with key 
players in the market improved performance, which is consistent with our 
expectations. Specifically, access to radio was a key ingredient to success for these 
131 firms. In contrast, TV access did little for performance upon new entry, 
possibly because far fewer songs are played on TV than on radio  
Surprisingly, owning one’s own copyrights, and therefore presumably 
being more knowledgeable about upstream inputs, had a negative effect on one’s 
performance. The underlying rationale for starting a new venture that is hardly 
profitable by itself could eventually function as a leverage to broker more favorable 
record deals with major record companies (Burke, 1997). However, this 
explanation seems only applicable to a small minority of very successful artists 
(Negus, 1992). Another possibility is the notorious oversupply in the cultural 
sectors of those actors who are upstream to the firms in our sample: the suppliers 
of artistic input (Menger, 1999; Caves, 2000). Because of this continuous 
oversupply, legitimacy from having assumed a role that allowed acquainting oneself 
with supplying industries is not a necessary condition for success in the music 
industries. Even the least knowledgeable firm can find competent artists to jump at 
any chance to be published, recorded or reproduced. Moreover, this legitimacy 
with suppliers, as evidenced by exploiting one’s own melody copyright, might 
negatively interact with one’s legitimacy to other stakeholders. An entrant 
exploiting his own melody copyrights signals to stakeholders that the entrepreneur 
is an artist and possibly a failed artist. To most non-artists, this signal suggests that 
the entrepreneur is not commercially inclined and therefore not someone on 
whom to risk one’s scarce resources. 
With regard to the entrepreneurial objectives, the results were mixed. The 
positive effects of financial motivations and the negative effects of non-financial 




on performance. Entrants motivated by financial reasons may readily persuade the 
internal and external constituency of the viability of the new venture. In contrast, 
entrants motivated by intrinsic interest gain psychological benefits directly from 
the work itself and can tolerate lower profits. This result may be especially 
pronounced in the music industry, because as in many other creative industries 
people need not primarily seek monetary gains. Such entrants - although being 
involved in a new venture that is very legitimate in their own eyes - may not rate so 
favorably with internal and external constituencies who do pursue monetary gains. 
Also, the oversupply of artistic works can be understood as a consequence of this 
divergence: artists are notorious for overestimating their chances of success and 
for their willingness to take greater risks compared to other stakeholders (Burke, 
1997). Moreover, the results suggest that, apart from the actual detrimental effects 
of the divergence between legitimacy to self and legitimacy to others, the perception 
of such divergence, by significant stakeholders, may in itself have a negative impact 
on performance. 
This study has a few limitations. We relied on questionnaire data rather 
than precise financial statements. Also, we had no other sources of information 
available to verify and triangulate the self-reports of the interviewees. Although 
ordered outcome variable regressions and a structural equation model based on 
polychoric correlations partially addressed these limitations, the results still tended 
to underestimate the effects of the predictors on the outcomes. Still, the significant 
results we found were sufficiently robust for us to discuss their implications. 
3.5 Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Research 
In this study we investigated the performance of 215 new entries, initiated 
by 131 companies active in the Dutch music industry, specifically, entries into 
three music industries: music publishing, music recording, and music reproduction. 







legitimacy that the venture enjoyed in the new industry. We argued that internal 
and external constituents judged the legitimacy of the new venture not only by 
evaluating whether or not the actions of the new venture are legitimate as is 
customary (Suchman, 1995), but rather by looking at the past and future of their 
endeavors. Our results indicate that the past matters; previously assumed 
entrepreneurial roles differentially impacted performance upon new entry. Also the 
future mattered; the various entrepreneurial objectives that the entrepreneur had 
set showed distinct effects. These results suggest that entrepreneurial roles and 
entrepreneurial objectives serve as ad personam markers of legitimacy that the 
entrepreneur has at his or her disposal to convince the internal and external 
constituencies of the new venture’s desirability, propriety, and appropriateness. 
Although legitimacy may not be completely malleable, the findings in this study do 
suggest that the legitimacy of the new venture reflects the entrepreneur’s legitimacy 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
As such this paper nuances the effect of organizational legitimacy on 
performance. The Mathew effect is still very much embedded in our current 
understanding of organizational legitimacy; the greater is the legitimacy of a firm 
the greater the ease to secure additional resources, thereby enhancing its 
performance. Yet this study directs attention to first considering the type of 
legitimacy before any meaningful conclusion be reached about its effect on 
performance. The benefit of the approach in this study is that took a novel 
perspective on legitimacy; contending that the new venture not only needs to be 
legitimated to external constituencies, but also needs to meet an internal threshold 
of legitimacy that justifies to the entrepreneur him or herself the time, money and 
effort spent on the pursuit of a new entry. This inward looking legitimacy may 
complement the outward looking perspective that has hitherto dominated the 




Although this paper finds evidence for an association between markers of 
legitimacy and organizational performance, it does not explicate the mechanism by 
which these markers convince the internal and external constituency. Such a study 
could shed light on how legitimacy “constitutes an asset in sustaining the flow of resources 
from the environment” (Hannan & Freeman, 1989: 67). This line of reasoning is also 
being entertained by the Resource-based View of the firm (henceforth RBV) that 
suggests that the (initial) endowments of a firm affect performance prospects 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Yet an organization at any given point in time may represent different 
degrees of legitimacy to different groups of stakeholders. No one – not even the 
entrepreneur – has complete and accurate knowledge of his stock of legitimacy. 
Especially one would like to investigate how the various markers of legitimacy may 
elicit risk-taking behavior on the part of certain stakeholders while others may be 
disinclined to do so. Whereas self-perceived legitimacy justifies risk-taking behavior 
to the entrepreneur, a resource supplier may not be convinced of the legitimacy of 
the new venture and as a result decide not to avail resources. Whether or not 
stakeholders do so depends on the extent to which the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur serve to make new entry legitimate in the eyes of these stakeholders. 
By making explicit the multifaceted characteristics of legitimacy, our approach 
renders the link between organizational legitimacy and performance suitable for a 
more precise analysis. Actual decisions made by the relevant stakeholders depend 
on a rough estimate of the amount of acceptable risk that a new venture 








4 Competition, Selection, and Authenticity; 
Payola and the Advent of Rock and Roll 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Competition is defined as the “active demand by two or more organisms or kinds 
of organisms for some environmental resource in short supply.”10 In economic terms this 
means that suppliers are vying for the favorable consideration of their prospective 
customers by offering the ‘best’ possible products. Yet who determines which 
products are the best? And, equally important; how do prospective customers find 
out what is the best buy before proceeding to the cash register? 
This paper posits that understanding the way in which a product’s value is 
determined is a prerequisite for competitive processes. To compete successfully, a 
firm’s products have to be recognized as valuable. As this is the point of departure 
for analyzing of competitive processes, the concept of the selection system 
(Wijnberg, 1995; Wijnberg & Gemser, 2000) will be employed to analyze the 
events that unfolded after the introduction of rock and roll in the US music 
industry halfway through the 1950’s. 
The selection system describes the interaction between firms that are in 
competition with each other and actors that are in the position to affect this 
competitive process by asserting the value of the products on offer in this market. 
In a given selection system the latter set of actors is called the ‘selectors’ and the 
first set is comprised of the ‘selected’. As such, wine critics operate as selectors in 
the wine industry by im- or explicitly giving ratings to the various wines that are 




For a comprehensive understanding of how the value of competing 
products is determined, it is important to realize that selectors themselves can be 
involved in their own competitive process among each other. More specifically, the 
selected can affect the competitive process of the selectors by allying themselves 
with particular groups of selectors and not with others. This implies that the 
survival chances of the selected and the selectors are intricately related and their 
respective competitive arenas cannot be fully understood in isolation. 
The main purpose of the paper is to better understand the strategic 
opportunities that arise from the mutual interdependence of these competitive 
arenas. Special attention will be paid to the relationship between the subsequent 
strategies that are pursued and the ways in which the awareness of the mutual 
interdependence between selectors and selected affects the value of the goods and 
services in question. 
The cultural industries seem particularly suitable for studying the 
relationships and interactions between the selectors and the selected. This stems 
from the fact that within cultural industries the role played by selectors in the 
determination of value is generally more visible than in other industries, for 
instance those of lawn-mowers and refrigerators. Some refrigerators are considered 
to be more valuable than others for the supposedly obvious reason that they can 
store more food, keep it cold for a longer period of time at less cost, and maybe 
because they have a better fit with other appliances in the average kitchen. Some 
paintings, books or movies, on the other hand, are considered to have more value 
than others because they have qualities that are supposedly harder to determine, 
such as aesthetic value or, even more problematic, innovation and authenticity. 
The harder it is to determine the value of individual product characteristics, the 
more valuable is the necessary knowledge and expertise (Hirsch, 1969; 1972; 
Peterson & Berger, 1975; Wijnberg, 1995; Wijnberg & Gemser, 2000; Caves, 2000). 







as selectors. It not only increases the likelihood of fierce competition among 
selectors themselves, but also the likelihood that the selected will make an attempt 
to influence the outcome of the competitive process taking place among the 
selectors for their own gain. 
For the purposes of this paper, the focal interest will be on authenticity. 
Authenticity can be considered to constitute an essential characteristic of a 
product; just like acceleration is a product characteristic of a car or like novelty 
being a product characteristic of a painting or an academic paper. As noted in the 
above, the selectors determine the value of a product on the basis of their 
judgment concerning the presence of the product characteristics they think most 
relevant and therefore also evaluate the authenticity a particular product. 
Authenticity is of particular importance in the music industry because of the fact 
that the consumption of music plays such an important role in how people create 
and sustain their psychological and social identity. Whole genres derive their 
meaning from authenticity and sometimes their names make explicit references to 
it (think of ‘roots reggae’). As such, the ‘production’ of authenticity featured 
prominently in country music (Peterson, 1997). 
However, authenticity as a product characteristic has a more profound 
effect on the development of competitive processes than others as authenticity can 
also be considered to constitute an essential characteristic of the selector. One 
needs to be authentic to authenticate. Because of this implicit link between the 
authenticity of the selectors and the authenticity of products it is posited that the 
production and evaluation of authenticity have specific ramifications for the way in 
which the selected and selectors interact.  
This paper is organized as follows. In the theory section, the framework of 
the selection system will be explained in greater detail, focusing in particular on the 




between selected and selectors, leading up to a differentiation of 4 basic strategic 
options. Next, authenticity, as a product characteristic and as an attribute of 
selectors, will be discussed. This is followed by an examination of the practice of 
payola employing the theoretical perspective developed in the earlier sections. 
Payola is a term that refers to the offering of money or other incentives in 
exchange for favorable consideration of a song by the selectors. We will focus 
upon the way in which record companies competed by allying themselves with 
radio and TV broadcasters that acted as the relevant selectors at the time. In doing 
so, we will put a special emphasis on the role of authenticity in the competitive 




4.2.1 Selection Systems & Competition among Selectors 
In spite of its centrality in the analysis of how markets function, the 
concept of value remains poorly understood. Yet value is the driver of economic 
behavior; production and consumption patterns are built on the respective 
understandings of what is valuable. When determining the value of a product, it is 
necessary to identify the explicit or implicit set of criteria that is employed to arrive 
at an estimate of the value of a product in comparison with competing alternatives. 
Sometimes the consumer is able to do this for him/herself, but there are also many 
situations in which the customer may not be able to arrive at an estimate of 
product utility, for instance because of the existence of significant information 
asymmetries (Akerlof, 1970; Nelson, 1970; Darby & Karni, 1973).  
The framework of selection systems (Wijnberg, 1995; Wijnberg & 
Gemser, 2000; Gemser & Wijnberg, 2001) may serve well for the purpose of 







competitive processes in terms of actors who are being selected (the selected) and 
actors who are doing the selecting (the selectors). In every industry a particular 
selection system can be identified. The selectors identify which products to take 
into consideration, and then proceed to evaluate these selected products on the 
basis of the criteria they deem relevant. Hence customer utility can be seen as the 
value that the product has to the customer according to the judgment of the 
relevant selectors. From our definition of selectors it follows that if the evaluation 
of a particular group of actors, for instance film critics, only predicts but does not 
influence box office results (Eliashberg & Shugan, 1997), this group does not 
constitute selectors. 
Three ideal types can be distinguished: market, peer and expert selection. 
The first type is market-selection, in which the final customers are the relevant 
selectors and the producers are the selected. In this case, customers themselves are 
able to ascertain the customer utility of a product before proceeding to a 
commercial transaction. In other cases the customers may have to rely on the 
vicarious evaluation by others, especially in the absence of clear criteria with which 
to assess the value of a product. In these instances, the customer takes the 
opinions of others as proxies with which to quantify the utility of a product. Such 
is the case in the second ideal type - called peer selection - when the opinions of 
other producers (peers) form the shorthand description by which customers will 
judge the perceived customer utility of the product under consideration. A clear-
cut case of peer selection is the practice of academic papers being reviewed by 
fellow academics. If expert selection - the third ideal type - prevails, customer 
utility is derived from the opinions of a category of persons, who are neither 
customers nor producers but to whom particular knowledge and expertise is 
ascribed. As such, insurance companies are rated by Moody’s, restaurants by 




emphasized, however, that the types of selection systems described here are ideal 
types. In reality, outcomes of competitive processes are often determined by a 
combination of these types. In some cases, two types of selection, e.g. market and 
expert selection, can be seen to operate alongside each other; in other cases two or 
more selection systems operate sequentially. It is posited that in the analysis of any 
competitive process it is possible to specify what kind of selection system is 
prevalent, the identity of the relevant selectors, and the identity of the dominant 
selectors. 
It is important to emphasize that the role of selectors is twofold: they are 
the gatekeepers for the selection system and the jurors of the selection process. 
Firstly, they explicitly or implicitly identify which firms are valid competitors, 
thereby effectively distinguishing between ‘selected’ and ‘non-selected’ firms. 
Secondly, they separate winners from losers by attributing much value to the 
products of some producers and little to the products of others, which is 
eventually reflected in the price that the customer is willing to pay for a particular 
product. This is why the common reading of gatekeepers is too narrow and as it is 
confined mostly to the act of differentiating among the ‘selected’ and ‘non-
selected’ (e.g. Caves, 2000). 
Because the selectors determine the outcome of the competitive process, 
firms will attempt to win their favor by offering goods or services that are more 
likely to satisfy the preferences of the consumers than the goods or services 
offered by their competitors. This is what is normally understood by direct 
competition. However, firms are also tempted to influence the selectors’ judgment 
in other ways. If a firm is able to get a preferential treatment by one of the 
dominant selectors so that its products are more readily acknowledged or more 
favorably rated, its chances to establish a competitive advantage are greatly 
enhanced. Such a relationship can take various forms: it can take the form of 







bribes (Caves, 2000; Conlan, 1994). Such relationships are often deemed illegal or 
are at least prone to raise the suspicion by the authorities concerned with 
competition policy. 
Besides acting as selectors in other actors’ competitive processes, the 
selectors can be involved in their own competitive processes, as competitors or, in 
the terminology used here, as selected. It is important to understand that the 
selectors (in their pursuit of becoming ‘selected’) are competing with other 
(potential) selectors connected to the same selection system, for the privilege, and 
the resulting benefits, of being the dominant selector in that system.  
In situations of pure market selection the role of selector brings few 
benefits to the average consumer, precisely because the other consumers will not 
be willing to pay for the services of selectors other than themselves. In situations 
where peer selection dominates, those peers who are more important selectors 
than others can often reap rewards in the form of increases in in-group status, 
which can, in turn result in other benefits. Being successful as a selector is most 
important where there is expert selection by professional experts, who have to earn 
their living by acting as such. Therefore, the more expert selection is dominant, the 
more it is likely that the competition between (potential) selectors is fierce. In such 
instances, alliances between selectors and groups of selected are more likely to be 
prevalent for the purposes to influence their respective competitive processes 
because the benefit may be mutual. 
This particular strategic option can be understood best as an alternative 
within a fourfold classification of basic strategies that are available to competitors 
in a particular selection system: 1) direct competition with other firms by offering 
products that better satisfy the preferences of the selectors; 2) convincing the 
selectors that prefer the products of other competitors to change their preferences; 




other selectors; 4) changing the characteristics of the selection system as a whole so 
that one’s products stand a better chance of being preferred by the relevant 
selectors. Which strategic option is desirable will of course depend on the 
resources and capabilities of the competing actors, but also on the extent to which 
the characteristics of the products, and the preferences of the selectors concerning 
these characteristics, lend themselves to the pursuit of a particular strategy. 
 
4.2.2 Authenticity & Selection  
The word authenticity denotes truthfulness: something or someone is 
judged as genuine, true to it- or oneself. To authenticate is to establish that this is 
the case. Although a semantic analysis reveals various nuances, there are essentially 
two different readings of authenticity. The first and most straightforward sense of 
authenticity refers to the fact that something is really what it claims to be (in the 
sense of not constituting a fake or imitation). The second reading of authenticity 
refers to the fact that something is what it ought to be according to its 
creator/author. In this second sense, authenticity stands in a peculiar relationship 
to originality which again has two complementary parts. Originality in the sense of 
having a clear and direct link to the true originator can render something authentic. 
Yet originality in the sense of being new, innovative, unexpected, different from 
the traditional essence of the particular category has a different meaning. The 
critical issue here is perception, because authenticity as a product characteristic 
cannot be operationalized without specifying whose perception will determine and 
thereby authenticate its presence.  
If authenticity is a significant determinant of value, the perception of the 
relevant selectors will be the perception that counts. Moreover, authenticity as a 
characteristic of a product or of a producer – apart from how it is defined and 







If authenticity features prominently among the characteristics of a particular 
product, the selectors perform their twofold role by firstly denying inauthentic 
products/producers entry to the relevant selection system and secondly by 
determining the value of products by establishing the level of authenticity along 
with the levels of other significant product characteristics that are present. It 
should be clear that, as much as one attempts to distinguish the two, authenticity 
of the product and authenticity of the producer are intimately related, especially in 
the sense that certification of the authenticity of the producer can lead to starting 
out from the assumption that the product has authenticity and vice versa. But this 
relationship goes further. Particular to authenticity is the fact that the ‘true to self’ 
aspect specifically touches upon the relationship between producer and product; 
the product is authentic and the producer is authentic if the producer could not 
have produced something different without being untrue to her/himself and the 
product would be ‘false’ if produced by someone else. Besides this relationship 
between the authenticity of the product and the producer, there is another 
relationship that is of even greater interest for this paper, the one between, on the 
one hand, the authenticity of product and/or producer and, on the other hand, the 
authenticity of the selector. 
Authenticity is similar to innovation in the sense that it is something that 
can only be determined with knowledge of the product category and its history. A 
stylistic innovation, for instance, can only be adequately evaluated with sufficient 
knowledge of the discourse of art history (Schapiro, 1953; Gilmore, 2000; 
Wijnberg, 2004). Because the average consumer usually lacks sufficient knowledge 
of these matters, a higher relative importance of authenticity or novelty will make it 
likely that the relevant selection system will evolve or has evolved away from 
market selection and towards peer and, especially, expert selection. The relevant 




the product is innovative or authentic. An interesting difference appears at this 
point between novelty and authenticity. The art-historian who certifies a particular 
artist or movement as innovative does not necessarily have to be an innovator in 
his/her own field to be convincing and successful as a selector. However, someone 
who certifies the authenticity of someone or something has to be perceived as 
authentic him/herself to be a successful selector.  
As such, it is likely that when authenticity is relatively important as a 
product characteristic, the selectors will more often be peers or experts. Especially 
when selectors earn their living as professionals by providing implicit or explicit 
product appraisals, this may give rise to potential conflicts of interest. Precisely 
these selectors have to overcome suspicions that they represent the interests of the 
highest bidder, and thus are inauthentic as selectors, to compete successfully with 
other (potential) selectors. This is the case in, for instance, the pharmaceutical 
industry, where the preservation of professional neutrality is a cause of concern 
(Conlan, 1994). For selectors of products where authenticity is an essential 
characteristic, their authenticity is such a fragile asset that even when it is merely 
questioned, the reputation of the selector can be severely damaged. As we shall see 
below, this fact can have important consequences for the interaction between, on 
the one hand, the competitive processes within a selection system and, on the 
other hand, the competition between (potential) selectors. 
 
4.2.3 Authenticity in Music 
 Wijnberg and Gemser (2000) showed how the relative importance, as a 
product characteristic, of novelty per se came to dominate all other product 
characteristics in the selection systems of the modern visual arts, after the success 
of the Impressionists. Similarly, the relative importance of authenticity increased 







music, both classical – think of the success of ‘authentic’ performances of 
especially baroque music – and popular – many popular artists use closeness to 
their ‘roots’ as a powerful sales argument, whether their music is hip-hop (McLeod, 
1999) or country (Peterson, 1997). In her 2003 song ‘Jenny from the block’, 
Jennifer Lopez explicitly acknowledged the importance of being authentic, singing: 
‘no matter where I go, I know where I came from (from the Bronx!)’.  
It should be emphasized that in this last example authenticity does not 
mean original or innovative or rebellious but nothing more than the authenticity of 
the link between producer and product that has been described in the previous 
section like Jenny taking her block with her when she goes singing. In most cases 
where authenticity is of importance as in the case of Rock and Roll - as we will 
describe below - authenticity also refers to the authenticity of an artifact as an 
expression of a particular ideological position or at least socio-cultural stance. 
However, for the purposes of our argument it is of little significance what kind of 
authenticity is under consideration; the crucial question is how important 
authenticity is as a product characteristic and how this product characteristic is 
perceived and determined. 
The main reason for the increase in the relative importance of authenticity 
as a product characteristic for many cultural products seems to lay in the fact that 
consumption of cultural products can function as a marker of identity. While in 
previous periods most persons were not expected to question their personal or 
group identity, or the relationship between the two, the modern period has often 
been characterized by the problem of establishing and maintaining one’s identity, 
both as a person and as a group member. A medieval peasant, a priest, or a baron, 
knew not only who he was but also what kinds of consumer behavior was 
expected of (or allowed to) him. In the modern world one’s identity is most 




especially decisions regarding the consumption of cultural products are perceived 
to reflect upon one’s psychological and social identity (Bourdieu, 1984; DiMaggio, 
1987; Campbell, 1987). Among cultural products, the consumption of music is the 
most powerful marker of identity especially for adolescents and subsequently 
young adults incidentally still represent the largest segment of demand for recorded 
music. The consumption of music in these groups is so central that they 
significantly impact the consumption of other products, such as clothing (Dolfsma, 
1999). 
Precisely this link between music and identity increases the importance of 
authenticity, because the authenticity of one’s identity will become linked to the 
authenticity of the music that one consumes and the musicians making it 
(Peterson, 1997; McLeod, 1999; Clay, 2003). This linkage only increased in strength 
when the reputation of popular musicians came to be based not only on their 
ability to express themselves in terms of performance but also in terms of voicing 
their personal ideas and beliefs (Frith, 1996). Whenever the authenticity of an artist 
became questionable, in an artistic sense but also in an ideological sense, problems 
arose with the (self-) identification of consumers. Examples range from the blatant 
non-singing by the pop vocal duo Milli Vanilli to the belated admission of being 
homosexual by superstar George Michael. Recently, the rock-band Metallica 
shocked fans by suing the peer-to-peer file sharing network Napster, which like 
Metallica itself was deemed to be an icon of the anti-establishment. This, in turn, 
makes it only more important that the relevant selectors certifying authenticity in 
music are perceived as authentic themselves. The case of payola, which will be 
presented below, illustrates the economic consequences of the relationship 








4.3 Payola & the Advent of Rock and Roll 
4.3.1 Payola 
Because the music industry is an industry marked by overproduction, 
consumers will only come to know a small fraction of the products on offer. 
Hirsch (1969) referred to this as ‘the filtering process by which records are preselected for 
public consumption’. The importance of this filtering process is the main reason for 
the prevalence of the practice of ‘payola’, offering money or other incentives in 
exchange for favorable consideration of a song by the actors involved in the 
filtering process. Caves (2000) gives a broader definition of payola as ‘the bribe paid 
in order to influence a gatekeeper’s choice among competing creative products’. Taking an 
institutional approach to the issue, Coase (1979) regarded payola as an economic 
mechanism, which enhanced rather than diminished customer welfare. In essence 
payola enabled a pricing system thereby avoiding the waste of resources that would 
accompany alternative solutions. 
The term payola is best known in connection with the upheaval in the 
1960s about payments to radio DJ’s. The term itself, however, originates from the 
vaudeville era, when music publishers started paying popular performers or 
bandleaders to perform a song in theatres and music halls, in the hope of an 
increase in the demand for sheet music (Segrave, 1994; Hyland, 1995; Brewster & 
Broughton, 1999; Caves, 2000). Isaac Goldberg, a famous songwriter in the first 
decennia of the 20th century, noted that the competition for getting a song 
performed by a well-known artist became so intense that there were ‘simply not 
enough singers to go around’’11. It became an elaborate business, including secretly 
paying waiters to engage in a sing-along with the performer on stage or monetary 
incentives being given to the members of the audience to clap their hands with the 




Caves, 2000). Although being by and large a lawful activity, payola eventually ran 
into severe criticism and was dubbed by entertainment magazine Variety (1915) as 
‘payment evil’12.  
Yet it was not until the advent of Rock & Roll in the 1950s that payola 
became the object of a widely publicized Congressional inquiry that ended its 
legality. The major difference was that this time the emphasis of the public scrutiny 
had shifted from the givers to the takers of payola (Segrave, 1994). Whereas before 
a hefty fine was levied when a music publisher was found to have paid for airplay, 
now the DJs themselves were subjected to criminal investigations (Segrave, 1994; 
Brewster & Broughton, 1999). 
4.3.2 The Music Industry & the Advent of Rock and Roll 
The music industry in the late 1940s resembled an oligopoly with a few 
dominant firms, the so-called majors: Capitol, Columbia, RCA, Victor, and 
Mercury. There were smaller firms, but they mainly focused on smaller niche-
markets and did not present a threat to the majors. Not surprisingly, the industry 
concentration rates were at an all-time high, with the market share of the largest 
four companies, the so-called C4 ratio, reaching 89% in 1949 (Peterson and 
Berger, 1975). The most important broadcasting medium was radio and this 
industry was also highly concentrated, with four national networks catering to most 
of the listeners. All the majors had ownership relationships with leading media: 
Columbia was aligned with CBS, Victor RCA was affiliated with NBC, Decca was 
linked with MCA and Capitol was connected to Paramount Pictures. Therefore 
they could give a song heavy rotation if such was required. In 1948, 70 million 
radios were in use in the United States while the TV audience was estimated to 
reach about an eighth of that figure (Sanjek & Sanjek, 1991). The four national 







of popular music were considered to constitute a fairly homogenous market that 
was fairly predictable (Peterson and Berger, 1975).  
This situation started to change in the 1950s and the sum of those changes 
irrevocably changed the landscape of the music industry (Peterson, 1990). At first, 
however, developments were gradual and modest. Because of the large difference 
in scale and scope, the majors and the smaller independent firms, the so-called 
‘indies’, seemingly formulated their strategies in disregard of the behavior of each 
other. The most significant developments affecting the business environment 
were: a) changes with regard to broadcasting media; b) changes with regard to the 
characteristics of the audience. 
In the early 1950s, television was quickly gaining popularity; exceeding 20 
million sets in 1952. Large advertisers were quick to respond to the growth of this 
new medium, by shifting their advertisement expenditures accordingly. Peterson 
and Berger (1975) reported that between 1948 and 1952 the income from radio 
broadcasting fell by 38%. As a direct result, many commercial radio stations got 
into dire financial plights as they saw their income from advertising quickly 
diminished (Hirsch, 1969). Yet the number of radio stations increased during this 
period as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) started to grant many 
new licenses to broadcast, allowing the number of radio broadcasters to double in 
the four years following 1947 (Peterson, 1990). Most of these new radio stations 
were local and specialized themselves in particular types of music and segments of 
the audience (Sanjek & Sanjek, 1991). Peterson (1990) reported that many of these 
new broadcasters had little financial resources; greatly restraining the scope and 
scale of their activities. The radio stations were forced to resort to the cheapest 
form of broadcasting: playing records on air (Peterson & Berger, 1975). 
There were big changes taking place in the market as well. The income gap 




rhythm and blues (Sanjek & Sanjek, 1991). But even more important was the 
growing segment of teenagers that would reach its height at the peak of the baby 
boom in the early 60’s, who by this time had become avid consumers of music. 
Although they had less purchasing power in comparison to the adult segment, they 
were indispensable for the market for music singles (Clarke, 1995). Additionally, 
teenagers seemed to increasingly adopt a group identity that set them apart from – 
and some would say even in opposition to - the adult population. This 
development coincided with a greater awareness and appreciation of the 
songwriter among the record buying public (Clarke, 1995). This not only provided 
an additional reason for worry about teenage behavior (think of movies such as the 
1955 picture Blackboard Jungle about an unruly high school), but also translated 
into an additional demand for role models and identity-markers with whom the 
teenagers could identify themselves. New forms of popular music, principally Rock 
& Roll, fulfilled this demand and turned the market from being largely 
homogenous to becoming increasingly heterogeneous (Peterson and Berger, 1975). 
Whereas the majors were quick to recognize the importance of television 
as a new broadcasting medium, they largely overlooked the changes with regard to 
the demand side (Sanjek & Sanjek, 1991; Denisoff, 1975; Peterson and Berger, 
1975). By this time the majors had largely completed their strategy of vertical 
integration in the music industry. They controlled the whole value system from the 
artist upstream to distribution downstream, and increasingly thought that the 
market was malleable (Peterson and Berger, 1975). As a result, the majors 
continued to formulate their strategies with regard to radio and television all based 
on the assumption of a homogenous audience. Also because of their ownership 
ties to the larger radio networks, the majors disregarded the heterogeneity that was 
developing in local radio (Peterson and Berger, 1975). Encouraged by the success 
of television shows like Dick Clark’s American Bandstand, the majors became 







stars, while hardly tapping into the emerging genre of Rock and Roll artists (Sanjek 
& Sanjek, 1991; Denisoff, 1975).  
The smaller record companies, also called the ‘indies’, followed a very 
different strategy. Whereas there were as little as half a dozen active record 
companies in 1941, this number grew to 1,500-2,000 in the 1950s, because of the 
diffusion of new and cost-effective technologies (Segrave, 1994). As their limited 
means put television out of reach, they were aggressively pursuing exposure of 
their new songs via the increasing number of local radio stations (Peterson, 1990). 
In doing so they, the indies, did what their larger rivals had done before them: 
paying money to radio DJs in exchange for airplay of their Rock & Roll songs 
(Peterson & Berger, 1975; Coase, 1979). Precisely because the smaller radio 
stations were mainly playing records instead of live performances and because they 
specialized in particular genres and targeting specific audiences, they proved to be 
very attractive media for the new genres of rhythm & blues and later Rock & Roll 
that the independent record companies were pushing (Peterson & Berger, 1975). 
Having their music played on local radio yielded two specific advantages to the 
independent record companies. Firstly, they were able to manage their own local 
distribution networks, in effect sidestepping the competitive advantage that the 
majors enjoyed at the national level. Secondly, these local radio networks could 
provide a springboard for gaining national popularity of their songs, because a 
record that was a hit with the audience at one station was likely to be picked up by 
another station. 
The local DJ proved to be the crucial actor in this process. The DJs at the 
local radio stations enjoyed much greater autonomy than their counterparts in the 
radio networks, which were largely controlled by the majors. The local DJs vied to 
be the first to introduce new, original and authentic, music to their audience. As 




networks, these local radio DJs identified themselves with the music they played, 
almost as if they were themselves musicians. At the same time they manifested 
themselves more and more explicitly as vocal and authentic representatives of their 
audience. Both aspects of the new role of the DJ were particularly visible or, 
rather, audible, in the case of the DJs associating themselves with the Rock and 
Roll movement (Brewster & Broughton, 1999). This was exemplified by the case 
of Alan Freed, who was also promoting Rhythm and Blues and Rock and Roll 
music by organizing dance events. At one such event in Boston, riots broke out 
and arrests were made. Because the event was widely covered in the media a direct 
result was that advertisers became weary of becoming associated with Rock and 
Roll. This event did initially constitute a setback for the Rock and Roll movement 
as several radio stations even chose to ban Rock and Roll all together (Sanjek & 
Sanjek, 1991). At the same time, however, the local DJs became increasingly 
legitimated as authentic representatives of the anti-establishment in the eyes of the 
Rock and Roll fans (Segrave, 1994; Brewster & Broughton, 1999).  
During the 1957-58 television season the majors realized that TV had not 
yet matched radio’s ability to induce record sales when the popularity of their 
supposed ‘affable’ singing personalities on TV dwindled (Sanjek & Sanjek, 1991). 
Although American Bandstand proved to be a great success with 67 ABC affiliates 
airing the show in 1957, it hardly played any new releases on the show, limiting the 
chances for new music to be introduced to the public (Segrave, 1994). Guests that 
frequented the show were arrived artists like Fabian, Frankie Avalon, and Chubby 
Checker, not Elvis Presley or Buddy Holly. There was a firm belief among the 
majors, however, that TV would be the dominant platform for releasing music in 
the future. But things proved to move slowly and Peterson (Peterson, 1990) 
reported that in 1948 the radio stations played more new music than did the TV 







a medium to which people looked for their popular music’. Contrary to the expectations of 
the majors, the ‘death of radio’ did not materialize. 
In the meantime, the new independent record companies thrived and as a 
result the volatility in the music industry increased dramatically. Accordingly, 
Peterson and Berger (1975) reported that during the years 1955 to 1962 the market 
share of the largest 4 firms, measured with the C4 concentration ratio, dropped 
from 74 percent to a mere 25 percent.  
To reverse this trend, the majors basically had four strategic options: 1) 
they could compete with the successful indies by developing and marketing Rock 
and Roll that would please the teenager audience; 2) they could court the local 
radio DJs by bribing them into favoring their songs instead of those offered by the 
indies; 3) they could start to undermine the power of the local radio DJs who had 
proven to be so crucial for the realization of the success of the indies; or 4) they 
could attempt to change the ways in which the tastes of the main (teenager) 
audience was constructed, so as to make them dislike rock and roll. In fact the 
majors followed all of these strategies simultaneously. 
Even if hesitantly at first, they started to develop their own Rock and Roll 
artists as well as buying successful artists, such as Presley, away from the indies. 
They also started to pay more attention and more money to local radio stations 
and, especially, DJs. At the annual Deejay Convention in 1959, the majors went at 
great length to comfort the DJs and this even included the provision of escort 
services (Segrave, 1994). More salient, however, was the vigorous pursuit of the 
third option aimed at undermining the power of the local DJs who had allied 
themselves with the indies (Coase, 1979). To do so their prime objective was to 
eradicate the DJs’ claims of authenticity as representatives of the Rock and Roll 




own taste. The prime tool to achieve this objective was to persuade the lawmakers 
and politicians to look into the subject of payola. 
The major record companies embarked on an extensive lobbying 
campaign directed at Capitol Hill claiming that the practice of payola severely 
limited their chances of commercial success. For different reasons, Congress was 
also keen on curbing the influence of the DJs, who were seen as the pushers of 
Rock & Roll (Coase, 1979). Spurred by recent riots at dance events, the 
establishment was more willing to put an end to the spread of ‘bad music’ than to 
rid the industry of supposed malpractices (Brewster & Broughton, 1999; Coase, 
1979). As a direct result of the hearings, there was tremendous public outcry about 
the practice of payola. But more importantly: not only was the establishment upset, 
the Rock and Roll fans felt disappointed in their genuine belief in the honesty of 
those associated with the music: the artists, the record companies and especially 
the DJs. The explicit payments made to the DJs were testimony of the fact that 
Rock and Roll was not a genuine underground movement; on the contrary it 
thrived on capitalist practices! Blatant denials of the practice hardly fared better 
than DJs trying to rationalize their actions. Tom Clay, a prominent DJ in Detroit, 
explains the practice in almost Coasian terms: ‘But it is all right for a man to put down 
$200 and leave a record for a deejay. If the deejay honestly thinks it is good, then he is justified in 
taking the $200 because, after all, that money is an investment for the record company. If the 
deejay turns down the record, the $200 is well spent. It saves the company money- they won’t go 
ahead and make 10,000 records.’13 
What had been a tax-deductible expense for years was quickly outlawed 
shortly after the finish of the Congressional hearings and payola was banned by law 
in 1960 (Hirsch, 1969). 
Clearly the payola hearings affected the indies much more in comparison 
with the majors, although they both had engaged extensively in payola. Yet when 







strike a preferential deal. For instance, RCA agreed to openly declare not to engage 
future payola practices, without having to admit it had ever done so before 
(Segrave, 1994). This led Segrave (1994:100) to state that ‘[m]ainly it was Rock and 
roll, small record companies and deejays especially, who came under the gun. Lost or deliberately 
left out in the shuffle were […] major labels. The greater one’s position in the establishment, the 
more likely one was to get a cursory or nonexistent look.’ 
Keen on avoiding any hint of favoritism by the DJ after the scandals that 
were revealed during the Congressional hearings, the radio stations quickly adopted 
the Top 40 format because of its largely ‘scientific’ manner in which records were 
selected (Hirsch, 1969), which contrasted favorably with the corruptible practices 
of the DJs (Brewster & Broughton, 1999). The Top 40 format was structured 
around giving airplay to songs in accordance with their representative share of 
over-the-counter sales at the retail store. 
In the years directly following the payola hearings, Rock and Roll had lost 
a lot of its appeal, which showed in the number of Rock and Roll records sold 
(Peterson and Berger, 1975). The majors gradually increased their market share to 
the detriment of the market share of the indies, who were very dependent on Rock 
and Roll for generating revenue. In spite of its declining popularity, the majors 
were keen to invest in the Rock and Roll genre through the acquisition of smaller 
independent records labels, by buying artists away from the indies, or by 
developing their own stable of rock and roll artists. As not all radio programs were 
formatted on the basis of the top-40 and new songs also needed an outlet on the 
air, the majors set out to contract ‘independent’ pluggers, a loosely defined 
network of agents with established relationships with the radio stations, for 
‘promotional activities’. Millions of dollars were allocated by the majors to 
accommodate this form of ‘legal payola’ (Caves, 2000). Furthermore, the majors 




producing a large quantity of new releases in the hope that two or three out of 10 
releases would attain commercial success (Denisoff, 1975). This strategy effectively 
set in motion a crowding out effect as the radio stations could only consider three 
to four new albums each week (Vogel, 1998). The independent record labels could 
not afford these costly strategies and were consequently forced to support just the 
releases they thought would make hit singles rather than supporting a diversified 
portfolio (Denisoff, 1975). Thus by the time Rock and Roll regained popularity in 
1962/3, the majors had such a firm grip on the genre that they could fully profit by 
advertising popular artists, like Elvis Presley. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
In this section we will discuss the case of payola in terms of the theoretical 
framework presented earlier in this paper. We will focus on the relationship and 
interaction between the selected and the selectors and give special attention to the 
role that authenticity played. 
We started examining how payola was defined in the extant literature. In 
terms of our framework payola should be understood as incentives, monetary or 
otherwise, offered by particular selected to the selectors in order to persuade them 
to favor the products of these selected relative to the products of others. Given the 
twofold role of selectors, favoring specific selected can mean that these selected 
are allowed more effective entry to the selection system than they would have been 
enjoying otherwise, or that the products of the selected are rated higher than 
would have been the case if the selectors had evaluated them in disregard of the 
identity of the producers. In the course of the twentieth century it became 
apparent that, with regard to the products of the music industry, the most effective 







by the media (Rothenbuhler, 1985; Rothenbuhler, 1987; Sanjek & Sanjek, 1991; 
Segrave, 1994; Caves, 2000). 
Although TV sales did enjoy tremendous growth in the early years of the 
1950s, the forerunners of the VJs did not replace their counterparts on the radio as 
the dominant selectors in the music industry. People still largely based their 
musical taste and purchases on what they had heard on the radio (Sanjek & Sanjek, 
1991). Within radio itself a dichotomy could be observed. On the one hand, there 
were the DJs at the established radio networks who like their counterparts at the 
TV networks - did little to accommodate the changes that had been taking place in 
demand. On the other hand, there were the DJs at the local radio stations who had 
been quick to pick up and at times even encourage these changes in demand. The 
result was that a feedback-loop ensued in which the influence of those DJs 
increased who seemed best to represent the tastes and mood of the audience. It is 
important to emphasize that although the tastes of the audience played an 
important role in this process, the radio DJs were the significant selectors as the 
listening audience who depended on the DJs to select for them. The reason why 
these DJs could so effectively act as selectors was based in large part on the fact 
that their audience wanted music they could find authentic, as a foundation for 
their self-image, as individuals and as members of the group. To certify 
authenticity as a product characteristic, the local radio DJs used their own 
authenticity. With their rebellious attitude they could be trusted to select music that 
would rock the establishment. 
The very reason why the majors had linked up with radio and TV 
networks was that, by having ownership relationships with the selectors, they 
hoped that they could favorably influence the competitive process. Subsequently, 
they could give a song heavy rotation almost by means of corporate order. The 




with selectors that were not bound to the majors: the local radio DJs. The most 
effective way to do so was by providing (mostly small-scale) payola to these actors. 
In the second half of the 1950s, it became clear that the indies had got a lucky 
break, because they and not the majors had been able to ally themselves with the 
most significant selector of the time: the local disk jockey. In short, the majors had 
grossly miscalculated the effect of TV as an effective medium for introducing new 
music to the public.14 
The effect of the alliances with the selectors was directly visible in how the 
respective market shares of the majors and the indies developed. The market share 
of the indies saw unprecedented growth; the majors, on the contrary, saw their 
market share tumble as they had placed their bets on the radio and television 
networks in stead of on the dominant selectors. 
As described in the previous section, the majors had four strategic 
options; Reformulated in terms of our theory: 1) they could try to produce rock 
and roll music that was more in line with taste palate of the dominant selectors at 
the time: the local radio DJs; 2) they could try to ally themselves with the dominant 
selectors, by paying (bigger) bribes to the local DJs, thereby changing the 
preferences of selectors; 3) they could make an attempt to undermine the 
effectiveness of the local radio DJ in his role as a selector of music, or 4) they 
could attempt to change the relevant selection system altogether. 
While all strategies were followed, not all were equally effective. The 
option of changing the selection system by betting on TV rather than radio may 
have been a viable alternative in the long run; in the short run it had proven 
disastrous. The third strategy proved the most effective, at least in the short run. 
The majors knew that DJs had one Achilles heel: their authenticity. Being the 
selectors of authentic Rock and Roll music, the local DJs had to present 
themselves as the voice of the rebellious Rock and Roll spirit. When the majors 







painfully clear during the hearings that followed that the local DJs were not 
authentic. In the eyes of the Rock and Roll fans, the shame was not in the 
supposed illegality of the acceptance of payola. On the contrary, the local DJs were 
just pawns in a capitalist game, being solely motivated to play records on air 
because of monetary incentives rather then picking records in the spirit of Rock 
and Roll. 
In this way the majors were able to reverse their earlier strategic mistakes. 
By undermining the authenticity of the dominant selector, the majors in fact 
turned a valuable asset in the hands of the indies – their strong ties to the local 
radio DJs - into a liability. More precisely, by interfering in the competitive process 
among selectors the majors destroyed the competitive advantage of those selectors 
that had allied themselves with their rivals, the indies. This in turn significantly 
reduced the competitive advantages held by the indies themselves. In fact, by 
incapacitating the local radio DJs in their function as the dominant selectors they 
bought themselves time; time to effectively pursue the first and second strategic 
options; developing their own Rock and Roll portfolio as well as allying themselves 
with the dominant selectors. Furthermore, the adoption of the Top 40 format in 
radio broadcasting, both at the local radio stations as well as at the national 
networks, played into the hands of the majors as they had the benefit of having 
substantial marketing budgets and superior distribution channels at their disposal 
to promote a song (Kretschmer, Klimis & Choi, 1999). Additionally, being able to 
increase the size of the audience was of increasing importance for a DJ’s career as 
this determined the revenue stream from advertising (Brewster & Broughton, 
1999). Therefore, aligning oneself with one of the majors, for the DJ would seem 
to the safest bet in this respect. 
As a direct result of the strategic actions taken by the majors it is hardly a 




majors were able to profit greatly at the expense of their less fortunate rivals, the 
indies. Consequently, the majors were able to regain their market share that they 
had lost to the indies in the preceding years. 
Yet as long as the individual careers of the industry’s executives are 
evaluated against being able to produce chart potential, trade picks and eventually 
chart positions (Peterson & Berger, 1971), the incentives to provide payola, in its 
most straightforward sense, is likely to resurface time and again, as an instrument 
to influence the selectors (Caves, 2000). And although the selection of the Top 40 
was supposedly tamperproof, sales figures were still often the direct result of 
substantial bribery practices paid directly to the retailer (Hirsch, 1969).15 As a 
matter of fact, Chancellor Media, the biggest broadcasting company in United 
States, was reported to have cashed 25 million US$ for pay-for-play contracts as 
recently as 1998 (Taylor & Schiffman, 1998). 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
The case of payola has demonstrated that the option of allying oneself 
with one group of selectors or discrediting another group of selectors allied with 
one’s competitors can be an effective strategy. The desirability and feasibility of 
this strategy could be explained by the role that authenticity played, as a product 
characteristic and as an attribute of selectors. In the 1950s the indies had been able 
to ally themselves with the dominant selectors at the time: the DJs at the local 
radio stations. The majors responded by questioning the authenticity of these radio 
DJs, as selectors, by accusing them of accepting payola, and destroying their 
credibility as the purveyors of authentic music. This, in turn, had severe 
repercussions for the competitive position of the indies who were allied with these 







Yet, one note of caution needs to be heeded here. Evidently, the majors 
also pursued other strategies and it is therefore impossible to counterfactually test 
how effective the option of discrediting the dominant selectors would have been in 
isolation. However, the case provides sufficient evidence to support the 
proposition that pursued strategy played a significant part in the competitive 
victory of the majors. Thus, the case strongly suggests that once dominant 
incumbents can quickly loose markets share when investing in a new selection 
system that turns out not to be dominant. Generally this option of sidestepping the 
current selection system by attempting to erect a new one, would have been a 
much more attractive alternative to outsiders as has been evidenced by the 
members of the Impressionist movement (Wijnberg & Gemser, 2000). However, 
in most cases these actors will not have the capabilities to pursue this option 
successfully. Dominant incumbents generally have assets that are well adapted to 
the current selection system and be loath to risk the value of these assets (Chandy 
& Tellis, 1998). Therefore these actors would be unlikely to pursue the option of 
changing the selection system. Yet the case of payola proved a chance per se to 
examine such a situation for it was one of the rare events that incumbents with 
strong ties to the dominant selectors traded these relationship in favor of what they 
mistakenly thought to be the newly emerging selection system. Yet striving to 
regain lost territory proved cumbersome once the ties with the dominant selectors 
had become severed or were non-existent. 
The framework of the selection system has proved particularly useful to 
understand this case because it allowed us to analyze more systematically how the 
competitive process in the music industry changed in the course of the 1950s, to 
separate the roles of the DJ as a selector and as one of the selected in his own 
competitive process, and to highlight the particular importance of authenticity for 




The line of argument of this paper is of course applicable to other cases 
concerning products where authenticity features prominently among product 
characteristics. In a broader sense, the argument can be considered to be an 
example of a systematic analysis of the interaction between two different sets of 
actors who are linked by selected-selector relationships.  
Finally, the argument has interesting implications for other theoretical 
approaches, such as population ecology. Population ecologists and institutional 
theorists alike have stressed the importance of legitimation processes in the 
formative years of an industry (Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). A 
new industry effectively implies the production of new products, entry of usually 
new competitors, and the emergence a new selection system, including a set of 
selectors who define the set of most significant product characteristics on which a 
verdict can be made about the value contained by the competing new products. 
Rao (1994) showed how firms in a young industry could attain a competitive 
advantage by engaging effectively in the competitive process in which the early 
selectors legitimize their own position which in turn led to the articulation of the 
most significant product characteristics. He illustrated this by showing how 
yardstick competitions among selected, led to the articulation of criteria in the early 
automobile industry.  
Moreover, as industries mature not only the composition of the set of 
selected - or the firms in the industry - may change, but also of the set of selectors. 
Changes in this set may resemble what Hannan and Freeman (1977) refer to as 
‘environmental change’. Shifting alliances between particular groups of the selected 
and particular groups of selectors, could explain much of the longevity or mortality 








5 From Resources to Value and Back 
5.1 Introduction  
The Resource-Based View of the firm (henceforth RBV) is arguably the 
most influential theoretical perspective within the field of strategic management 
today. Recently, however, the RBV as a theoretical framework has been the object 
of much criticism. It has been said to be ‘tautological’ (Priem & Butler, 2001a), 
missing the credentials for becoming a theory (Priem & Butler, 2001b) and 
providing but a partial explanation for competitive heterogeneity (Hoopes, Madsen 
& Walker, 2003). In this paper an attempt is made to repair two fundamental 
problems of the RBV; one dealing with how resources are defined and one dealing 
with the proposed underlying mechanism explaining how resources, singly and in 
combination, bring about a competitive advantage. 
The first problem pertains to how resources are defined. So far the RBV 
has produced a myriad of proposed categories, which has not only made it difficult 
to compare the results of other RBV-inspired studies but also to compare them 
with those stemming from other approaches, such as transaction cost theory 
(Hoopes, Madsen & Walker, 2003). Although most proposed categorizations were 
implicit or explicit attempts to distinguish among superior and inferior resources, 
they rarely produced criteria with which the value of resources could be 
ascertained. Barney’s (1991) VRIN criteria that have manifested themselves as the 
de facto standard for measuring resource value have been deemed flawed on 





The second problem concerns the mechanism by which resources 
facilitate a competitive advantage. The premised causality becomes problematic 
when deducing a competitive advantage from heterogeneity in the factor market, 
thereby neglecting the product market in which the firm is to attain and sustain the 
actual competitive advantage (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2001; Priem & Butler, 
2001a; Priem & Butler, 2001b). By doing so, most RBV studies exclude from the 
analytical framework what may be the single most important factor explaining how 
a competitive advantage may come about: the demand side (Hoopes, Madsen & 
Walker, 2003; Priem, 2005; Sirmon, Hitt & Ireland, 2005). 
Although in this paper we will deal with these problems integrally, it is 
important to note that these problems are conceptually different to understand the 
objective of this paper. Employing institutional theory we define three sets of 
criteria ‘ante rem’, ‘in re’, and ‘post rem’ - that allow resources to be evaluated on 
their functional role in competitive processes. These criteria allow distinguishing 
among inferior and superior resources measured as the extent to which they enable 
a firm to attain and sustain a competitive advantage. Thus we make an explicit 
attempt to address and repair these two fundamental problems embedded in the 
conceptual framework of the RBV by redefining how resource value can be 
measured and by making more plausible how resources can generate a competitive 
advantage. 
In doing so, we position ourselves firmly within the RBV tradition (i.e., 
using resource heterogeneity to explain performance differentials) but only after 
fundamentally reconsidering the relationship between resources and value. 
Following recent studies (Sirmon, Hitt & Ireland, 2005), we emphasize the 
importance of explicitly linking the factor market to the product market in order to 
arrive at a full appraisal of how the firm may use resources to its advantage. 







understanding of the extent of resource specialization among competing firms, the 
(un)bundling of resources and the boundaries of the firm. 
This paper is organized as follows. First, we examine resources in the 
framework of the RBV. We discuss how assets serve to create, capture and protect 
value. To remedy the perceived shortcomings of the RBV, we propose a 
trichotomy of criteria to determine the value of resources in competitive processes. 
Next, we use this classification and venture into the theory of the firm, by 
addressing the rationales underlying the bundling of resources (Wernerfelt, 1984). 
This discussion yields a number of propositions concerning: 1) specialization 
among different firms with regard to their resource portfolio; 2) the conditions 
under which the value of resources becomes readily observable; 3) the tradability 
and the mobility of resources, and; 4) the sustainability of performance 
differentials. This paper concludes with some final remarks and suggestions for 
further research. 
 
5.1.1 From RBV to Value 
The basis tenet of the Resource-Based View is that a firm can attain and 
sustain a competitive advantage on the basis of superior resources (Penrose, 1959; 
Wernerfelt, 1984; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Barney, 1986; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 
1993). Consequently, profit differentials can be explained by the resource 
heterogeneity of competing firms. 
By providing an inside-out theory of the firm, the RBV offered an 
attractive alternative for approaches that favored environmental causes as 
predictors of competitive heterogeneity, such as the strategic positioning 
framework (Porter, 1980) and the perspective offered by population ecologists 




by the RBV: explaining competitive performance by factors that were seemingly 
under direct managerial control: resources that resided within the boundaries of 
the firm. The compelling logic employed in the RBV inspired many empirical 
investigations that sought to explain performance differentials (Henderson & 
Cockburn, 1994; Sakakibara, 1997; Maijoor & van Witteloostuijn, 1996). 
The operationalization of the RBV resulted in the identification of 
numerous resources and consequently a broad spectrum of categories has been 
proposed, most notably ‘productive’ and ‘administrative’ resources (Penrose, 
1959), ‘complementary assets’ (Teece, 1986), ‘tangible assets’ and ‘intangible assets’ 
(Miller & Shamsie, 1996), ‘dynamic capabilities’ (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997), 
‘knowledge’ (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) and ‘strategic assets’ (Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993). 
These classifications have been useful for addressing the various resource 
domains, but have not yielded a single unifying perspective to systematically relate 
the pool of resources available to a firm to performance differentials (Hoopes, 
Madsen & Walker, 2003). Therefore no clear definitional standard has emerged of 
what resources are (and what they are not) and how their value can be identified. 
The underlying reason maybe that these attempts were often an ambiguous mix of 
describing resources in terms of their particular features and of stating a case for a 
hierarchy among resources in terms of their ability to bestow a competitive 
advantage. Yet this implied that the classification of resources and their appraisal in 
terms of their value have often been confounded. This in turn led to the fact that 
distinguishing the various categories of resources often coincided with different 
readings of superior and inferior resources, which are essentially different 
concepts. 
Barney (1991) took a different angle on the matter. He distinguished 
among superior and inferior resources by using a set of criteria that could in 







‘complementary’, ‘tangible’ or ‘intangible’, ‘static’ or ‘dynamic’, ‘strategic’ or ‘non-
strategic’. In his view, resources should be ‘valuable’, ‘rare’, ‘inimitable’ and ‘non-
substitutable’. The logic embedded in this quartet of criteria, often abbreviated as 
VRIN, was that resources should contain value as they should “exploit opportunities 
or neutralize threats in a firm’s environment” (Barney, 1991: 106); secondly, resources 
should be rare, as it is hard to conceive of resources that could render a firm a 
competitive advantage while being abundantly available; thirdly and fourthly, 
resources should remain in scarce supply over time, i.e. not easily imitated or 
substituted. It was clear that a void was filled by Barney’s criteria to differentiate 
between superior and inferior resources irrespective of their categorization, and as 
such they were widely adopted. In addition, some studies have attempted with 
mixed success to validate these criteria empirically (Maijoor & van Witteloostuijn, 
1996).  
Recently, however, the RBV and Barney’s VRIN criteria in particular have 
been fundamentally criticized. Firstly, the RBV does not serve to answer the 
fundamental question what resources are, as “virtually anything associated with the firm 
can be a resource” (Priem & Butler, 2001b: 32). The proposed VRIN criteria do little 
to alleviate these concerns as they reveal shortcomings in meeting their objective: 
distinguishing among superior and inferior resources. The VRIN criteria seem to 
constitute an arbitrary set of adjectives that overlap substantially. The criteria are 
neither mutually exclusive nor do they represent an exhaustive set of criteria that 
describe what an input should live up to before constituting a resource. 
Furthermore, what is the singular meaning of the predicates ‘valuable’, ‘rare’, 
‘inimitable’ and ‘non-substitutable’? If something is valuable it is unlikely to be 
easily substituted or imitated implying substantial overlap among the proposed 
criteria. And the reverse also holds; if the fact that something is rare and difficult to 




the meaning of the predicate ‘valuable’? Valuable to whom and in what way? In 
other words: what is the relationship between resources and value?  
The fact that it remains problematic to define resources brings us to the 
second caveat in the RBV: the mechanism employed to describe how resources 
should install a competitive advantage and be valuable as such. It has been argued 
that the inferences that are made on the basis of the RBV are in essence 
tautological (Priem & Butler, 2001a). The reasoning employed in the RBV could 
not generate valid if/then statements between the specific resources that a firm 
deploys and its ability to realize a sustainable competitive advantage. Although, the 
RBV does spell out that superior resources produce a competitive advantage it does 
not spell out the underlying mechanism of how this is accomplished. Especially for 
a framework stressing the importance of resources as drivers for competitive 
advantage, it is crucial to shed light on the processes underlying this hypothesized 
causality. Yet the line of reasoning employed by the RBV does quite the opposite: 
if profit differentials are observed, then valuable resources are to be had as 
apparently some firms are able to outperform others (in terms of efficiency and 
efficacy). And because of the very existence of profit differentials these resources 
must meet the VRIN criteria for otherwise profit differentials could not be 
observed in the first place. In doing so, the RBV assumes rather than explains the 
mechanism that resource heterogeneity leads to competitive heterogeneity 
(Hoopes, Madsen & Walker, 2003). In this context it has been argued that the 
RBV generates analytic rather than the synthetic statements that are the markers of 
a bona fide theory (Priem & Butler, 2001b). 
It has been argued that the reason why this mechanism has remained 
underdeveloped is that the RBV’s account of value is problematic as it solely 
assesses resource value in the context of the factor market, neglecting the product 
market in which the firm is to attain and sustain its actual competitive advantage 







Butler, 2001a). In its appraisal of resource value the RBV has formulated criteria of 
how resource value can be retained, neglecting the fact that value needs to be 
attained in the first place. Consequently, the sustainability concerns have crowded 
out the attainability concerns when linking resources to a firm’s competitive 
advantage. As a result the RBV has largely neglected the dynamics of the business 
environment and especially the dynamics of the demand side (Hoopes, Madsen & 
Walker, 2003; Priem, 2005; Sirmon, Hitt & Ireland, 2005). 
Recapitulating, the RBV posits that competitive heterogeneity is the result 
of resource variance. Thus being able to differentiate among valuable and less 
valuable resources is of crucial importance to the understanding of how 
competitive advantage is generated. Yet Barney’s (1991) seminal endeavor to 
construct such criteria – though laudable and highly popular – is contestable on at 
least two accounts: firstly, it does not provide an exhaustive set of clear and 
mutually exclusive criteria with which to evaluate resources on the basis of their 
impact on competitive position of the firm, and secondly, it does not provide for a 
theoretical underpinning of how resource heterogeneity procured in the factor 
market leads to performance differentials in the product market. 
5.1.2 From Resources to Value and Back 
Given the ambiguity in defining what RBV’s resources are, it may be 
instrumental to start examining what resources do. How can resources bestow a 
firm with the means to increase their returns? In this respect, Bowman and 
Ambrosini (2000) made a useful distinction between ‘value creation’ and ‘value 
capture’, defining ‘value creation’ as the contribution to customer utility of the final 
good, and ‘value capture’ as the difference between revenue and cost. This 
distinction is important because resources that create value may not be the same as 




added a third: value protection, denoting how a firm can ward off the invasion of 
its competitive position by envious rivals. In the discussion that follows this 
distinction is employed to examine how resources contribute to value. Although 
the distinction between the creation, capture and protection of value are intricately 
related, it is key to disentangle them in order to clarify how resources contribute to 
the firm and how competitive advantages are achieved and maintained. Taking the 
RBV seriously leads one to consider whether it is possible to identify resources 
that serve one or more of the three purposes. To make a full appraisal of how 
resources are employed, one has to consider more specifically what value is. 
Following earlier studies (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2001; Barney, 2001; Priem & 
Butler, 2001a; Priem & Butler, 2001b) we emphasize that resources are not 
valuable in their own right; they are only valuable to the extent that they create, 
protect and capture value. 
Yet what is the reading of value in this context? As the competitive 
advantage of the firm is to be achieved in the product market, resources should 
create, protect and capture value with explicit reference to the competitive process 
taking place in this market. But then again how does value show itself? Although it 
has often been treated as an unambiguous matter, value that is exchanged in 
product markets is more often than not covered in a veil of uncertainty. The value 
of a product may be so uncertain that it may significantly complicate the eventual 
purchase (Akerlof, 1970; Darby & Karni, 1973). In markets in which consumers 
have difficulty assessing the value of competing products, the ultimate purchasing 
decision may never materialize. More fundamentally, institutional theorists have 
argued that the very characteristics of the competitive process are determined by 
the ways in which customers handle uncertainty. To mitigate this uncertainty, 
attention has been directed to product critics who often mediate such markets, and 
their evaluation can decide the outcome of competitive processes (Hirsch, 1972; 







crucial in the formative years of an industry (Rao, 1994) but typically retain their 
impact in more established industries as well (Eliashberg & Shugan, 1997; Anand 
& Watson, 2004; Hsu & Podolny, 2005). Being perceived as a winner by such 
market intermediaries often translates into commercial success, as customers are 
more inclined to favor endorsed products over those that are not. 
The way in which customers deal with uncertainty at the market level and 
the characteristics of competitive processes at the industry level has been explicitly 
linked within the framework of the selection system (Wijnberg, 1995; Wijnberg & 
Gemser, 2000; Gemser & Wijnberg, 2001; Priem, 2005). Selection systems describe 
competitive processes in terms of actors who are being selected (the selected) and 
actors who are doing the selecting (the selectors). In every industry a particular 
selection system can be identified. First, the selectors identify which products to 
take into consideration, and then proceed to evaluate these selected products on 
the basis of the criteria they deem relevant. Hence customer utility can be seen as 
the value that the product has to the customer, the one who pays for the product, 
according to the judgment of the relevant selectors. Three ideal types are 
distinguished: market, peer and expert selection. The first type is market selection, 
in which the final customers are the relevant selectors and the producers the 
selected. In this case, customers themselves rely on their own evaluation of 
expected utility of a product before proceeding to a commercial transaction. In 
other cases the customers may have to rely on the vicarious evaluation by others. 
In these instances, the customer takes the opinions of others as proxies with which 
to determine the utility of a product. Such is the case in the second ideal type - 
called peer selection - when the opinions of other producers (peers) form the basis 
on which customers will make judgments about the perceived customer utility of 
the product under consideration. A clear-cut case of peer selection is the case of 




publications in major journals, which are edited and reviewed by peers, i.e. fellow 
academics. If expert selection - the third ideal type - prevails, customer utility is 
determined on the basis of the opinions of a category of selectors, who are neither 
customers nor producers but to whom particular knowledge and expertise is 
ascribed (Hirsch, 1972). Examples abound; insurance companies being rated by 
Moody’s, restaurants by Michelin, pharmaceutical drugs by practicing physicians et 
cetera. It should be emphasized, however, that the types of selection systems 
described here are ideal types. In reality, outcomes of competitive processes are 
often determined by a particular combination or sequence of these types. In some 
cases, two types of selection, e.g. market and expert selection, can be seen to 
operate alongside each other. Some may decide to purchase toothpaste for the 
fresh taste one knows it provides; others may feel compelled to buy it after they 
have been advised to do so by their dentist. 
The role of selectors in competitive processes is twofold. Firstly, they 
explicitly or implicitly identify the set of valid competitors, thereby effectively 
distinguishing between ‘selected’ and ‘non-selected’ firms. Secondly, they formulate 
criteria on the basis of which they separate winners from losers by attributing more 
value to the products of some producers and less to the products of others (Hsu & 
Pollock, 2005). The score on these criteria is eventually reflected in the price that 
the customer is willing to pay for a particular product or the number of products 
sold. Understanding competitive processes as the continuous struggle among rival 
firms to become on of the selected can serve to distinguish more clearly among 
different functions of resources by focusing on how they serve the competitive 
position in a particular selection system. Accordingly, we propose 3 criteria on the 
basis of which resources can be of value to a firm competing for the favor of the 
reigning set of selectors: ‘in re’, ‘ante rem’, and ‘post rem’ criteria. 
First of all, firms need resources for the production of goods and services. 







value contained by a firm’s output. This means that all resources can be rated on 
the extent to which they create product characteristics that have value in the eyes 
of the relevant selectors. As an illustration; a car has several characteristics on the 
basis of which its value is judged. Think of reliability, fuel efficiency, safety, 
environmental friendliness, design et cetera. Thus resources that help bring about a 
favorable rating on criteria that the relevant selectors have spelled out either ex- or 
implicitly for these characteristics have value to firms engaged in competitive 
processes. Hence our formulation of ‘in re’ criteria, that is a measure of the value 
of resources in their functionality to create value: 
 
In re criteria: In re criteria describe the value of resources in their capacity to create 
product-characteristics that have value according to the relevant selectors. 
 
‘In re’ criteria allow for a differentiation between valuable resources and 
less valuable resources, which is rooted in their capacity to create value. Yet from 
the above it becomes clear that the possession of resources that create value on the 
‘in re’ continuum will not suffice to do well in competitive processes. A sine qua 
non condition for products to contain value is that firms need to get the product 
acknowledged by the relevant selectors so that it can be rated on the basis of the 
relevant product criteria. No value is created if it is not perceived as such by 
relevant selectors. It is not enough to be able to manufacture a product or good. 
First of all, a firm has to enter the competitive process as a true competitor: as one 
of the selected. We posit that on the basis of specific resources the firm can 
improve its chances of being recognized by selectors as being a true competitor 
and in doing so have their products evaluated against competing products. Under 




(potential) competitors to get access to the selection system, by convincing 
selectors to pay attention to the focal firm and not to its rivals. 
What should be emphasized here is that these resources are employed 
‘ante rem’ - that is before the value of the competing products (created by the ‘in 
re’ resources) can be compared. One has to enter the selection system before one 
can do well in the eyes of the selectors. It should be clear that this brings us close 
to the notion of the barrier to entry. However, there are differences. The literature 
on barriers to entry focuses mainly on assets that build barriers (Geroski, 1991), 
and not on the assets that are used to overcome them. More importantly, however, 
conceptualizing barriers to entry in this fashion allows one to see more clearly 
which assets grant market access. The use of the concept of the selection system 
enables a more specific distinction between resources that are used to create value 
in the eyes of the selectors (the scarcity of which can give rise to a barrier to entry), 
and resources that can be used to enable the firm to be granted - explicitly or 
implicitly - a competitor status by the selectors and/or to deny this to others. This 
allows us to deepen and clarify our understanding of the concept of barriers to 
entry as it was originally proposed by Bain (1956) , who mainly focused on scale 
advantages that can be achieved from the use of resources that satisfy ‘in re’ 
criteria. Condensing the argument laid out in the above leads us to propose the 
following definition of criteria that describe the value of resources in their capacity 
to put the firm in a position that its products will be evaluated. 
 
Ante rem criteria: Ante rem criteria describe the value of resources in their capacity to 
either allow a firm to effectively enter a particular selection system as one of the selected or prevent 
its rivals from doing so. 
 
Yet the more successful a firm becomes in realizing value creation through 







criteria, the more it attracts the (unsolicited!) attention of envious rivals. This 
directs attention to the concept of value protection as a firm can only capture the 
value it creates if the firm owns resources that ensure that the products cannot be 
imitated. Therefore, it follows, that the possession of resources, which have value 
along the ‘in re’ and ‘ante rem’ dimensions, forms a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for value to be created and ultimately be appropriated. 
The importance of appropriability concerns, which have been well 
acknowledged in the extant literature, focuses on how firms can provide isolating 
mechanisms that are aimed at preventing direct rivals from profiting through 
competitive imitation (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Rumelt, 1982; Mahoney & 
Pandian, 1992). Various means of value protection have been identified. They can 
either be formal, taking the shape of institutionalized monopolies such as patents 
(Mansfield, Schwartz & Wagner, 1981; Levin, Klevorick, Nelson & Winter, 1987; 
Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, 2000) and copyrights (Conner & Rumelt, 1991) or be 
non-formal, such as causal ambiguity (Reed & DeFillippi, 1990) and the threat of 
loss of reputational capital (Gemser & Wijnberg, 2001). 
Again, the approach of this paper is to consider the ‘functionality’ of 
resources, by focusing on the roles these resources play in competitive processes. 
Therefore, we also take into account those resources that can be used to 
counteract the protective efforts of others. Thus we place under the same heading 
of resources those that can be employed to enable a firm to imitate its rivals, 
emphasizing that value protection harbors both a defensive as well as an aggressive 
element. For instance, by engaging in blanket-patenting a firm can aggressively 
prevent its innovative rival from protecting itself adequately (Kingston, 2001). 
Causal ambiguity can make it harder to imitate but can also make it harder to 
detect or prove imitation. The fear of loss of reputation can stop an imitator, but a 




itself in court. Resources that serve achieving such ends are clearly valuable to 
competitors but in a different way than with regard to the previously mentioned 
criteria. Therefore a third type of criteria can be defined as follows: 
 
Post rem criteria: Post rem criteria describe the value of resources in their capacity to 
either allow a firm to engage in competitive imitation of the product-characteristics that have value 
according to the relevant selectors or prevent its rivals from doing so. 
 
Here it is important to note that a specific resource – be it human, 
physical, financial or otherwise – typically produces different value on the ‘in re’, 
‘ante rem’ and ‘post rem’ criteria because the specific resource takes on different 
functionalities in competitive processes. Consequently, ‘in re’ criteria, ‘ante rem’, 
and ‘post rem’ criteria can be employed to determine the full economic value to 
the firm of a particular resource. Consider an employee that has much value based 
on ‘ante rem’ criteria for s/he entertains closely knit relationships with the relevant 
selector. Yet this employee may very well have little value on the ‘in re’ criteria, 
since his/her core duties are hardly directed at the ‘in re’ functionality. 
In essence, we argue that resources are employed by firms to perform 
different functions in competitive processes. The value of every resource can be 
determined by scoring it with regard to three mutually exclusive criteria that each 
measures one of the three functions that resources can perform in competitive 
processes. These criteria can be seen to provide an alternative to Barney’s (1991) 
VRIN criteria as they exhaust the possibilities in which a resource can be 








5.2 Bundling Unbundled 
One further remark is of importance here. It is the interplay of the various 
assets that determines the extent to which firms can finally capture value from the 
final customer. Therefore, no simple one-on-one relationship can be formulated 
between one of the three criteria and the notions of value creation, protection and 
capture. For firms to create value, they need to possess resources that rate not only 
highly on the ‘in re’ criteria, but also on the ‘ante rem’ criteria for reasons 
explicated in the above. Similarly, for firms to effectively protect value, they may 
resort to the exploitation of resources that have value along the ‘post rem’ criteria, 
but may equally find it worth their while to make sure that the (potential) ties of 
their rivals to the dominant selectors are severed, thereby effectively employing 
resources that have value based on ‘ante rem’ criteria. Relying on resources that 
ensure that selectors do not acknowledge the product of a (potential) rival firm 
may wield the most effective means of value protection. The underlying rationale is 
obvious; the rival’s product as well as the accompanying patent/copyright - and 
thus the related ‘in re’ and ‘post rem’ resources - are essentially worthless when it not 
selected. Therefore, the criteria as spelled out allow a more fine-grained analysis of 
how resources are employed not only to attain, but also sustain a competitive 
advantage. It will depend on the specific circumstances which combination of 
resources is most beneficial to the firm’s performance. The next section will be 
devoted to further explore this issue. 
5.2.1 First & Second-Order Bundling 
The issue of bundling is at the same time an issue of unbundling 
resources. One singular resource does not make a firm; a firm is always a bundle of 
resources. The issue of optimal firm boundaries that has been the focus of 




equivalent to the issue of which portfolio of resources results in an optimal 
competitive position. The importance of ‘bundles of assets’ (Wernerfelt, 1984), ‘co-
specialized resources’ (Lippman & Rumelt, 2003) or ‘complex resources’ (Denrell, 
Fang & Winter, 2003) has been emphasized in this respect. 
Yet what is the optimal bundle of resources when maximizing resource 
value in competitive processes? To resolve this issue we propose distinguishing 
between first-order and second-order bundling of resources. First-order bundling 
refers to the bundling of resources for reasons of competitive efficacy that mainly 
pertains to optimizing the resource portfolio of the firm in terms of the different 
resource functions. Second-order bundling refers to the bundling of resources for 
reasons of operational efficiency, which mainly pertains to optimizing the resource 
portfolio of the firm in terms of minimizing the costs of production.  
 
5.2.2 First-order Bundling 
 In order to resolve the issue of first-order bundling, the 
functionality of resources in competitive processes needs to be addressed. 
Although the argumentation proffered in the above is testimony to the importance 
of resources that score highly on ‘post rem’ and especially ‘ante rem’ criteria, it 
would be premature to conclude that it is only these resources that have to be 
included within the firm’s boundaries to enhance the likelihood of attaining and 
maintaining a competitive advantage. There are strategic considerations why firms 
should not solely focus on retaining resources that score highly on criteria other 
than ‘in re’. The main reason is that selection systems are rarely completely stable; 
apart from radical changes leading to a replacement of a selection system by a 
completely different selection system (Wijnberg & Gemser, 2000), the composition 
of the set of selectors can change, also as a result of competitive processes among 







much less effective in another. In other words, there is a degree of idiosyncrasy to 
every resource and there are obvious switching costs when changes in the selection 
system take place. In similar vein, other scholars have noted that demand-side 
instability has profound implications for the resource-base of a firm (Sirmon, Hitt 
& Ireland, 2005). Resources that score highly on ‘post rem’ criteria are usually 
more suited to particular selection systems than to others (Wijnberg, 2004). This is 
even more likely in the case of assets that score highly on ‘ante rem’ criteria, 
because they are by definition effective with reference to a particular set of 
selectors. The resources that allow firms to favorably influence one set of selectors 
is likely to lose its value when another set of selectors emerge, while it is usually 
less problematic to redeploy ‘in re’ resources that create products in the changed 
selection system. Thus changes in the selection system affect the value of the 
resource portfolio that a firm possesses.  
Changes in the characteristics of selection system can be caused by all 
kinds of reasons, including large-scale socio-economic developments on which the 
strategic choices, behavior and performance of competing firms have but little 
influence. Other changes, however, are likely to have been caused by strategic 
behavior that - in turn – may have been a reaction to a manifestation of 
performance differentials among firms. First of all, it is self-evident that 
competitors who are not selected for serious consideration will have the greatest 
incentives to help establishing a new selection system. Secondly, owners of ‘in re’ 
resources may also try to bypass the system, because they may feel poorly 
remunerated by the firms that own ‘ante rem’ and ‘post rem’ resources, with which 
they need to cooperate to effectively market the final product.  
To react to such developments, firms owning ‘ante rem’ and ‘post rem’ 
resources have several options. Firstly, they could strengthen their own 




competitive position of those selectors that favor them. This could involve direct 
monetary payments paid to particular selectors (Coase, 1979) or more indirect 
interventions in the competitive process among selectors. 
Secondly, firms owning ‘ante rem’ and ‘post rem’ resources could pay a 
premium to the possessors of ‘in re’ assets so that they do not feel compelled to 
bypass the current selection system and help to create another one. This practice is 
not uncommon in the car industry, where companies like Toyota actively seek the 
cooperation of their subcontractors through rent-sharing schemes (Kogut, 2000).  
The third alternative would be that firms may choose to engage in first-
order bundling to ensure that all resources that have high scores on all three 
criteria are represented in their portfolio. Here it is important to note that the 
viability of these strategies is fully dependent on the stability of the selection 
system. The more unstable the selection system, the more firms that own ‘ante 
rem’ and ‘post rem’ resources may be inclined to pursue first-order bundling. The 
underlying rationale is that ‘ante rem’ and to a lesser extent ‘post rem’ resources 
may be effective under one selection system but may be rendered obsolete when a 
new selection system takes control. Thus an unstable selection system may prompt 
firms to hedge against the eventuality of a changing selection system and procure 
‘in re’ resources as their specificity with regard to a particular selection system is 
likely to be smallest. In summary, these arguments suggest the following 
proposition17: 
 
Proposition 1: The extent of specialization among firms in an industry with regard to 
resources that rate highly either on ‘in re’ or ‘post rem’ or ‘ante rem’ criteria, will be positively 








5.2.3 Second-order Bundling 
Next to arguments of efficacy, efficiency reasons can be discerned that 
may compel a firm to bundle different types of resources within its organizational 
portfolio. As such, second-order bundling generally refers to the scale and scope 
advantages that can be had in resource deployment. With regard to scale, there 
exists a minimum-efficient scale of deployment for certain resources and hence a 
critical mass may be needed before they can be effectuated. The literature makes 
reference of many instances where potential technical and social efficiencies can 
result from combining resources in particular settings. With regard to scope it has 
been noted that resources may not be effective unless bundled with other 
resources (Wernerfelt, 1984). This implies that a resource can only be put to its 
best use in combination with other resources the resource supplier may or may not 
be able to acquire. Thus second-order bundling may follow when clear 
organizational advantages are to be had by combining (different) resources. Simon 
(1991) noted that loyalty and a sense of belonging could enhance the viability of 
bundling human resources within a single organization. Second-order bundling 
may also be beneficial when shared experiences initiate learning curves for the 
members of the organization (Yelle, 1979). 
It is important to note that bundling for reasons of efficiency is 
fundamentally different from the bundling of resources for efficacy arguments. 
Whereas the latter has direct implications for the competitive position of a firm, 
the first is only auxiliary to first-order bundling decisions. Peter Drucker’s (1992: 
29) famous adage comes to mind: “Nothing is less productive than to make more efficient 
what should not be done at all.’’ Therefore, the focus of this paper will remain first-





5.3 Unbundling Managerial Control 
Thus far, we have discussed bundling as the result of explicit decision-
making by the firm’s management; however, the extent to which the management 
can make such decisions is in itself limited by the characteristics of resources and, 
especially, by the extent to which it is possible to identify how well particular 
resources rate on particular criteria. Consider a firm that is able to outperform its 
rivals. Especially if this firm is to sustain this competitive advantage over time, it 
must by definition be able to command a superior bundle of resources. The 
importance of ‘post rem’ and ‘ante rem’ resources has been stressed in this respect. 
Consequently, the firm that is outperforming its competitors will trigger the envy 
of its rivals, who will be very keen to learn more about the key components of its 
competitive success, in order to copy or acquire them. As discussed, determining 
which ingredients are key to competitive success entails determining how well 
different resources score according to the three criteria. Therefore, an observed 
performance differential will set in motion a directed search of rival firms aiming 
to identify the valuable resources that must – in accordance with RBV logic – lie at 
the root of this competitive advantage. This directed search essentially implies that 
market forces are unleashed to articulate the value of the resources that help attain 
a competitive advantage. Over time this will result in the identification of crucial 
resources, that rate favorably on any of the ‘in re’, ‘ante rem’ and ‘post rem’ 
criteria. And with their identification the tradability of resources is also enhanced. 
This leads us to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: The competitive pressure to identify the value of the resources of a 
successful firm according to the ‘in re’, ‘ante rem’ and ‘post rem’ criteria is positively related to the 








Yet the strongest driver aimed at identifying the extent to which resources 
fulfill criteria may not come from outside the organization but from within. Here it 
is important to understand that organizations themselves can also be considered to 
constitute competitive arenas. In every organization the resource providers 
compete among each other for the proceeds that the organization earns as a 
collective. The perceived added value of the contributions of the individual 
resource providers will guide how these proceeds will be divided. This competitive 
arena can be considered the internal selection system opposed to the external 
selection system that allows resources to be valued outside organizations that led 
to the formulation of proposition 2. As Moran and Ghoshal (1999: 407) 
wrote: ‘Organizations in general and firms in particular counterbalance the institutional 
constraints imposed by markets by muting, replacing or otherwise modifying market incentives 
[…] each firm creates a unique subsidiary context, consisting of its own mix of incentives that 
encourage the assimilation, sharing and combination of resources…’ 
Thus due to internal of competition processes, members of the 
organization will base their claims for sharing in the proceeds earned by the 
organization on how well the resources they have made available have helped 
realize a competitive advantage. As Coff (1999) has emphasized, the dividends paid 
to shareholders are just one part of these revenues; other members of the 
organization also stake claims vis-à-vis these captured revenues. When members 
become more aware of the relationship between the competitive advantage that is 
being attained and their contribution to it, they will seek extra remuneration. 
Especially because ‘[T]he division of the surplus is the outcome of bilateral bargaining and the 
shares are formally indeterminate’ (Lippman & Rumelt, 2003: 909), new bilateral 
bargaining may ensue between the providers of resources on the one hand and the 




empowered their owners, who may choose to exert their ‘exit’ option (Hirschman, 
1970) if not adequately remunerated. 
Of course we acknowledge that even though the competitive value of a 
resource may be identified, the risk profile of the supplier of resource and the firm 
may differ. Although the firm may procure resources with the expectation of being 
able to put the resource to its best use, it assumes a risk of failure. Therefore, the 
supplier may agree to a lower price reflecting the optimal price minus a risk 
premium. More fundamentally, however, besides the willingness to assume risk, 
the firm can build an arbitraging role from its ability to modify and reduce risk. If a 
firm can reduce the valuation risk of the outputs it produces, it can directly reduce 
the valuation risk concerning the inputs it acquires as it in effect negotiates the 
environment and buffers against uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Thus the 
possession of resources that score highly on the ‘ante rem’ criteria is a double-
edged sword; not only does it reduce the uncertainty in the product market, but it 
also empowers firms on the factor market for it yields a favorable risk-premium 
outlook to its owner.  
Notwithstanding that the firm does not always have to pay the full price 
for resources, significant profit differentials between firms will lead to these 
internal pressures along with the aforementioned external pressures to identify the 
extent to which resources fulfill the ‘in re’, ‘ante rem’, and ‘post rem’ criteria. This 
will make the market for these resources more transparent and the resources 
themselves easier to trade. Consequently the exit-option will be easier to 
contemplate and the resources will become more mobile, which in turn will make 
the market more transparent and so on until the competitive advantage is 
dissipated. The fact that the contribution of academics to the competitive standing 
or their organization can be rated according to an ‘objectified’ set of criteria 
(number of publications, citations, impact factors, teaching evaluations etc.) greatly 








Proposition 3: The mobility of a resource is positively related to the extent to which it 
has been identified to fulfill ‘in re’, ‘ante rem’, and ‘post rem’ criteria. 
 
The arguments leading up to propositions 2 and 3 present a daunting 
prospect for the management of a successful firm. Although we emphasized earlier 
that managers cannot be considered to make their decisions autonomously, it is 
would be overstating that management is completely powerless in the face of the 
vicious or virtuous cycle of value discovery described above, in which the internal 
selection system comes to mirror closely the external selection system. 
Following Simon (1991), Wijnberg (2004) has suggested that 
organizational benefits, and as a result the chances of realizing a competitive 
advantage, may decrease when the internal selection system mirrors too closely the 
external selection system for resources. An organization in which the internal 
selection system mirrors too closely the external selection system will be less of a 
collective entity. Its employees will feel less loyalty to the organization than is the 
case when there is divergence between the valuation resulting from the internal 
selection system and the valuation produced by the external selection system. 
Members of the organization will be less inclined to accept postponements of the 
remunerations for their contributions. For all these reasons the organization will 
function less as a true organization and more as a group of transaction-partners. 
This paper allows us to convert these suggestions in a more precise proposition.  
In the arguments leading up to the previous propositions it has already 
been assumed that preventing the acquisition of precise knowledge about how well 
particular resources score according to the aforementioned criteria serves the 
successful firm in protecting itself against competitors and also maintain the 




argument in favor of not making explicit how much every factor of production 
contributes to the firm’s success we now add the argument of the preservation of 
organizational benefits. This reasoning differs markedly from the literature on the 
use of performance measurement schemes to curb social loafing (For a review see 
Karau & Williams, 1993). This body of literature stresses the importance, for 
increasing overall productivity, of the formulation of clear and objective 
performance measures. This approach may be effective in organizations where 
there is very little information about the relationship between resources and 
competitive outcomes. When the members of the organization have little idea 
about the value of each other’s contribution, the organization will benefit from 
making more transparent how each member contributes to the eventual success of 
the organization. 
Yet we want to argue that once a minimum efficient level has been 
reached to control social loafing, the articulation of the individual contributions of 
members towards the organization’s success will likely produce negative effects on 
overall organizational performance. The articulation of performance measures may 
result in making the value of resources that reside within the organization 
transparent beyond the boundaries of the organization, effectively making the 
internal selection visible outside the organization. This would enable the owners of 
resources to market themselves beyond the boundaries of the organization on the 
basis of valuations that are produced by the internal selection system. This in turn 
would make it easier for competitors to copy successful resource-mixes and for the 
owners of resources to remain within or exit the organization. Therefore, 
‘objective’ performance measures may again serve operational efficiency but, after 
having passed a minimum level of efficiency, can harm competitive efficacy. This 








Proposition 4: The extent to which the value of resources as determined in the 
internal selection system can be seen to be derived from the valuations that take place in the 
external selection system will have an inverted u-relationship with the performance of the 
organization. 
 
The implications of this proposition bring us back to bundling, because 
bundling resources that score on ‘in re, ‘ante rem’, and ‘post rem’ criteria can help 
to counteract the pressures of articulating the value of particular resources. 
Additionally, determining the value of bundles of resources that only score on the 
‘in re’ criteria as well as distributing the associated rents may become cumbersome 
if the resources are co-specialized. But in principle the total value of resources that 
only score on the ‘in re’ criteria - even if co-specialized - can be directly linked to 
the value of the final product as determined in the selection system in the product 
market. The value of ‘post rem’ and ‘ante rem’ resources, however, is derived from 
the effect on the competitive position of the producer and is determined in 
another selection system in which the competing firms are actually the final 
customers. Thus combining within the firm resources that have different functions 
in competitive processes makes it more difficult to assess their individual 
contributions based on the external selection system and therefore causes the internal 
and external selection systems to diverge, in turn creating the conditions in which 





5.4 Concluding Remarks 
The prime objective of the Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm is to 
study the relationship between specific resources which a firm exploits and the 
resulting capability to attain and maintain a competitive advantage. The concept of 
‘value’ plays a crucial role in explaining how a sustainable competitive advantage is 
to be attained (Barney, 1986). Recently, however, the Resource-Based View has 
been criticized for its lack of an adequate appreciation of what actually constitutes 
‘value’ and how ‘value’ can be derived from ‘resources’. The criticism that has been 
voiced against the RBV has revealed two caveats: firstly, the extant literature on the 
RBV lacks a clear and unambiguous measure of resource value, and; secondly, the 
RBV does not clearly spell out the mechanism that demonstrates how resources 
can bring about a competitive advantage, for it largely disregards the product 
market in which this competitive advantage is to be brought about. 
This paper addresses these concerns by proposing three sets of criteria to 
measure the value of resources based on their functional merit in competitive 
processes: ‘in re’, ‘post rem’, and ‘ante rem’ criteria. These criteria can be employed to 
measure the value of a resource in its capacity to attain and maintain a competitive 
advantage, be the resource tangible or intangible, static or dynamic, strategic or 
non-strategic. As such, the proposed criteria can be superimposed on any resource-
classification to construct more specific hypotheses about the conditions under 
which a particular resource can be of value to the firm. Moreover, these criteria 
allow for the distinction between first-order and second-order bundling of 
resources, to achieve a better understanding when bundling is desirable on grounds 
of competitive efficacy and when for reasons of operational efficiency. 
These foundations allowed the construction of a number of propositions 
explicating the extent of resource specialization within an industry as well as the 







the organization. Our discussion of the causes and effects of the identification of 
the value of resources sheds new light not only the mobility and tradability of 
resources but also on the issue of firm boundaries. Here we break fundamentally 
with the extant literature on the RBV as we contest the silent assumption that all 
resources are essentially placed under managerial discretion. Building the optimal 
resource portfolio may not be at the discretion of the firm itself but at the hands of 
the owners of resources who may or may not choose to become members of the 
organization. Thus managerial control over resources depends on the extent to 
which the relationship between resources and competitive advantage remains 
opaque and ambiguous. Conversely, the more the value of resources becomes 
explicit and transparent, their owners can enjoy the enhanced tradability and 
mobility. 
In a similar vein, the articulation of resource value using the proposed 
criteria also provides new insights on the issue of firm boundaries, by analyzing the 
extent to which resources can be retained within the firm. Thus the make-or-buy 
decision (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1985) may not be one taken by the 
management but rather by the resource supplier. In fact the extent to which the 
internal selection system and the external selection system converge and diverge in 
their assessment of resource value may be the prime driver behind the resulting 
organizational form. Hierarchies may fare better in an in environment of 
divergence, because the management can exploit the existing information 
asymmetry whereas convergence may lead to market or network forms of 
economic organization (Powell, 1990) as the internal selection system has in 
essence been absorbed by the external selection system. 
The discussion of the internal and external selection system also allows 
delineating the difference between resources and inputs. The value of inputs is 




organization and do not share in the fortunes of the organization as a whole. In 
contrast, providers of resources are members of the organization and as such they 
compete with other members in the internal selection system. An important part of 
our argument had to do with the relationship between the selection system in 
which the firm is active as a competitor and the selection system operating within 
the firm, determining the internal distribution of the captured revenues. As Coff 
(1999) has emphasized, the dividends paid to shareholders is just one part of these 
revenues; other stakeholders of the organization also claim their share and these 
should be taken into account when making an appraisal of how well the firm 
performs. As quoted before, Lippman and Rumelt (2003) stress the fact that all 
revenues can be considered payments for inputs or resources. The suppliers of 
inputs are rewarded by the prices that the firm pays in the markets for inputs. 
What is left of the revenues - after subtracting the payments for inputs - can be 
distributed among the members of the organization, most often employees and 
shareholders. These members stake their claim on a share of the revenues based on 
the significance of the resources they availed for the firm’s process of value 
creation, protection and capture. Or conversely, this statement can be read as an 
alternative definition of what a resource is: something that enables a member of an 
organization to stake a claim on the organization’s proceeds as a compensation for 










This thesis builds on the premise that the outcome of competitive 
processes is to a large extent contingent upon how consumers endeavor to curb 
the uncertainty regarding exchange value. Mitigating the adverse effects of 
uncertainty, institutions emerge that serve to better inform the consumers of the 
value that is object for exchange. Rather than the random fashion in which 
mainstream economics models exchange, these institutions create a certain degree 
of inertia with regard to buying behavior as consumers follow the implicit or 
explicit guidelines that these institutions produce. Therefore, firms that are able to 
create or procure resources that grant them access to such institutions are 
hypothesized to enjoy a leveraged competitive position vis-à-vis their rivals thereby 
reaping the benefits that non-random exchange can bring about. 
Against this background I have undertaken four independent studies that 
aim to capture how firms develop strategies to further their economic interests. 
The first study brought to light how firms can improve their terms of exchange 
with suppliers upstream and buyers downstream by maintaining closely knit 
relationships with institutions that mitigate this uncertainty on behalf of the final 
consumers. These institutions will be central in the analysis of competitive 
processes in the remainder of the studies. As such, we build on the selection 
system perspective (Debackere, Clarysse, Wijnberg & Rappa, 1994; Wijnberg, 
1995; Wijnberg & Gemser, 2000; Wijnberg, 2004; Priem, 2005) in which these 
institutions are treated as ‘selectors’ because of their central role in the 




created by firms that suffer from the ‘liability of (smallness and) newness’ 
(Stinchcombe, 1965) may invoke such great uncertainty on the parts of potential 
stakeholders that these stakeholders may only be willing to commit their resources 
provided that the legitimacy of these small and new firms reaches some kind of 
threshold level. The widespread prevalence of the practice of payola throughout 
the history of the music industry was the object for study in the third investigation, 
which provided support for the general proposition pervading this thesis that 
competitive success hinges on the way in which firms can ally themselves with the 
dominant selectors. The fourth study tried to combine the insights provided by the 
preceding three studies proposing a reading of resources that could prove a viable 
alternative for the popular resource based view of the firm. By delivering a novel 
approach to measure the value of resources, this study suggested that the defining 
difference between markets and organizations is the extent to which an 
organization is the competitive arena in which the value of a resource is 
determined. 
By focusing on how firms could economize on the uncertainty that is 
present in markets, this thesis made an explicit link between institutional theory 
and strategic management. Although the implications of institutionalization 
processes for competitive processes have been acknowledged (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983), this thesis takes a step further by positing that institutions are 
involved in their own competitive processes. The recognition that these 
institutions are not merely disembodied entities, helped to understand the interplay 
between competitive processes at the industry level and those that are affecting the 
survival chances of the institutions themselves. This thesis has made an attempt to 
show how selectors operate as market institutions that mitigate the effects of 
uncertainty and are therefore also risking their own competitive position when 
endorsing particular firms. Thus the competitive success of firms in the industry 







enjoy with particular institutions and vice versa. While the former is increasingly 
gaining currency in the extant literature (Rao, 1994; Anand & Watson, 2004), the 
latter is a novel finding. 
As such, this thesis proffers a view of competitive processes as 
institutional arenas. Being granted access to the arena is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for competitive success to ensue as the outcome depends on 
how well each contender scores relative to the other in a game in which the rules 
are set by the relevant selectors. Formalizing competitive processes using the 
metaphor of institutionalized arenas would solve a number of pressing issues 
facing organization scholars, most notably the problem underlying taxonomies of 
competition. Porac and Thomas (1990) took issue with how competition was 
defined in the extant literature arguing that it did not live up to how practicing 
managers perceived competition. Especially, large field studies employing the 
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) fell short of providing a realistic account of 
competition because industries in these studies were confined to bureaucratic 
categories. The result is that, while quantitative industry studies are becoming the 
norm in our discipline, industry definitions are hardly given. Apart from the 
obvious problems this creates for operationalizing key variables, theoretical 
concerns are mountings as well because without a thorough understanding of 
industry definitions, it is hard to validate concepts such as ‘new entry’ as well as 
‘vertical integration’, because both hinge on a clear definition of industry 
membership. Viewing competitive processes as selection taking place in 
institutionalized arenas would provide a more comprehensive and realistic account 
of competition as it derives its meaning from the perception by the competitors 
themselves. To understand if two firms are competing with each other can be 
readily observed by determining whether or not they are competing for the 




classifications of industries, competition can be defined based on the set of 
companies that vie for the favor within a particular selection system. Examples that 
come to mind are rankings, endorsements, attention by media and so on and so 
forth. This should however include both the ‘selected’ as well as the ‘non-selected’ 
firms that failed to make a successful bid to be considered by the relevant 
selectors. Of course, this thesis acknowledges that in reality selection is a gradual 
scale; just as it is hard to imagine that one firm enjoys being selected by all relevant 
selectors, it is hard to imagine that one firm may be completely non-selected. 
As has been elucidated in the course of this thesis, these findings provide a 
significant contribution to the realms of strategic management. The insights have 
been especially fruitful to rekindle two opposing views on how a competitive 
advantage is to be achieved. Resources-based perspectives have been contending 
with environmentally determined models for becoming the dominant theoretical 
framework within the strategic management discipline. The resource-based 
theories of the firm emerged as a reaction to the hitherto popular theories that 
stressed the environment as the prima causa for a firm’s competitive position. 
Proponents of the latter are the population ecology perspective (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1989) and the strategic positioning framework as developed by Porter 
(1980). The necessity to identify and subsequently procure crucial resources is not 
fully appreciated in these outside-in theories of the firm, leaving little room for 
entrepreneurial and managerial discretion. The resource-based view (RBV) of the 
firm questioned that resources are highly mobile and tradable on factor markets as 
was implicitly assumed by the models sporting environmental determinism and 
took this as its forte to explain how a competitive position could be attained and 
sustained (Barney, 1991). Yet the RBV proved unable to provide a comprehensive 
account of how firms can attain a competitive advantage in the market in which 
they operate for its conceptualization of resources was purposefully disconnected 







resources in relationship to the competitive processes in which a firm is engaged, 
this thesis has explicitly linked the factor market and the product market, in which 
the firm is to attain its actual advantage. In this manner resources that reside within 
the boundaries of the firm are explicitly linked to the competitive environment in 
which the firm is operating. In doing so, this understanding of resources renders 
the artificial distinction between the inside-out and outside-in perspectives 
obsolete, staking a claim that both provide but a partial view of competitive 
processes. 
This reading of strategy has salient implications for our understanding of 
institutional entrepreneurship. In all competitive processes, but especially in those 
taking place in the formative years of an industry, it is of utmost importance that 
potential customers get educated about (novel) products should they ever be able 
to attain an appreciation of their potential value. Thus pioneering entrepreneurs 
fulfill an arduous task when engaging in innovative behavior; firstly, they need to 
produce a novel product, and secondly the need to enact the environment so that 
sense making institutions are installed that are able to assess the value of products 
that compete in this new market. This is especially telling from studies of 
groundbreaking innovations; they have first to attain an adequate level of cognitive 
appreciation before they can be traded. Especially the work done by Rao (1994) on 
the early automobile industry is insightful in this respect. He describes that the 
success of the car was contingent upon the car being recognized as an alternative 
product category in the market for transportation, which until then consisted 
mainly of train and horseback. The organization of car races that enjoyed great 
media coverage in the newspapers served to construct the car as a separate product 
category. As a result the newspaper industry served to reduce the initial hesitance 
on the part of prospective buyers in the formative years of the automobile 




watchdog organizations had on industry dynamics when they took on the role of 
‘impartial testing agencies’ on behalf of the consumers. Anand and Watson (2004) 
illustrated how institutionalized arenas may over time be enacted by the 
deployment of ‘tournament rituals’ that could largely explain the competitive 
success of the participants. Thus these ‘tournament rituals’ are not only legitimacy 
building devices for new industries and companies, but are at the same time crucial 
for the instigation of a selection system, where firms compete for favor of the 
selectors. 
The institutionalization of new product categories also implies that criteria 
are formulated (e.g. regarding reliability and durability) that help consumers to 
arrive at an estimate of the value contained by the competing product. Such criteria 
typically develop into ‘evaluative schemas’ that help consumers differentiate among 
products in the same product categories (Hsu, 2004). Thus product variety may 
also be more understandable in relationship to the reigning selection system.  
As such, studying the institutionalization of new product categories is 
instrumental for understanding how new organizational forms emerge. As the first 
product of its kind is likely to be understood by the market in a prototypical sense 
(Lakoff, 1987), pioneering producers are likely to become the benchmark against 
which newcomers are measured. Subsequent variation of organizational forms is 
likely to be understood as degrees of deviation from this prototypical producer. 
New entrants in the market for fast-food are understood in the way in which they 
fit the category created by McDonald’s Big Mac, Coca-Cola’s Coke, and 
Microsoft’s Windows. 
As the institutionalization of products generally reaches beyond the 
capabilities of single companies, institutional entrepreneurship generally requires a 
strong degree of co-operation among the industry’s pioneers geared at producing 
most notably cognitive legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). In similar vein, 







suggesting that in the formative years of an industry the mortality rates are low 
because the industry gains legitimacy, thereby hosting a wide array of 
organizational forms which is subsequently narrowed as the industry reaches 
maturity and competition intensifies. 
Yet whereas Aldrich and Fiol (1994) stress the cognitive legitimacy of the 
organization, the findings of this thesis suggest that the product needs to be firstly 
understood before any meaningful verdict can be made about the taken-for-
grantedness of the organization producing it. This is supported by the fact that the 
articulation of explicit ratings by the relevant selectors regarding value has been 
deemed to have profound repercussions for how the organization is perceived by 
the environment and by itself (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996).  
Especially since the product is the marker by which new organizations can 
be understood by its environment, the cognitive legitimacy that the product enjoys 
is posited to form the foundation for cognitive legitimacy at the organizational 
level. And as the cognitive legitimacy that the product enjoys is contingent on the 
way in which the selectors views a particular product, the linkages that are 
established between firms that are selected in the formative years of an industry 
and the selectors are likely to be the crucial explanatory factors for how 
organizational forms emerge. Thus the organizational form as a ‘blueprint’ for an 
industry’s representative firm (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) is likely to develop in 
lock step with the selection system and it is not unlikely that the creation of the 
new product will trigger a ‘speciation event’, i.e. the birth of a new organizational 
form (Lumsden & Singh, 1990). Ultimately the institutionalization and the 
subsequent diffusion of an organizational form can be accelerated by the workings 
of the selection system. 
Moreover, when an organization is the first to be sporting a particular 




development and evolution of industry standards display a high degree of path 
dependency (David, 1985). Thus it is likely that a prototypical effect may be 
induced in this respect. It is likely that because it was the first, this firm may have 
strong influence on how the classification system of this product will evolve, which 
in turn are likely to affect the survival chances of the focal organization.  
Moreover, the creation of a new product has strong implications for how 
the prototypical organization is conceived of. Under isomorphic selection 
pressures it is plausible that organizations that follow suit after an institutional 
entrepreneur paved the way, will exhibit isomorphism on the organizational level 
by taking after the innovating company when designing their organizational form. 
Based on the findings in this thesis, it can be posited that observed 
isomorphism in industries is a reflection of the achieved dominance of particular 
criteria which are used by the selectors in their assessment of the selected. As such, 
this thesis subscribes to the view that competitive processes will over time display 
a convergence to norms that are upheld by institutions as has been acknowledged 
by the literature (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
While not disputing that these competitive processes may be highly 
ceremonial, I see no ground for the trade-off between efficiency and legitimacy as 
was suggested by Meyer and Rowan (1977), and which was subsequently employed 
to explain the decoupling of organizations. On the contrary, I believe that 
efficiency criteria are by themselves highly institutionalized and cannot be isolated 
from the competitive process in which a firm is engaged. In other words, efficiency 
defines the most economical way of production but this is different from 
stipulating that only the cheapest resources should be deployed as these may not 
have any economic value. Thus legitimacy and efficiency are likely to go hand in 
hand. Furthermore, as the findings of the second study suggest, relevant 
stakeholders may only be compelled to offer their resources to a particular firm 







illegitimate should pay a risk premium to the owners of resources, making them 
less efficient than their legitimate rivals. So rather than relaxing the control over 
exchange because a trading partner enjoys greater legitimacy, I believe that this 
trading partner is more legitimate because it adheres more closely to the particular 
criteria. And as suggested by the fourth study, it is the extent to which these criteria 
become explicit and known to the owners of resources that is the reason 
underlying the decoupling of organizations. 
This in turn implies that organizational and institutional evolution are 
intricately linked. Thus selection pressures that operate at the organizational level 
are dependent upon the selection pressures that are present at the institutional level 
and vice versa. For understanding variation in institutions and industries it is 
crucial to understand the selection pressures that hold sway. To date the 
predominant view has been that selection pressures operate on industries rather 
than on institutions. To survive selection pressures the literature on organization 
theory has stressed that organizations need to develop in lockstep with their 
environment. If the lack of fit between the organization and its environment 
becomes too pronounced the organization’s survival chances will diminish. Yet if 
organizations become too frantic in their accommodation of environmental change 
they risk soliciting organization mortality as well because some degree of inertia 
may be needed to maintain a perception of reliability with constituencies in- and 
outside the organization (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Therefore organizations need 
to walk a tightrope between maintaining and changing their organizational 
parameters, which are strongly affected by institutions. 
 Acknowledging that organizational life also breeds institutional life, may 
provide the stepping stone for the analysis of how selection pressures at the 




may provide useful clues as to how institutional and organizational isomorphism 
are interrelated. 
Another new line of research that this thesis alludes to is how competitive 
processes may lead to the emergence of classification systems. Although 
classification systems have received much attention in the philosophical and the 
psychological disciplines (see e.g. (Lakoff, 1987; Murphy, 2002), it has been but 
marginally addressed in the economics and management science literature. 
Classification systems are usually accepted as a given, not as a subject for a study 
but as a means to demarcate its boundaries. While there is appreciation of the 
importance of classification systems, and especially the boundaries of genres, in the 
cultural industries (DiMaggio, 1987) the dynamics of classification systems are 
rarely taken into full account when studying economic phenomena in the sector, 
while at the same time classification has an evident impact upon the competitive 
process because only by categorizing, even if implicitly, products and product 
characteristics can economic value be determined. 
Yet classifications and criteria are not contrived in a void; they are 
contingent upon the outcome of selection processes that operate at the level of the 
entities that do the classifying. Classifying a product implies understanding its 
(potential) value in relationship to other products. Not only does a product need to 
be distinguished from other categories of products, it also needs to be 
distinguished from other products within its own category. Distinguishing among 
products in the latter sense requires that products need to be categorized on their 
relative value. 
Before being able to market their product they need to ensure that a 
classification system exists to guide prospective buyers. This entails that if the 
product cannot be understood by the existing classification system, a new product 
category with the accompanying criteria needs to be acknowledged by the market. 







new product classification but can be evaluated by the existing set of selectors and 
radical innovations that not only are in need of a new product classification but 
also of a new selection system as it rendered the old one obsolete. In doing so, 
these institutional entrepreneurs engage in re-classifying both markets (by creating 
new product categories) as well as industries (by creating a new niche for new 
organizations to inhabit). 
Thus the success of an innovation hinges on whether or not it can be 
understood by prospective customers. And classification systems do just that: they 
serve as a vehicle to categorize the innovation by pointing out differences and 
similarities with existing categories thereby laying the groundwork for its cognition. 
More importantly, however, when an innovation causes new categories to be 
added or the classification system to be modified, it changes the parameters of the 
competitive process itself. As new categories emerge new entrepreneurial 
opportunities are discovered and new entrants soon follow suit. Research on how 
classification systems emerge does not only help to understand how product 
cognition takes form but it can inform us of the co-evolution between product 
diversity and industry structure. 
In short, the classification of products centers on how product appraisals 
take place, implying that the study of the emergence of market institutions may 
reveal how new classification systems emerge. Although the psychological 
discipline is keen to acknowledge that categories are socially enacted (Murphy, 
2002), this understanding of competitive processes may aid in the understanding of 




Nederlandse Samenvatting  
Binnen de economische discipline is ruimschoots aandacht geschonken 
aan de conceptualisatie van het begrip ‘markt’ daar het ten grondslag ligt aan elke 
vorm van economisch gedrag. Als metafoor bleek de markt als conceptueel model 
zeer bruikbaar om inzichtelijk te maken hoe vraag en aanbod in evenwicht 
gebracht worden door middel van een interveniërend prijsmechanisme. Getoetst 
aan de aan de realiteit, echter, bleek het begrip weinig handreikingen te bieden om 
het feitelijke handelen van vragers en aanbieders te verklaren. Het grootste 
probleem ligt besloten in de aannames die gemaakt zijn ten aanzien van 
economisch gedrag. Met name het feit dat onzekerheid nauwelijks geïdentificeerd 
wordt als bepalende factor, vormt een fundamentele beperking voor de 
theoretische reikwijdte van vele gepostuleerde (evenwichts)modellen.  
Dit proefschrift stelt dat de onzekerheid omtrent waarde, en omtrent hoe 
die waarde vastgesteld wordt op markten, sturend is voor het economische gedrag 
van producenten en consumenten. In de meeste traditionele economische 
modellen, zoals nog op middelbare scholen onderwezen, worden consumenten en 
producenten vaak gerepresenteerd als louter omhulsels van 
consumentenpreferenties en productiefuncties; zij worden door de markt naar een 
optimale evenwichtsuitkomst gevoerd. In verder uitgewerkte vormen van deze 
modellen kunnen producenten ook allerlei vormen van strategisch gedrag 
vertonen, bijvoorbeeld door beslag te leggen op schaarse productiemiddelen of 
door samen te spannen als oligopolisten, maar hun strategisch gedrag wordt zelden 
of nooit in verband gebracht met het proces van waardebepaling als zodanig. En 
ook in deze modellen blijft de consument veelal de passieve en onderbelichte 
partner in het marktproces. In dit proefschrift wordt juist nader ingegaan op de 
betekenis van de onzekerheid omtrent waarde en omtrent de vaststelling van 







aanbodzijde. Zoals in dit proefschrift blijkt is het effectief omgaan met die 
onzekerheden een belangrijke determinant van strategisch handelen en het 
bereiken van concurrentievoordelen door producenten. 
Het is belangrijk te beseffen dat deze onzekerheid, zowel aan de kant van 
consumenten als aan de kant van producenten, tot onjuiste en daardoor kostbare 
beslissingen kan leiden. De producent kan een product vervaardigen dat niet 
afgenomen wordt; de consument een waardeloze aankoop begaan. Om de 
potentiële kosten te beperken zullen zowel producenten als consumenten op zoek 
gaan naar manieren om deze onzekerheid beter te kunnen beheersen en aldus de 
eventuele schadelijke gevolgen te beperken. 
Dit risicomijdend gedrag zet een zoektocht in gang naar de communis 
opinio over hetgeen als waardevol gezien wordt op een bepaalde markt. Zowel de 
producent als de consument zijn geneigd om zich te voegen naar deze heersende 
mening, daar zij de gevolgen van hun geïsoleerde (en dus mogelijk schadelijke) 
waardeinschatting niet kunnen overzien. Maar hoe wordt deze heersende mening 
kenbaar gemaakt?  
Dit proefschrift stelt dat op elke markt institutionele processen werkzaam 
zijn die ten doel hebben de waarde tot uitdrukking te brengen. Met behulp van 
institutionele theorie wordt een raamwerk geconstrueerd dat inzichtelijk maakt hoe 
de waarde op markten bepaald wordt. Echter in tegenstelling tot de meest 
gangbare lezing van instituties, is in dit proefschrift een perspectief gekozen 
waarbinnen instituties in de eerste plaats gezien worden als handelende actoren. 
Hiermee wordt overigens niet ontkend dat er actor-overstijgende instituties 
bestaan, maar dat deze instituties slechts begrepen kunnen worden als ze 
geconstrueerd worden door al dan niet bewust handelende actoren.  
Voortbouwend op eerder onderzoek onderscheidt dit proefschrift drie 




tot stand komt. Waardebepaling kan geschieden door: 1) een expert; 2) een 
medeproducent, en 3) de consument zelf. In het eerste geval doet een expert, aan 
wie bepaalde kennis en expertise wordt toegeschreven, een uitspraak over de 
waarde van de concurrerende producten. In het tweede geval doet een 
medeproducent een uitspraak over welk product als waardevol gekenmerkt kan 
worden. In het derde geval schat de consument zelf de waarde in van het product. 
Hierbij dient opgemerkt te worden dat de verschillende systemen elkaar niet 
uitsluiten. Integendeel: vaak zullen de verschillende selectiesystemen naast elkaar 
bestaan en zelfs met elkaar concurreren. Wat echter van fundamenteel belang is 
om specifieke competitieve processen inzichtelijk te maken, is te bepalen welk 
selectiesysteem dominant is. Zo worden de markten voor muziek en 
farmaceutische producten gedomineerd door expert-selectie; de DJ of de dokter 
bepaalt wat waarde heeft en wat niet. Binnen de academische wereld wordt wat 
voor waardevolle wetenschap doorgaat veelal bepaald door academici, die zelf 
werkzaam zijn op deze markt. De redacteur van een tijdschrift bepaalt in 
samenspraak met zijn reviewers of het werk van een vakgenoot publicatiewaardig 
is. Wanneer de consument zichzelf in staat acht om de waarde te bepalen van het 
desbetreffende product, kan marktselectie de meest dominante vorm van selectie 
opleveren. Vaak blijkt echter, dat waarde niet eenvoudig is vast te stellen en dat 
waardebepaling een proces in werking zet dat niet transparant en eenduidig 
verloopt. Zo zullen veel consumenten hun keuze voor een bepaalde tandpasta zelf 
bepalen daar zij menen zelf goed te kunnen inschatten wat de waarde is van het 
desbetreffende product. Dit zou tot de overhaaste conclusie kunnen leiden dat 
louter marktselectie van belang is op de markt voor tandpasta. Echter meer dan 
eens verandert de consument van voorkeur na van de tandarts verstaan gekregen te 
hebben dat maar beter naar een ander merk tandpasta kan worden uitgekeken. 
Ook zijn selectiesystemen geen statisch gegeven. Eerder onderzoek heeft 







verandering van het selectiesysteem doormaken. Zo bracht de opkomst van het 
impressionisme een verandering in het selectiesysteem op de kunstmarkt teweeg. 
Van een markt waarin de waardebepaling van de medekunstenaar centraal stond, 
evolueerde de markt zich naar één waarin de waardebepaling van de galerie, in haar 
rol als expert, de overhand kreeg. 
Dit proefschrift neemt het selectiesysteem als uitgangspunt om 
strategievorming binnen competitieve processen nader te aanschouwen. Er worden 
twee rollen onderscheiden die de selectoren op zich nemen. Eerst maken de 
selectoren - bewust of onbewust – een keuze tussen welke producten zij in 
overweging nemen bij hun waarderingen en welke ze uitsluiten. Vervolgens doen 
de selectoren een impliciete of expliciete waardeuitspraak van de concurrerende 
producten. Een voorbeeld van een impliciete waarde uitspraak is het toekennen 
van zendtijd voor een bepaald poplied door de DJ. Zelfs zonder een expliciet 
oordeel van de DJ wordt de boodschap dat een bepaald popnummer waardevol 
genoeg is om gedraaid te worden overgebracht aan het luisterende publiek. Een 
voorbeeld van een expliciete waardebepaling is de wasmachinetest door de 
consumentengids. 
Om competitief succes te behalen is het voor producent dus in eerste 
instantie van belang om te zorgen dat het product in overweging genomen wordt 
in de set die relevante de selector evalueert. Een wasmachine kan nog zo goed zijn, 
maar als de producent er niet in slaagt om deze opgenomen te krijgen in het 
vergelijkend warenonderzoek van de consumentenbond, zal de kans op 
commercieel succes lager zijn. Vervolgens moet de producent zorgen om een zo 
hoog mogelijke waarde te bewerkstelligen door een product te fabriceren volgens 
de criteria die de relevante selector hanteert. Dit impliceert dat de mate waarin de 
producent erin slaagt om te voldoen aan deze twee voorwaarden bepalend is voor 




zullen dus trachten om de relevante selectoren voor zich te winnen daar hier een 
groot commercieel belang mee gemoeid is. De mate waarin de producenten in deze 
opzet slagen, zal grote gevolgen hebben voor de mate waarin de handel al dan niet 
willekeurig geschiedt. Als namelijk de consumenten zich laten verleiden door hun 
aankopen te doen bij de producenten wiens producten worden aangeprezen door 
de selectoren zullen er systematische patronen te ontdekken zijn in de 
handelsrelaties die ontstaan tussen de betrokken partijen. 
Dit proefschrift heeft ten doel om strategisch gedrag te verklaren door een 
analyse te maken van hoe producenten zich verhouden tot de relevante selectoren. 
Ten einde deze doelstellingen te bereiken zijn 4 studies ondernomen. Drie zijn 
empirisch van aard; één is theoretisch. De empirische studies betreffen twee 
kwantitatieve studies (hoofdstukken twee en drie) gebaseerd op survey data en een 
kwalitatieve studie gebaseerd op secundaire bronnen (hoofdstuk vier). De 
theoretische studie (hoofdstuk vijf) bouwt voort op de inzichten verkregen uit de 
empirische studies. 
Ofschoon ik stel dat het gepostuleerde model belangrijke inzichten 
verschaft met betrekking tot elk willekeurig competitief proces, heb ik gekozen om 
mijn onderzoek te beperken tot de markt voor popmuziek. Naast het feit dat ik de 
markt voor muziek een aantrekkelijker onderzoeksdomein vind dan de markt voor 
koelkasten, bestaat er een aantal methodologische motivaties. Ten eerste is de 
markt voor muziek zeer geschikt voor de doelstellingen van deze studie daar het 
belang van een selector voor commercieel succes uitvoerig erkend wordt en dit 
element nog maar nauwelijks gebruikt is om strategische gedragsvorming te 
verklaren. Ten tweede ondervindt de muziekmarkt dusdanig sterke technologische 
veranderingen (denk aan de ICT revolutie) dat de notie dat er een verschuiving van 
het selectiesysteem kan plaatsvinden plausibel is. 
In de eerste studie (hoofdstuk twee) wordt onderzocht hoe de creatie en 







wordt dat de industrie waarvan de perceptie bestaat dat er relatief weinig waarde 
wordt gecreëerd, maar veel waarde kan worden toegeëigend, bij uitstek de industrie 
is waarheen verticale integratie alsmede nieuwe markttoetreding zich bewegen. Om 
dit verband te onderzoeken is een vragenlijst opgesteld die afgenomen is bij 146 
bedrijven die werkzaam zijn binnen de Nederlandse muziekindustrie. Het blijkt dat 
slechts producenten die een nauwe band onderhouden met de relevante selectoren 
een grotere kans van slagen hebben. In tegenstelling tot de verwachting, blijkt dat 
ICT met name muzikanten weinig extra mogelijkheden kon bieden om meer 
waarde toe te eigenen.  
In de tweede studie (hoofdstuk drie) wordt het commerciële succes 
onderzocht van 215 nieuwe marktactiviteiten van 131 bedrijven werkzaam in de 
Nederlandse muziek industrie. In deze studie wordt gesteld dat het commerciële 
succes in grote mate afhangt van de legitimiteit die de organisatie geniet in de ogen 
van de interne en externe belanghebbers. Deze legitimiteit wordt gemeten aan de 
hand van de verschillende rollen waarmee de ondernemer zich vertrouwd heeft 
gemaakt (waaronder de interactie met de relevante selector) en aan de hand van de 
onderliggende doelstellingen die de ondernemer met deze markttoetreding wil 
bewerkstelligen. Logit, Probit, en Gompit analyses van primaire data suggereren 
dat bepaalde vormen van legitimiteit een beter predictor zijn voor commercieel 
succes dan andere. 
De derde studie (hoofdstuk vier) onderzoekt de case van ‘payola’ aan het 
eind van de jaren ’50 in Amerika. De term ‘payola’ slaat terug op de praktijk van 
het omkopen of verleiden van de (relevante) selector opdat deze de muziek van 
een bepaalde platenmaatschappij oneigenlijke voorrang verleent ten opzichte van 
de muziek van andere platenmaatschappijen. Hoewel payola altijd met argusogen 
werd gevolgd, nam het pas de vorm aan van een schandaal toen aan het eind van 




platenmaatschappijen voor het draaien van muziek. Deze gebeurtenis viel samen 
met de inpalming van TV door de grote platenmaatschappijen, de zogenaamde 
‘majors’, die meenden dat de relevante selector niet de lokale radio DJ was maar 
the new kid on the block: de TV host. De majors bleken echter op het verkeerde 
paard gegokt te hebben en hun marktaandeel slonk snel ten faveure van de kleine 
independents. Het succes van de kleine independents werd verklaard door het 
omkopen van de lokale radio. In dit hoofdstuk wordt nagegaan in hoeverre de 
majors een strategie aanhingen die erop geënt was om de lokale DJ in diskrediet te 
brengen door openlijk de authenticiteit van de DJ in twijfel te trekken. De lobby 
van de majors vond gehoor bij het Amerikaanse congres dat prompt een 
grootschalig onderzoek startte betreffende payola. De authenticiteit bleek de 
achilleshiel van de DJ want toen de omkooppraktijken publiekelijk aanhangig 
gemaakt werden, was hun geloofwaardigheid als de verkondigers van het nieuwe 
establishment niet meer waar te maken. Ze geleken immers meer geldwolven dan 
de bestrijders van het grootkapitaal en de gevestigde orde. Het resultaat van het 
onderzoek was dat de vele DJs van met name de lokale radiostations hun baan 
verloren oftewel in het gevang bellanden. Kort na de hoorzittingen begonnen de 
majors zich te verzoenen met de lokale radiostations met als gevolg dat hun 
marktaandeel weer snel terrein won. 
In de vierde studie (hoofdstuk vijf), staat de ambiguïteit met betrekking tot 
waarde wederom centraal. Dit maal wordt niet alleen de uiteindelijke waarde van 
de finale producten geproblematiseerd maar ook de waarde van de 
productiemiddelen die nodig zijn in het productieproces. In deze theoretische 
studie wordt betoogd dat de strategische managementliteratuur tekortschiet met 
betrekking tot een heldere en eenvormige benadering van het bepalen van de 
waarde van productiemiddelen. Er wordt tevens betoogd dat de huidige theorie 
onvoldoende uitleg verschaft over hoe een productiemiddel tot een competitief 







geen direct verband legt tussen de markt voor productiemiddelen en de markt voor 
producten en zodoende niet inzichtelijk kan maken hoe een productiemiddel kan 
leiden tot een competitief voordeel in de uiteindelijke markt waar de finale 
producten verhandeld worden. Omdat dit verband ontbreekt, kan ook geen 
adequate uitspraak gedaan worden over hoe een productiemiddel van waarde kan 
zijn voor een bedrijf. Er worden drie nieuwe criteria gepostuleerd die gebruikt 
kunnen worden om de waarde van productiemiddelen te bepalen, precies omdat zij 
een direct verband leggen tussen de markt voor productiemiddelen en die voor 
eindproducten. Dit hoofdstuk levert een inzicht op dat de mate waarin de waarde 
van het productiemiddel transparant is voor degene die het ter beschikking stelt, 
mede de organisatievorm van het bedrijf bepaalt. Hiërarchische organisatievormen 
lijken effectiever zolang de waarde van het productiemiddel niet transparant is. 
Echter naarmate deze waarde meer expliciet is, zullen andere organisatiestructuren 
als de marktstructuur en de netwerkstructuur eerder de overhand krijgen. 
Samengevat kan dit proefschrift gelezen worden als een verzameling van 
essays, die onderzoeken in hoeverre de onzekerheid ten aanzien van waarde het 
strategisch gedrag van prducenten beinvloedt. Door het centraal stellen van de 
institutionele structuren die opgetrokken zijn ter reductie van onzekerheid omtrent 
waardebepaling, is getracht betere verklaringen te vinden voor de aard van de 
marktrelaties die totstandkomen tussen de verschillende actoren, alsmede meer 
inzichtelijk te maken welke oorzaken het succes of falen van bepaalde vormen van 
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1 Uncertainty remained an unwelcome guest even in more recent models of exchange. 
Think for instance of the world of Debreu (1959) where it was enough for value to be 
scarce for economic behavior to ensue. 
2 White (1981) on the other hand argued that uncertainty may not result in the 
convergence of economic behavior, but may, on the contrary, elicit differentiating 
strategies on the part of the suppliers who, when faced with limited information about the 
dispositions of their prospective customers, take their competitive position relative to their 
rivals. 
3 Although, the theory of value has been given ample attention within the economic 
discourse, it did not produce an unequivocal reading of value. Marxian, Ricardian and other 
cost-based theories of value hardly provide plausible pointers of how value could be readily 
evaluated by the consumers. Even the more subjective notions of value proposed by 
Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek do not showcase how uncertainty regarding 
value sets in motion an endeavor on the part of the consumers and the producers to 
overcome the potential adverse effects of the decisions that are affected by this uncertainty. 
4 This chapter has appeared as a publication in the Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 
42, No. 2, pp. 251-276, March 2005. 
5 The reader should bear in mind, however, that Figure 2 is an abridged model of the value 
system of the recorded music industries; a more detailed representation could be drawn up, 
including other actors such as, managers/agents, studio musicians, sound engineers/mixers 
and producers. Furthermore, marketing is not listed as a specific value creating activity 
because in principle marketing is an element relevant to every stage in the value system. 
6 Conway Twitty was named after one of the most successful artists of the twentieth 
century in the US. 
7 Bruderl and Schussler (1990) later nuanced the term and argued for a ‘liability of 
adolescence’ as the organizational mortality peaked between one and fifteen years of 
existence. 
8 Here we employ terminology that was originally employed within the ecological literature. 
New entry de ipso was later added to the existing repertoire of new entry de alio and de 
novo, to denote entry that sprouted from existing businesses that were already represented 
in the same industry (Carroll & Hannan, 2000), we argue that the essence of new entry de 
ipso lies in having experience in the target industry. 
9 All other results as well as the used questionnaire are available upon request from the 
authors. 











11 As quoted in Segrave (1994) page 3. 
12 As quoted in Segrave (1994) page 14. 
13 As quoted in Segrave (1994) 
14 Needless to say that in the long run the majors’ firm belief in TV would prove them 
right, as the success of MTV indicates. 
15 This changed after the introduction of Soundscan, a digital point-of-sale technique, 
which registers all the retail sales as they occur (Anand & Peterson, 2000). 
16 The importance of distinguishing among value creation and value capture has also been 
acknowledged within the marketing discipline as well (Mizik & Jacobson, 2003). 
17 Of course there are the obvious physical constraints to the extent to which a firm can 
unbundle its resources. A firm may feel compelled to unbundle ‘in re’ and ‘ante rem’ 
resources, but this may very well be impossible for they may both lie anchored in one 
indivisible unit of human or physical resource. 
